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Specialization and versatility regarding officer negative outcomes have different 
implications for agency policies and practices. Versatility suggests interventions that 
address several problematic behaviors, while specialization may necessitate more 
targeted interventions. If officers who engage in one form of negative behavior are also 
more likely to be involved in other undesired outcomes than co-monitoring behaviors via 
early intervention systems or other mechanisms may be an effective means of identifying 
problematic officers. The threat posed by officer-involved motor vehicle collisions to the 
safety of police and the public has received increased attention from practitioners and 
researchers in the past decade or so. However, we do not know if officers in negative 
outcomes while on duty are also more likely to be in vehicle collisions. This study 
examines these links with a survey of patrol officers and their supervisors in a large 
police department. The findings demonstrate significant effects of citizen complaints for 
reasons other than excessive force but none of the other negative officer outcomes on 
collision involvement. In addition, off-duty collisions and secondary employment 
consistently increase the likelihood of on-duty crashes. The policy implications of these 
findings for reducing officer collisions are discussed at length.
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The amount of specialization in offending is a question with great significance for 
the development of theories of crime and deviance1. Empirical evidence of specialization 
suggests theoretical explanations should be able to account for observed differences in 
offending behaviors. Developmental theories, such as Moffitt’s (1993) taxonomy that 
assumes two groups of offenders, are appropriate for this task. On the other hand, if 
individuals engage in varied manifestations of crime and deviance, an all-encompassing 
framework such as self-control theory as explicated in Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) 
seminal text, A General Theory of Crime, may be better suited to explain their offending 
behaviors. Decades of research on the generality of crime and deviance has established 
that individuals tend not to specialize (Brame, Mulvey, Piquero, & Schubert, 2014; 
Kempf-Leonard, 1987; Paternoster, Brame, Piquero, Mazerolle, & Dean, 1998; Piquero, 
Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Dean, 1999; Sampson & Laub, 1993). However, 
researchers have also demonstrated that versatility is not absolute and important 
differences exist. For instance, Osgood & Schreck (2007) discovered a greater amount of 
specialization among violent offenders than nonviolent offenders, and Lynam, Piquero, 
and Moffitt (2004) found more violent specialization in self-report data than official
                                                          
1 Paternoster, Brame, Piquero, Mazerolle, and Dean (1998) defined specialization as “the 
extent to which an offender tends to repeat the same specific offense or offense type on 
successive criminal events” (p. 133). 
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records2. Overall, the criminological literature contains mixed evidence in support of both 
general and developmental theories of crime and deviance.   
Theoretical explanations of crime and deviance committed by police officers 
specifically are not nearly as well developed. Sherman (1980) sought to develop “a 
substantive theory of police behavior” (p. 94), and summarized quantitative research on 
four police officer behaviors including violence, which he broadly defined as, “justified 
and unjustified use of any physical force (including deadly force) against citizens” (p. 
69). Black (1976, 1980) also took an encompassing approach when he explained the 
conditions under which officers apply the law, while others have taken a narrower slant 
and addressed particular behaviors such as racially-biased decision making (Smith & 
Alpert, 2007). Still, a theory of negative police officer outcomes does not exist.  
One key piece of information that is missing and hindering theories of negative 
police officer behaviors concerns the question of specialization or generalization. We 
simply do not know if officers involved in one type of concerning behavior are also more 
likely to be in other negative outcomes while on duty. This information would be useful 
in determining whether a theory of police deviance should be general in scope or specific 
to a particular negative outcome. Specialization and versatility regarding police officer 
negative outcomes have different implications with respect to law enforcement agency 
policies and practices and therefore hold considerable significance for police practitioners 
and policymakers. Versatility suggests that agencies may be able to design interventions 
that address a wide range of problematic behaviors, while specialization may necessitate 
more targeted interventions. If police officers who engage in one form of negative 
                                                          
2 In comparison, Piquero (2000) found less evidence for specialization among violent 
offenders based on his analyses of official records. 
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behavior are also more likely to be involved in other undesired outcomes than co-
monitoring a wide range of behaviors via early intervention systems (EIS) or other 
mechanisms may be an effective means of identifying problematic officers.  
Police practitioners and policymakers are constantly balancing many demands 
including protecting public and officer wellbeing as well as the image of police in 
society. Today, threats to public safety and support of the police span historical concerns 
such as deadly and excessive force and contemporary additions to the list of negative 
officer outcomes such as officer-involved motor vehicle collisions. As leaders search for 
methods of reducing newly recognized hazards and those that will continue emerging in 
the future, evidence of empirical associations with more traditional concerns may offer 
policy guidance by drawing on ideas from more established areas of research. For 
instance, researchers have found that agencies with more restrictive policies have fewer 
deaths from vehicle pursuits (Alpert, 1997; Crew, Kessler, & Fridell, 1994) and deadly 
force incidents (Fyfe, 1979; Meyer, 1980; Sherman, 1983; Uelmen, 1973). It may be that 
more restrictive policies are also an effective way of reducing other negative officer 
outcomes as well.  
Motor Vehicle Collisions and Other Negative Officer Outcomes 
Police researchers and the American public have always paid close attention to 
officer behaviors with the potential to threaten the lives and prosperity of fellow officers 
and citizens. Research on negative police outcomes has centered on force broadly 
speaking, more specifically deadly force, excessive force, and force that causes injuries. 
Historical changes in the police institution and citizenry have shifted the scope of 
scrutinized police behaviors. Technology has played a key role in the weapons available 
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to police that must be monitored. Among all of the potentially concerning police 
outcomes that have been the subject of empirical investigation, it appears that motor 
vehicle collisions have been overlooked in terms of the threat posed to the safety of 
officers and the public. In recent years, police practitioners and researchers have 
recognized that motor vehicle collisions are among the most harmful police behaviors. In 
this way, motor vehicle collisions are similar to deadly and excessive force, vehicle 
pursuits, and other negative officer outcomes that threaten citizen and officer safety and 
undermine the legitimacy of police. 
There are numerous pieces of evidence to support the hypothesis that officers in 
motor vehicle collisions may also be disproportionately represented among other negative 
outcomes including deadly force, citizen complaints, and vehicle pursuits. To begin, this 
study was inspired by conversations with police leaders and policy makers who 
speculated about the associations between officer-involved vehicle collisions and other 
negative outcomes during 2012 and 2013 meetings of the California Commission on 
Peace Officer Standards and Training (CalPOST) Situation-Appropriate, Focused, and 
Educated (SAFE) Driving Campaign. The knowledge of experienced police officials 
should not be discounted (Sparrow, 2011). This issue was also raised at the June, 2013 
Maryland State Summit on Reducing Deaths, Disabilities, and Injuries to Maryland Law 
Enforcement Officers Engaged in Traffic-Related Activities, which included police 
executives and other delegates from the state and beyond who gathered to produce a 
report to the Maryland Highway Safety Office. The agenda of discussion questions 
included the following: “Does officer, deputy, and trooper behavior behind the wheel 
parallel behavior in other aspects of the job?”, “Can success be achieved by focusing on 
5 
driving safety alone?”, and “Should abuse of the police vehicle be treated in the same 
way as abuse of force?” 
Police agencies have co-monitored numerous negative officer outcomes for many 
years in hopes of identifying and addressing potentially problematic employees. Early 
intervention systems, a common mechanism used by agencies to identify problematic 
officers, operate by monitoring numerous different behaviors at the same time including 
use of force, deadly force, and citizen complaints (Alpert & Walker, 2000; Walker, 
Alpert, & Kenney, 2001). Although it is relatively less common, some agencies also 
include vehicle collisions in their EIS. Of course, agencies have received and investigated 
citizen complaints regarding a variety of different behaviors for many years as well 
(Rojek, Decker, & Wagner, 2015). The Prince George’s County (MD) Police Department 
(PGPD), where this study was conducted, records citizen complaints as an open-ended 
narrative (Prince George’s County, 1991), and ultimately categorizes them into nine 
categories (Prince George’s County Citizen Complaint Oversight Panel, 2014). Many of 
these categories are quite broad. For instance, “conduct related” complaints refer to 
“excessive, unwarranted or unjustified behavior that reflects poorly on the officer the 
department or on the county government, regardless of duty status. This category 
includes allegations of misconduct, unbecoming conduct, and unreported misconduct” 
(Prince George’s County Citizen Complaint Oversight Panel, 2014, p. A1). The approach 
of monitoring comorbidities, or the co-occurrence of negative outcomes, is popular in 
hospitals and the fields of medicine and public health. Finally, agencies have attempted to 
curtail on-duty vehicle collisions with improved officer training, more restrictive policies, 
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and closer supervision and monitoring, all of which are tactics that have been used in the 
past to address other negative outcomes including deadly force and vehicle pursuits. 
Research on negative officer outcomes is often limited to one outcome such as 
deadly force, citizen complaints, pursuits, and more recently motor vehicle collisions. 
However, researchers of negative officer outcomes have tended to focus on the same 
characteristics of officers, agencies, and situations—suggesting particular variables may 
have predictive value across a variety of behaviors. For instance, researchers have 
repeatedly pointed to demographic characteristics such as officer age and gender and 
aspects of agency culture including supervision and enforcement of policies. Sherman 
(1980) summarized quantitative research on detection activities, arrest decisions, service 
behaviors, and violence, and his review of explanatory variables at the individual-, 
situational-, organizational-, community-, and legal-level demonstrated overlap across 
multiple officer behaviors many of which had been used to explain more than type of 
officer behavior. One of the only studies to simultaneously consider officer involvement 
in multiple negative outcomes was conducted in the NYPD by Fyfe and Kane (2006), 
who reviewed files of terminated officers. Several studies based on that research have 
found that officers involved in career-ending forms of misconduct were also more likely 
than their peers to be involved in a range of other problematic on-duty behaviors (Kane & 
White, 2013).  
Research at the officer-level, such as that by Fyfe and Kane (2006), is based on 
the repeated finding that negative outcomes are clustered within a small group of officers, 
which have been termed “bad apples.” Although the reasons for this is debated, it has 
been repeatedly proven that a small proportion of officers cause a majority of negative 
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outcomes in their agencies such as excessive force (Brandl, Stroshine, & Frank 2001; 
Christopher Commission, 1991; Kolts Commission, 1992; Lersch, 1998b, 2002). The 
Christopher Commission (1991) found that only 44 officers out of 8,450 officers 
employed by the LAPD during their study had received 6 or more citizen complaints for 
excessive force. Two-thirds of LAPD officers had received no force complaints over the 
4 year study period (Christopher Commission, 1991). The clustering of problematic 
behaviors among offenders has also been established (e.g., Braga, 2012; Chaiken & 
Chaiken, 1984; Greenwood & Abrahamse, 1982; Peterson & Braiker, 1981; Williams & 
Lucianovic, 1979; Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972). However, we do not know if the 
small groups of officers causing negative outcomes in their agencies are specialists or 
generalists. Walker et al. (2001) conducted a national study of early intervention systems 
in the U.S. including case studies and reported, “It has become a truism among police 
chiefs that 10 percent of their officers cause 90 percent of the problems” (p. 1). Motor 
vehicle collisions also appear to be clustered within a small group of officers who cause a 
disproportionate amount of the total crashes in their respective agencies. In their study of 
844 officers in serious collisions, Rix, Walker, and Brown (1997) found that 233 (28 
percent) had previously been in one other crash and 115 (14 percent) had been in three or 
more vehicle collisions.  
Goals and Overview of this Study 
Today, officer-involved crashes continue to be a substantial yet under-examined 
risk to both citizens and officers in the United States. The longstanding oversight among 
the practitioner and researcher communities and recent recognition of the disastrous 
impact of vehicle collisions involving their officers have placed police managers and 
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supervisors in a position of scrambling for ideas to reduce these events. Among pressing 
questions to police executives is the relationship between officer involvement in motor 
vehicle collisions and undesired officer behaviors such as use of force, vehicle pursuits, 
excessive force incidents, and other behaviors that have resulted in citizen complaints.  
At its core, this study considers whether officers who cause harm with their 
behind the wheel driving behaviors also disproportionately misuse other tools, weapons, 
and powers granted to police but expected to be used judiciously. More specifically, this 
study empirically examines whether officer involvement in vehicle pursuits, deadly force 
incidents, and citizen complaints about a variety of officer behaviors increases the 
likelihood of vehicle collisions. This study uses multivariate analyses to control for 
potentially confounding variables and is broader than the question of specialization in 
officer negative outcomes but it should shed light on this issue. As a group, the 
concerning and potentially costly behaviors examined in this study are referred to as 
negative outcomes, events, and behaviors throughout the following pages. Other terms 
used by prior researchers could also encapsulate negative officer outcomes. For instance, 
Barker and Carter (1994) defined police abuse of authority as “any action by a police 
officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, trespass 
upon human dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal right 
of a member of the police constituency in the course of performing ‘police work’” (p. 7). 
Certainly deadly and excessive force, vehicle crashes, and other negative outcomes have 
tendencies to injure the public. Other researchers have used terms including officer or 
employee misconduct, deviance, and crime (Kane & White, 2013; Kappeler, Sluder, & 
Alpert, 1998). Negative officer outcomes functions as a unifying term because there is 
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general consensus among practitioners, researchers, the public, and other stakeholder 
groups that deadly force, excessive force and other behaviors that result in citizen 
complaints, and vehicle pursuits and crashes are socially undesirable and potentially 
harmful events that should be limited whenever possible.  
The perception that motor vehicle collisions are accidents presents a mental 
roadblock to the idea that they represent negative behaviors and decision-making in the 
same way as excessive force. Although motor vehicle collisions are often referred to as 
accidents—a term which implies a random and unpredictable nature, it is clear that some 
portion of these negative officer outcomes is preventable. For instance, 45.1 percent of 
PGPD officers reported one or more collisions in this study, while 29.6 percent of 
officers reported at least one at-fault collision. A NHTSA study of fatal officer-involved 
collisions in the U.S. from 1982 to 2008 found 931 driver-related factors including 
speeding among the 726 vehicles involved (Noh, 2011). CalPOST reported that one 
driving behavior, operating motor vehicles at unsafe speeds, caused more than 1/3 of the 
over 7,100 injury and fatality collisions from 1997 to 2007 in the state (Gustafson, 2009).  
This study serves several purposes to the academic and practitioner communities 
interested in police vehicle collisions. This research may open or close the door to 
learning about officer-involved vehicle collisions from more established bodies of 
research on other negative outcomes including deadly force, citizen complaints, and 
vehicle pursuits. These outcomes have been the cause of considerable concern among the 
public and have been monitored by police departments and risk managers in the United 
States to detect problematic officers. It is unclear if these undesired behaviors can also be 
useful in identifying officers with problematic driving outcomes. Overall, this research 
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assesses whether officers in negative on-the-job outcomes are disproportionately likely to 
expose their employer to liability and other costs resulting from on-duty vehicle 
collisions. 
This study unfolds over the course of six chapters. Chapter Two reviews the 
current state of knowledge regarding the impact and causes of officer-involved motor 
vehicle collisions. Chapter Three justifies the importance of conducting research on 
negative officer outcomes that threaten public including officer safety as well as trust 
between the police and those they serve. Chapter Three also reviews the extant literature 
on other negative officer outcomes, a body of literature that suggests commonalities 
between involvement in these events and vehicle collisions. Chapter Four details the 
methodological procedures utilized in this study. The site for this research, the Prince 
George’s County (Maryland) Police Department, is described. Measurement of the 
independent and dependent variables is noted and the missing data and analytical 
strategies are detailed. Chapter Five provides the results of four regression models that 
examine the impact of deadly force, complaints for excessive force and other reasons, 
and vehicle pursuits on vehicle collisions among patrol officers in the PGPD. Finally, 
Chapter Six summarizes the significant findings and discusses he policy implications in 





POLICE OFFICER-INVOLVED MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS  
 
It is necessary to justify undertaking this research before turning to the reasons 
that police officer-involved vehicle collisions may be related to other negative outcomes. 
Although little empirical research has been devoted to understanding the causes and 
correlates of officer-involved vehicle collisions, the available research makes one thing 
clear: officer-involved vehicle collisions are threats to public and officer safety. Chapter 
Two begins with details of the human and financial costs of officer-involved vehicle 
collisions in the United States. Next, Chapter Two reviews the extant literature that has 
attempted to explain police crashes. Despite limited information about police crashes 
relative to other negative officer outcomes, it later becomes clear that many of the same 
causes have been implicated in numerous behaviors. 
The Relevance of Officer-Involved Vehicle Collisions 
  Police behaviors with the potential to harm the public and fellow officers have 
always been of paramount concern. The importance of harmful police officer behaviors is 
a consequence of the vital and unique role of public police—reducing the overall amount 
of disorder and acts that threaten the prosperity and safety of citizens. To accomplish 
their goal, police officers are granted authority to use exceptional powers and tools. In the 
United States, police are allowed in certain circumstances to use deadly force, detain and 
arrest citizens, and disregard laws regarding motor vehicle operations on public 
roadways. In turn, officers are trusted to engage in potentially harmful behaviors only to 
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the extent required in accomplishing their mandate—any excesses introduce harm that 
undermines the fundamental purpose of police. This agreement creates the foundation of 
the police-public social contract, which is spelled out in state and federal legal codes, 
agency policies, and court decisions. Perceived and actual violations of this trust have led 
to some of the most significant acts of civil unrest in United States’ history. 
As societal expectations of police have shifted, the officer behaviors that have 
been scrutinized by the public, government, researchers, and other interested parties have 
evolved as well. Concerns regarding officer behaviors focused on serious, deliberate 
officer misdeeds such as brutality and corruption a century ago but have expanded and 
incorporated events that are more commonly encountered in the daily activities of 
officers. Increased attention has also been paid to behaviors that threaten officer safety in 
the field, which have also shifted as technological advances have introduced new tools 
and weapons for police officers and suspects. Many tools used by officers present 
benefits in terms of officer and citizen safety but also hold the potential for misuse. 
Notable examples have included firearms, oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, and conducted 
energy devices (CEDs) (i.e., Taser).  
Perhaps the most significant technological advancement in policing over the past 
century has been the motorized vehicle. However, the potential negative results of police 
motor vehicle operations have not been accorded nearly as much attention as other 
potentially harmful officer behaviors such as use of force in general. The proliferation of 
motor vehicles in the general public during the early 20th century created a public safety 
concern that quickly became a focus of the police (Richardson, 1974). The danger 
associated with motor vehicle collisions was recognized and the police responded with 
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reorganized agencies that dedicated a large portion of manpower and other resources to 
traffic safety (Richardson, 1974). Motorized patrol became a ubiquitous part of policing 
and a visible representation of police. The importance of patrol has increased as 
American’s have continued to embrace automobile ownership as a vital part of daily life 
and commerce. Over the years, police vehicles have provided sanctuaries from 
unfavorable weather, a place to store essential weapons and communications devices, and 
a means of transporting unruly suspects. Motor vehicles may reduce police response 
times, expected to be impacted by travelling speeds to calls (Pate, Ferrara, Bowers, & 
Lorence, 1976)3. However, the benefits of police motor vehicle operation must be 
weighed against the foremost goal of citizen and officer safety because motor vehicle 
collisions frequently cause great harm and suffering.  
The Costs of Officer-Involved Vehicle Collisions 
There is a lack of information available to conduct an ‘apples to apples’ 
comparison of the harm caused by motor vehicle collisions and other negative outcomes 
such as excessive force incidents. In fact, there is an overall deficit in research on motor 
vehicle collisions involving officers, a constant theme of this study. Estimates of the 
number of officers killed in vehicles and on the streets of the United States are available 
at the national level from two sources: the federal government and a non-profit. 
Officer Fatalities 
The primary source of national information about officers killed in the line of 
duty is the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Law Enforcement Officers Killed 
and Assaulted (LEOKA) program. Information regarding officers who have been killed 
                                                          
3 Contrary to their hypothesis, Pate et al. (1976) found no significant effects of officer 
travelling speeds on overall response times. 
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or assaulted is provided by city, county, state, university and college, tribal, and federal 
law enforcement agencies participating in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) 
program. Additional information on officers, suspects, and circumstances is provided by 
FBI field offices and nonprofit groups including the National Law Enforcement Officers 
Memorial Fund (NLEOMF). Data received by the FBI are ultimately classified into 
officers feloniously killed and accidentally killed. Accidental deaths include officers 
killed in falls, aircraft accidents, accidental shootings, and struck by vehicles. More 
germane to this discussion are officers accidentally killed in automobile and motorcycle 
collisions. For the purposes of this research, automobile and motorcycle deaths are 
combined to measure officers killed operating motor vehicles. 
Over the past 20 years, a total of 2,463 police officers died at work in the United 
States, including 1,127 officers killed feloniously and 1,336 accidental deaths (FBI, 
1995-2014). Fortunately, the LEOKA data show a decline in the total number of police 
officers killed annually in the line of duty over this two decade period (see Figure 2.14). 
This drop has occurred in spite of motor vehicle collisions, which do not display the 
downward trend seen in felonious deaths. From 1994 to 2013, 874 police officers were 
killed in motor vehicle collisions (758 in automobiles and 116 on motorcycles), while 
1,127 died in assaults by suspects. On average, 43.7 officers were killed each year in 
motor vehicles from 1994 to 2013, compared with 56.4 officers killed per year 
feloniously during the same period. An average 35.2 percent of annual officer deaths in 
the U.S. during the last 20 years were due to vehicle collisions. The largest number of 
                                                          
4 Trends in Figures 2.1-2.5 are shown using linear lines of best fit. 
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officers killed in crashes over this period was 60 in 2003 and the lowest was 27 in 2013. 
In comparison, officers killed feloniously ranged from 79 in 1994 to 27 in 2013. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. FBI (LEOKA) data on all causes of officer deaths: 1994-2013. 
A more positive picture emerges over the past 10 years with respect to officer 
fatalities as measured by the FBI (2005-2014) and shown in Figure 2.2. The trend of 
decreasing fatal collisions becomes more evident and recent lows were observed in both 
collision-related and felonious deaths. The downward trend in officer fatalities is more 
easily observed in Figure 2.3, which excludes total officer deaths. The average number of 
officers killed in crashes was 42.5 from 2004 to 2013, while the number of officers killed 
by suspects was 51. The numbers of officers killed feloniously and in vehicle collisions 
were equal in 2013 (27)—the safest year for police officers in the United States in 
decades. Still, 37 percent of all officers killed on-duty from 2004 to 2013 were in 

























Figure 2.2. FBI (LEOKA) data on all causes of officer deaths: 2004-2013. 
 
 










































Another source of information regarding American officers killed in the line of 
duty is the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (2015), which maintains 
a monument in Washington, D.C. and an online repository of information. In order to be 
added to the memorial, nomination forms must be signed by agency heads and submitted 
to a committee that reviews the cases for eligibility. Military police and correctional 
officers are eligible only if they were performing normal law enforcement duties or were 
recognized as law enforcement officers by their employers, respectively. Part time 
officers are considered on a case by case basis. Annual figures on the number of officers 
killed are available back to the 1791, but data on the causes of death are only available 
for the past 10 years (NLEOMF, 2015).  
According to the NLEOMF (2015), a total of 1,501 officers died in the line of 
duty from 2004 to 2013. Of those, 504 officers were killed in motor vehicles, which 
included 434 automobile deaths and another 70 motorcycle crash fatalities. Thus, 50 
officers have died each year on average from automobile collisions in the United States 
over the past decade, a higher figure than that found in the FBI’s LEOKA data. In 
comparison, 548 officers were fatally shot, 14 were stabbed, 9 died from terrorist attacks, 
8 were beaten, and 1 each were strangled and poisoned to death during the previous 10 
year period, based on NLEOMF data. Approximately 33.6 percent of all officer deaths in 
the U.S. from 2004 to 2013 according to the NLEOMF (2015) were motor vehicle 
related. The number of officers killed in automobiles ranged from 32 in 2013 to 71 in 






Figure 2.4. NLEOMF data on causes of officer deaths: 2004-2013. 
Overall, the LEOKA and NLEOMF data provide slightly different estimates of 
the numbers of officers killed due to differences in reporting procedures and eligibility 
criteria. However, the overall picture of the prevalence of fatal officer involved collisions 
is alarming: approximately one-third of annual officer deaths in the United States have 
consistently been caused by motor vehicle collisions. Furthermore, officer motor vehicle 
deaths have been declining in recent years to a low in 2013, but have not been declining 
as quickly as deaths from other threats to officer safety. 
Information on fatal officer-involved vehicle collisions is also available from the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), which has agreements with 
state governments to provide information regarding fatal motor vehicle collisions that 
take place on their roadways annually. Crash information is maintained in NHTSA’s 

























annually by NHTSA and includes involvement of emergency vehicles, which are 
categorized as ambulances, fire trucks, or police vehicles. Information regarding officer-
involved vehicle collisions is limited in these annual reports but counts are provided of 
the number of officers and civilians killed (see Table 2.5). In 2011, Noh conducted a 
detailed analysis of officer-involved vehicle collisions in the U.S. from 1980 to 2008 
based on the FARS data. Noh (2011) found that FARS consistently provided a lower 
estimate of officer deaths due to motor vehicles than the LEOKA data due to different 
definitions of police vehicles, a FARS requirement that death take place within 30 days 
of collisions, and variations in state data filing procedures. Still, Noh (2011) reported that 
trends in vehicle deaths from 1980 to 2008 were similar in the FARS and LEOKA data.  
Officer Injuries 
Much less information is available regarding officer-involved vehicle collisions 
that have not resulted in one or more fatalities. The FBI’s LEOKA program only collects 
data on officer injuries that result from assaults and so the number that have resulted from 
vehicle crashes at the national level is unknown. Data from NHTSA’s FARS are limited 
to fatalities. However, recent evidence has suggested that nonfatal collisions, some of 
which result in serious, debilitating injuries to police officers and the public, are 
concerning in scope. Wolfe, Rojek, Alpert, Tiesman, and James (2015) reported that 39 
officers were killed in California but another 7,684 officers were injured in vehicle 
collisions from January, 2000 to December, 2009. This equates to nearly 200 officers 
injured for every 1 officer killed in California behind the wheel between 2000 and 2009 
(Wolfe et al., 2015). An earlier study of California peace officers reported that for each 
officer killed in a vehicle crash there were approximately 100 collisions that resulted in 
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non-fatal officer injuries (Gustafson & Cappitelli, 2010). A smaller ratio of officer 
injuries to deaths was found by Rix et al. (1997), who examined officer-involved 
collisions that occurred in England and Wales from 1990 to 1993 and resulted in 511 
injured officers and 16 officer deaths.  
 Details regarding the injuries sustained by United States’ police officers due to 
vehicle collisions are limited. Wolfe et al. (2015) examined records from the California 
Department of Motor Vehicles and found a total of 35,840 collisions involving peace 
officers had occurred in the state from 2000 to 2009. Wolfe et al. (2015) found that 
collisions over that decade resulted in 7,684 injured officers. A total 9,181 officer injuries 
were reported, including 6,380 complaints of pain, 2,395 other visible injuries, 367 
serious injuries, and 39 fatalities (Wolfe et al., 2015). Between 19.0 and 23.2 percent of 
annual collisions from 2000 to 2009 involving California law enforcement officers 
resulted in one or more officer injuries or fatalities (Wolfe et al., 2015). 
Even less is known about the minor collisions that are most common in police 
departments, including those that result in little or no property damage. Part of the reason 
for this oversight is that collisions without injuries are less harmful on the personal level. 
Another reason is that law enforcement agencies and state departments of motor vehicles 
may require injuries or a certain amount of damage before requiring officers to report 
their collisions. However, overlooking minor vehicle collisions is a costly mistake for 
agencies because of their magnitude. For instance, the Los Angeles Times reported that 
LAPD officers alone were in over 1,250 collisions over a 3 year period (Rubin, 2012). Of 
course, costly damage to police vehicles, civilian vehicles, and other forms of personal 
property can occur without injuries to the individuals involved. Overall, research on 
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officer-involved vehicle collisions that has been limited to crashes resulting in fatalities 
or even injuries to officers has severely underestimated the scope of the problem.  
Citizen Fatalities 
Broadly speaking, motor vehicle collisions are a major public safety threat in the 
United States. The National Center for Injury Prevention and Control reported that 
33,804 Americans were killed in motor vehicle traffic collisions in 2013 (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). This figure is slightly higher than the 32,719 
people NHTSA (2015) estimates were killed in the U.S. in 2013. A 2013 Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report on the leading causes of death in the U.S. 
for 2010 found that “unintentional motor vehicle accidents” were the most frequent cause 
of deaths among the 5 to 9 years, 10 to 14 years, and 15 to 24 years of age groups. They 
were also the leading causes of injury related deaths among all ages (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2013). Motor vehicle collisions were the second leading cause of 
injury related deaths among 6 of the 7 remaining age groups (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2013). However, precise estimates of the number of civilians killed in 
motor vehicle collisions involving police officers in the United States are unavailable. 
The lack of research is shocking considering that several sources have indicated police 
crashes actually result in more deaths to citizens than officers. The British Home Office 
reported that 76 out of 92 deaths (82.6 percent) that resulted from officer-involved 
crashes in the United Kingdom from 1990 to 1993 were members of the public (Rix et 
al., 1997). In a presentation at the 69th Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
Criminology, Hansen, Rojek, Alpert, Wolfe, and Tiesman (2013) reported that 13 people 
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were killed in officer-involved vehicle collisions in California over 2 years (2008-2009) 
and only 5 of them were peace officers.  
The deadly consequences of officer-involved collisions on everyday American 
citizens over time are evident in NHTSA’s (2005-2015) FARS data (see Figure 2.5). 
According to NHTSA, police vehicle crashes killed more citizens than officers during 
each of the past 10 years. From 2004 to 2013, police vehicle collisions caused an average 
of 69.2 citizen deaths and 30.6 officer deaths per year. The maximum number of annual 
citizen deaths was 90 in 2007 and the minimum number of citizens killed in collisions 
with police officers was 50 in 2010. Unlike officer fatalities, the number of citizen motor 
vehicle fatalities increased from 2010 to 2013. In terms of officer fatalities, FARS data 
from 2004 to 2013 show a similar trend as was found in the LEOKA and NLEOMF 
data—an overall decline over the past decade and a low in 2013.
 



















Nonfatal motor vehicle collisions are also extremely costly in the United States. 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2015) estimated that 2,313,000 
people were injured in vehicle collisions on U.S. roadways in 2013. In 2011, motor 
vehicle crashes were the fourth leading cause of nonfatal injuries treated in hospital 
emergency departments in the United States for the 6 age groups from 15 to 65 years and 
older, as well as among the entire population. During 2010 and 2011, the approximately 
3.9 million emergency department visits for motor vehicle collisions accounted for 10.1 
percent of the total injury-related emergency department visits in the United States 
(Albert & McCaig, 2015). Officer-involved vehicle collisions cause considerable nonfatal 
harm among the general public as well but this issue has been largely overlooked. For 
example, Hansen et al. (2013) found that 48.3 percent of serious injuries, 49.9 percent of 
other visible injuries, and 51.6 percent of complaints of injuries that resulted from 
officer-involved collisions in California during 2008 and 2009 were sustained by 
members of the public. Looking abroad, Rix et al. (1997) found officer-involved 
collisions in England and Wales from 1990 to 1993 caused 511 serious injuries to law 
enforcement officers and 514 serious injuries among the greater public. Overall, it 
appears that estimates of the harm caused by officer-involved vehicle collisions that have 
excluded citizens have substantially underestimated the total destruction that has resulted 
from police collisions. 
Financial Costs  
The total extent of the losses due to officer-involved vehicle crashes to surviving 
family members, employing agencies, and greater communities are difficult to quantify 
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but the financial costs can be estimated and are alarming on their own. The National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration conducted a comprehensive study of all vehicle 
collisions in 2000, not just incidents that involved police officers, and reported the total 
cost of a fatal crash was $977,208 (Blincoe, Seay, Zaloshnja, Miller, Romano, Luchter, et 
al., 2002). A follow-up reported that the cost of a fatal collision had risen to $1.4 million 
in 2010, not including lost quality of life (Blincoe, Miller, Zaloshnja, & Lawrence, 2014). 
These estimates of the total cost of a fatal collision in the U.S. included emergency 
services, property damage, medical care, and lost productivity (Blincoe et al., 2002, 
2014). In the cases of police line of duty deaths, surviving family members receive more 
than $333,000 from the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program5 (Public Safety 
Officers’ Benefits Program, 2014). The amount awarded by the federal government is the 
same for officers killed on the streets and in their vehicles. 
 The number of deaths is dwarfed by the number of police officers who have 
suffered debilitating and costly injuries resulting from vehicle collisions. In terms of per 
incident costs, NHTSA estimated each non-fatal crash in the U.S. during 2010 cost 
between $13,000 and $1,100,000 depending on severity, but did not examine police 
officer-involved collisions specifically (Blincoe et al., 2014). Similar to fatal collisions, 
costs have not been calculated specifically for collisions that have involved police 
officers. However, rough estimates based on the number of fatal police collisions and the 
costs per incident in the general public suggest that the costs of these events are 
tremendous. Many of the costs related to officer collisions will be borne by local 
                                                          
5 Officers killed on or after October 1, 2013 receive $333,604.68 from the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance Public Safety Officers Benefits program. Additional benefits vary by 
state, employer, and membership in groups like the National Rifle Association. 
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governments, which employ the majority of police in the United States, and all will 
consume resources that could be used elsewhere. 
The liability resulting from vehicle collisions can also pose considerable costs to 
law enforcement agencies and local governments. For instance, the Los Angeles Times 
reported that the LAPD paid almost $24 million over 9 years in approximately 400 civil 
cases that resulted from officer-involved collisions (Rubin, 2012). Car crashes were the 
reason for one out of four lawsuits filed against the LAPD during this period (Rubin, 
2012). The city only went to trial in a few of these cases, which suggests 
acknowledgment of some liability associated with these collisions (Rubin, 2012). 
Explaining Officer-Involved Vehicle Collisions 
Research into the correlates of officer-involved vehicle collisions is worthy of 
study because of the considerable impact (no pun intended) on members of the public as 
well as officers. The extant literature regarding the causes of on-duty collisions is 
examined in this section but there is a broad deficiency of empirical knowledge and 
research on the topic. Although 425 officers were killed in vehicle crashes in the decade 
from 2004 to 2013, slightly fewer than the 510 killed by suspects (FBI, 2005-2014), and 
an unknown number of citizens have been killed as well, much more attention has been 
devoted to negative consequences of firearms than motor vehicles. In the field of law 
enforcement, the risks posed by the motor vehicle have been largely overlooked 
(Cappitelli, 2015)6. Until recently, researchers of officer use of force and officer safety 
have focused more attention on tools including CED’s and OC spray than on motor 
vehicles. One exception has been research on police pursuit driving specifically (e.g., 
                                                          
6 Conversely, Tiesman, Heick, Konda, and Hendricks (2015) found risk perceptions 
scores for vehicle collisions were significantly higher than those for intentional violence.  
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Alpert, 1987; Alpert, 1997; Alpert & Dunham, 1989). However, police pursuits have 
accounted for only a small portion of the total officer collisions, from about 5 percent 
(Alpert & Dunham, 1989) to 10 percent (Noh, 2011)7. Thus, research limited to pursuit-
related collisions can only provide a partial picture of officer-involved crashes. 
It is unfortunate but true that little is known about the causes or correlates of 
officer-involved vehicle collisions (Stephens, Fielder, & Edwards, 2013). On the positive 
side, heightened interest has also been observed over the past few years among 
practitioners and academics who have partnered to discover means of reducing harmful 
driving behaviors. Examples include the Officer Safety and Wellness group that was 
created by the Bureau of Justice Assistance and Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Research Advisory 
Committee, and the CalPOST SAFE Driving Campaign’s Research Advisory Committee. 
Finally, President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) also included 
hearings on these issues. 
Much of what we know about officer-involved vehicle collisions has been 
provided by two federal and one state organization: the British Home Office (Rix et al., 
1997), the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (Gustafson, 
2009), and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (Noh, 2011). An early 
examination of officer-involved vehicle collisions was conducted by Rix et al. (1997), 
who studied 770 crashes that involved police in England and Wales from 1990 to 1993 
and resulted in 1,025 persons being injured and 92 deaths. More recently, NHTSA (Noh, 
2011) conducted a study of fatal officer-involved collisions in the United States from 
                                                          
7 On the other hand, an examination of 770 collisions in England and Wales found that 39 
percent of serious crashes occurred during a vehicle pursuit (Rix et al., 1997). 
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1980 to 2008, which took the lives of 823 officers. CalPOST was among the first 
practitioner organizations to devote itself to the problem of officer-involved motor 
vehicle collisions. CalPOST established the SAFE Driving Campaign, and created 
partnerships with a group of researchers from the University of South Carolina, 
Washington State University, the University of California – Berkeley, California State 
University – Sacramento, and the University of Colorado Denver. One CalPOST 
contribution to the extant literature focused on driver training but also examined several 
officer-level characteristics (Gustafson, 2009).  
Finally, a handful of research articles have attempted to explain officer-involved 
vehicle collisions in the U.S., including those in the August, 2015 special issue of 
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management that is dedicated 
to police crashes. In fact, most of the studies published in this journal issue were 
conducted by researchers affiliated with the CalPOST SAFE Driving Campaign. The 
diversity of approaches to better understanding officer-involved vehicle collisions is well-
demonstrated by this issue that contains studies that have examined characteristics of 
officers (Hansen et al., 2015; James, 2015; James & Vila, 2015; Wehr, 2015; Wolfe et al., 
2015), incidents (LaTourrette, 2015; Rice, Troszak, & Gustafson, 2015; Wolfe et al., 
2015), organizations (Wehr, 2015), and states (Gustafson, 2015). Looking across this 
body of literature, characteristics that have been blamed for motor vehicle collisions have 
been similar to those that have that have been found relevant to explaining use of deadly 
and excessive force, vehicle pursuits, and citizen complaints—suggesting a potential link 
between these negative officer outcomes. 
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Research Findings Regarding Officer-Involved Collisions 
Several researchers have examined demographic characteristics of officers in 
vehicle collisions. Not surprising considering their representation within law enforcement 
organizations, male officers have been disproportionately involved in serious and fatal 
collisions in the U.S. and abroad. In an analysis of FARS data, Noh (2011) found that 
93.0 percent of officers killed in the U.S. between 1980 and 2008 were male. A study of 
10 years of police crashes in California reported that 91.1 percent involved male officers 
(Wolfe et al., 2015). All 39 officers killed behind the wheel in the study by Wolfe et al. 
(2015) were male. Comparisons to non-involved peers were not made in these studies so 
it is unclear exactly how these figures related to the overall driving officer populations in 
those areas and times. In England and Wales, Rix et al. (1997) found approximately 90 
percent of officers in serious or fatal collisions were male. For comparison purposes, 87 
percent of officers at the time were male. On the other hand, Hansen et al. (2015) found 
nonsignificant gender effects on collisions in their survey of patrol officers in eight 
California agencies. Rice et al. (2015) found that female officers were more likely than 
male officers in California to have been culpable for their collisions. 
Officer age is another demographic variable that has been linked to on-duty 
vehicle collisions. In his classic explanation of police behavior, Sherman (1980) stated 
that “conventional police wisdom holds that younger officers are more aggressive, and 
also more likely to make mistakes than older officers” (p. 71). It is also possible that 
younger officers have received less exposure to the negative consequences of unsafe 
driving. Simply put, they may not have responded to deadly collisions—a sobering 
experience for officers (Tiesman et al., 2015). Rix et al. (1997) reported that officer-
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involved collisions peaked around 25 to 29 years of age and exhibited a steady decline 
afterwards. Overall, 41.0 percent of officers in injury or fatality collisions in the study by 
Rix et al. (1997) were between the ages of 25 and 34. After accounting for the age 
representation of all officers, Rix et al. (1997) concluded that serious collisions were 
more common among younger officers. For instance, individuals over 40 year of age 
represented 33 percent of officers in the U.K. but accounted for only 15 percent of 
serious collisions (Rix et al., 1997). More recently, Rice et al. (2015) found that younger 
drivers were significantly more likely than officers aged 50 years or older to be culpable 
for their collision involvement. 
Regardless of the underlying reasons why age is associated with crashes, similar 
arguments also appear to apply to officer experience. In fact, Hansen et al. (2015) 
included measures of officer age and experience on their survey of California officers but 
could not model the effects of both variables due to multicollinearity issues. 
Nonsignificant effects of officer experience on any on-duty collision involvement and on-
duty collision frequency were reported by Hansen et al. (2015).  
Officer rank has also been examined in relation to vehicle collisions. Rix et al. 
(1997) found that 86 percent of officers in serious collisions were constables as compared 
with 76 percent of all officers in the U.K. at the time. Rix et al. (1997) also suggested that 
the relationship they found between age and collisions was because younger officers were 
more likely to be at the rank of constable and to be assigned an operational role—both of 
which demand more driving and therefore place young officers at greater risk for 
collisions. Hansen et al. (2015) also noted that younger officers are more likely to be 
working in patrol, typical among entry-level officer assignments, and therefore face 
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increased exposure to driving-related issues including collisions all else being equal. 
Hansen et al. (2015) found that supervisors were significantly less likely than patrol 
officers to be in 1 or more as opposed to 0 collisions as well as 2 or more versus 0 
collisions. In fact, officer rank was one of only three consistently relevant variables in the 
models presented by Hansen et al. (2015).  
Another body of literature that holds promise with respect to reducing officer-
involved collisions considers the effects of officer fatigue. Much of this research has been 
conducted by Vila and colleagues, who have studied effects on officer fatigue that 
secondary employment (Vila, 2000, 2009; Vila & Kenney, 2002), excessive hours on-
duty (Vila, 2000, 2006 2009; Vila & Kenney, 2002; Vila, Kenney, Morrison, & Reuland, 
2000), and shift work (Amendola, Weisburd, Hamilton, Jones, & Slipka, 2011; Vila, 
2006). In turn, officer fatigue has been shown to have negative effects on officer safety, 
health, and on-duty accidents (Vila et al., 2000). In fact, the effects of fatigue on officer 
performance levels have been compared with the effects of alcohol (Vila, 2000, 2009; 
Vila & Kenney, 2002). The relationship between officer fatigue and collisions were 
recently considered in experiments conducted by James and Vila (2015), who found 
significantly worse post-shift driving performance among officers working night shifts 
than day shifts. A study by Rajaratnam, Barger, Lockley, Shea, Wang, Landrigan et al. 
(2011) reported that 40 percent of officers had sleep disorders—approximately twice the 
rate among the general public. 
Other studies have examined the relevance of training on driving. For instance, 
research conducted in California found that officers who completed an Emergency 
Vehicle Operations Course (EVOC) or Law Enforcement Driving Simulator (LEDS) 
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were significantly less likely to be in collisions (Gustafson, 2009). Alternatively, Rix et 
al. (1997) found that the most qualified “advanced level” drivers were in more serious 
collisions than the least trained “basic level” drivers and concluded that “there would 
appear to be no simple relationship between driving skills and involvement in serious 
accidents” (p. 19). Rix et al. (1997) add that “this apparently paradoxical situation is, 
however, explained in terms of the types of activity each group was involved in” (p. 19), 
because advanced drivers were more likely to be in pursuits than basic drivers. 
Furthermore, advance drivers were actually less likely than basic drivers to strike 
vehicles or people during pursuits (Rix et al., 1997). The finding that officers with more 
driving training and experience may be placed in more dangerous situations should be 
kept in mind when considering the effects of age and experience on collisions. 
With the return of war veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq, law enforcement 
agencies may receive more applications from potential employees with military 
experience in the near future. It has been suggested that combat veterans may have 
unique difficulties driving safety, particularly in the period immediately following 
deployment. The United States’ Army Medical Department (2011) focused on safe 
driving among veterans in a publication titled, “Post-Combat Driving: The American 
Road.” The publication reported a survey of combat veterans found 25 percent had 
disregarded stop signs, 49 had become anxious when cars approached too quickly, and 20 
percent had been anxious during routine driving during the previous 30 days. The Army 
argued the driving behaviors that kept soldiers safe at war were the same behaviors that 
threatened their safety back home. Although the paper did not explicitly discuss the 
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mechanisms behind this unsafe driving at home, it referred to feelings of stress, anxiety, 
frustration, and anger (United States Army Medical Department, 2011). 
 Researchers have also examined how agency driving culture may impact 
individual officers’ safe driving and collision involvement. Wehr (2015) conducted 
interviews with California officers and found that aspects of agency culture that were 
related to collisions included morale, field training, supervision, and adherence to policies 
and procedures. Hansen et al. (2015) also studied the effects of supervision and 
enforcement concerning agency driving policies on collisions, but used a survey of patrol 
officers in eight California agencies. Hansen et al. (2015) found significant effects of 
perceived likelihood of supervisory enforcement of speeding and technology-use (cell 
phone use for calls and texting) policies on self-reported collision frequency. There were 
no discernable effects on collisions for supervision and enforcement of policies regarding 
seatbelt use or code driving (Hansen et al., 2015). 
 A few studies have considered influences at the situational- or environmental-
level. One variable that appears relevant to this study is time of day. For instance, Wolfe 
et al. (2015) found that officer-involved collisions over a one decade timeframe in 
California were most likely to have occurred between noon and 6pm, and suggested that 
this may be due to evening rush hour traffic. The research by Wolfe et al. (2015) suggests 
that collisions may be related to citizen demand, risk exposure, and opportunity. 
Conclusion 
The tools available to police officers to accomplish their mandate have changed 
dramatically over the history of police, among the most notable being the addition of the 
motor vehicle to daily patrol and many other functions. Indeed, motor vehicles have 
33 
become an omnipresent aspect of policing in the United States and have drastically 
changed the daily routines of officers. Although vehicles are a relatively new tool and 
weapon in the field of law enforcement, crashes have been quickly climbing to the top of 
the list of problematic police events. Indeed, officer-involved vehicle collisions pose 
considerable threats to officer and public safety on American roadways. Over the past 
decade, motor vehicle collisions accounted for 42.5 percent of all officer deaths in the 
United States while 51.0 percent of line-of-duty deaths were caused by felonious assaults 
(FBI, 2004-2013). In some areas, officer-involved vehicle collisions have been found to 
have caused more deaths to citizens than officers (Hansen et al., 2013). The number of 
serious and minor injuries to members of the law enforcement community and general 
public is far greater than the number of fatalities, and although these collisions are less 
distressing in personal terms, the financial burden to families, agencies, and communities 
should not be discounted. Overall, many of the costs associated with officer-involved 
vehicle collisions are borne by members of the public, a problem that could potentially 
threaten the vital yet tenuous trust between the police and the public. In fact, traffic safety 
has become a foundational role of police in the United States (Richardson, 1974). Despite 
the dangers to public and officer safety, little research has been conducted in this area. 
For this reason alone, police crashes are worthy of the level of investigation that has been 
afforded other harmful events. Still, many variables that appear to predict collision 




LINKING VEHICLE COLLISIONS TO OTHER NEGATIVE OFFICER OUTCOMES 
 
Based on the personal and financial damage caused to officers, their families, 
agencies, and the general public, it appears that officer-involved vehicle collisions are 
quickly climbing to the forefront of concerning behaviors. However, potential for harm to 
officers and agencies is not the only connection between officer involvement in vehicle 
collisions and other undesired behaviors. Although differences exist, there exist several 
reasons to support the hypothesis that the same officers involved in collisions are also 
disproportionately represented among their peers in other negative outcomes including 
deadly and excessive force, citizen complaints, and vehicle pursuits.  
Exploring the links between these events is the purpose of Chapter Three. The 
chapter begins with a discussion of the role of police. Next, Chapter Three turns to the 
importance of monitoring undesired police behaviors in the United States. The remainder 
of this chapter pieces together the various pieces of evidence that suggest officers 
involved in vehicle collisions may also be disproportionately represented among the 
causes of other undesired outcomes in their employing agencies. First, similarities in 
explanatory variables are explored across several negative outcomes. Second, likenesses   
in agency responses to negative officer outcomes are discussed.  
The Relevance of Negative Officer Outcomes 
The balance of individual freedoms with governmental control over citizens forms 
the keystone of democratic government. The modern, democratic institution known as the 
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police was named after the ancient Greek city-state or polis, where societal development 
and prosperity required former strangers to live together in a mutually-beneficial manner. 
Social norms arose including the reduction of violence and other coercive acts that had 
formerly been accepted means of settling disputes between private parties. Reduced 
violence and other antisocial acts had the ability to increase societal order and economic 
success so the need naturally arose for a public body that could intervene justly and fairly 
between private parties, often at their own request, when no other legal or legitimate8 
recourse was available. Certain aspects of public police, an institution comprised of 
individuals nested in organizations, naturally emerged as agents of many governments. 
The foundation of these public bodies was built on achieving the societal goal of 
decreased disorder and violence. 
Democratic public police and their inseparable coercive powers originally arose 
from the citizenry. The institution was a natural governmental response to societal needs 
and later citizen requests for a public entity that promoted order and justice by 
intervening in private, volatile situations for which there was no other solution. Bittner 
(1970) described police activities as addressing, “Something-that-ought-not-to-be-
happening-and-about-which-somebody-had-better-do-something-now” (p. 39). Thus, the 
legitimacy of the institution has been and always will be based on citizen’s views 
regarding the police success in reducing actions that could damage the internal integrity 
of societies.  
                                                          
8 Tyler defined legitimacy as “a psychological property of an authority, institution, or 
social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, 
and just” (2006, p. 375). 
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The police must balance their use of legally authorized tools provided to them as 
agents of government, many of which have been banned from all other citizens, and their 
role in reducing those same behaviors among the public. Logically, police should use the 
minimal amount of force necessary to accomplish their function because any excesses 
pose risks to overall societal prosperity and order, which thereby undermine the purpose 
of the police institution. As Skolnick (1999) observed, “Order achieved through 
democratic policing is concerned not only with the ends of crime control, but also with 
the means used to achieve those ends” (p. 1).  
Because the role of police is to protect the public, force and other undesired acts 
can be legitimately used to protect themselves and others and thereby increase 
community safety (Adams, 1999). Legally and socially authorized use of non-negotiable 
coercive powers over citizens characterizes the police occupation across the world 
(Bittner, 1970). Klockars (1985) explained, “No police anywhere has ever existed, nor is 
it possible to conceive of a genuine police ever existing, that does not claim a right to 
compel other people forcibly to do something. If it did not claim such a right, it would 
not be a police” (pp. 9-10). Bittner drew analogies to medical doctors, the only people 
with authority to prescribe federally-controlled drugs, and priests, the only citizens who 
administer sacraments (Brodeur, 2007).  
Police are different from other occupations with distinct authorities because their 
powers are non-negotiable but interactions with members of medical and religious 
communities, on the other hand, are voluntary (Brodeur, 2007)9. Police officers are also 
granted exceptional powers to detain and arrest citizens, thereby taking their liberty, in 
                                                          
9 Max Weber in 1919 defined the state by its monopoly on legitimate force (Weber, 
Owen, Strong, & Livingstone, 2004). 
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order to satisfy their mandate of law enforcement. American police officers are given 
discretion to use coercive and even deadly force, and possess a variety of lethal and non-
lethal weapons in their arsenal. Adams (1999) notes, “However, the amount of force used 
should be proportionate to the threat and limited to the least amount required to 
accomplish legitimate police action” (p. 1). Bratton (1999), former chief of the NYPD 
and LAPD, stated, “There is no more difficult challenge in a free society than the 
legitimate exercise of force” (p. 19).  
Negative Officer Outcomes in the United States 
The United States has provided a unique case study of the importance of 
legitimate government actions and the classic balance of individual freedom with societal 
order. The U.S. was founded by individuals seeking to escape the oppression of 
government over their lives. The American Revolution involved armed rebellion against 
the ruling English government that had become illegitimate in the eyes of many citizens 
due to unjust intrusions into private lives and commerce. Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
began shaping this country by defining and limiting the powers of government. The First 
and Second Amendments to the Constitution grant citizens’ rights to speak out against 
and bear arms to oppose, respectively, unauthorized government intrusions into their 
lives. The Fourth through Eighth Amendments, one-half of The Bill of Rights, among 
other things limited the actions of domestic government agents and members of the 
criminal justice system including police. Originally intended with respect to the federal 
government, most of these constitutional provisions have been applied to the states 
because of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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Less than one hundred years later, the American Civil War was fought to decide 
the role of the federal government in state and private affairs. The point is that American 
police emerged in a society that was established because of and has remained ever-
concerned with excessive power of government actors over individual citizens (Stephens, 
2011). Police in England on the other hand were established at a time when citizens 
viewed their government with a great deal of legitimacy (Manning & Van Maanen, 
1978). The practical implications of police being viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the 
public they serve will be addressed shortly. 
Growth in emerging American cities led to increased crime and disorder but a 
lack of support existed for the establishment of what would now be considered an 
organized police force   because immigrants were concerned with government power 
over individual citizens. Early American settlers from Western Europe maintained close 
ties, communication, and trade with their birthplaces, especially London. The birth of 
modern, democratic public police is usually associated with the Parliamentary Police Act 
of 1829 authored by Sir Robert Peel in metropolitan London, England. Eventually, cities 
in the Northeast borrowed English concepts such as the night watch, sheriff, and 
constable.  
Unique aspects about American police formation created conditions and fostered 
concerns that remain the focus of research and other stakeholder attention regarding 
police officer behavior. The historical basis for the formation of the American nation, the 
way the police role has been defined in this country, and the impact of several police 
reform movements and court decisions made a substantial impact on the American police 
institution during the 20th century. Considering the historical backdrop, it is no surprise 
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that research and general interest about coercive police officer actions has been 
concentrated in the United States.  
American public police arose from societal desire for a mechanism of reducing 
internal violence and other forms of disorder primarily during the mid-1800’s. However, 
early American experiments with policing suffered from the same problems they were 
created to address. Violence was a hallmark of American policing during the 19th 
century—it was used by private parties against the police and was expected in return 
(Walker, 1998). Police violence against citizens was unpunished and increased hostility 
towards the institution (Walker, 1992). Subsequent police organizations that popped up 
during Westward Expansion embraced self-protection and frontier justice (Manning & 
Van Maanen, 1978). The discretionary authorization of coercive powers and an unclear 
police mandate allowed brutality and corruption to reign as officers carried out the 
political and financial whims of the elite (Alpert & Dunham, 2004), largely free of legal 
repercussions (Reiss, 1970).  
The Progressive Movement of the early 20th century ushered in efforts to define 
and maintain the proper role of police in the United States and was led by reformers such 
as chiefs August Vollmer and O. W. Wilson and President Hoover. Hoover established 
the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, also known as the 
Wickersham Commission in 1929 and the resulting chapter, “Lawlessness in Law 
Enforcement,” described how brutality was extensively practiced by police officers in the 
United States (National Commission on Law Observance & Enforcement, 1931). The 
Progressive Movement cast a spotlight on the lack of legitimacy with which the police 
were viewed by the American public. It was clear that unauthorized applications of their 
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unique authorities including corruption and excessive use of force necessitated a defined 
police role. A second aspect of this reform was that police were to be viewed as 
professionals, a prerequisite of which was self-regulation. In fact, this wave of political 
and social reform through the 1960’s became known as the era of self-regulation (Alpert 
& Dunham, 2004).  
The Wickersham Commission and Progressive Movement decreased violence and 
corruption among American police by ushering in a professional reform among the 
institution. However, the reform movement had two unintended consequences: it allowed 
police to define their role in terms of crime and law enforcement and it permitted internal 
regulation. American public police have been granted considerable coercive powers as a 
public body as well as the authority to exercise those powers in a largely discretionary 
and open-ended manner with little supervision or oversight in order to reduce crime. 
Some of this discretion is the result of America’s preoccupation with local control over 
government officials but much resulted from the Progressive Movement and 
professionalization movements.  
Internal regulation largely disappeared from police departments when major 
social movements including protests of the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s resulted in violent and lethal conflicts between American 
citizens and police. Nearly all of the major riots between 1964 and 1968 were the result 
of encounters between police and citizens (Feagin & Hahn, 1973). This era revealed 
another difference between English and American models of police according to 
Manning & Van Maanen (1978): the former respected ethnic diversity while the latter did 
not. The National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders (1968), commonly known as 
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the Kerner Commission, and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of 
Violence (1969) were convened to investigate the riots and the police role in these events 
and concluded the police had used far too much force against citizens.  
American police history has been further marked by instances of unauthorized use 
of coercive force against the citizenry and responses in the shape of reform movements. 
A 1989 riot occurred in the city after a Miami police officer stopped and killed a Black 
motorcyclist (Schmalz, 1989). In 1992, the acquittal of four LAPD officers who were 
videotaped beating motorist Rodney King also resulted in rioting in major cities including 
Los Angeles and Atlanta, and the Christopher Commission (1991) was formed in 
response. It is no surprise that a casual glance at the history of policing in the United 
States, as well as commentary and research on police, clearly demonstrates a principal 
desire to define proper officer behaviors as well as limit and punish improper applications 
of that authority.  
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 authorized the 
United States Department of Justice to investigate police departments for patterns and 
practices of undesired behaviors such as excessive force. Some investigations have led to 
formal consent decrees between agencies and the USDOJ. The consent decrees vary 
between jurisdictions but many require police to improve their data reporting and 
collection systems for deadly force events, pursuits, and other concerning actions. 
Additionally, many agencies have been required to implement early warning systems to 
track and detect problematic officer behaviors (Police Executive Research Forum, 2013).  
Shifts in police strategies have occurred over the history of American police in 
hopes of reducing negative officer outcomes. Many police reformers have recommended 
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closer contact with citizens to improve the behaviors of police officers and one notable 
shift in police tactics has been the establishment of Community Oriented Policing (COP) 
in many U.S. cities. Community policing requires communities and police to work 
together and increase responsiveness and accountability (Adams, 1999). Some 
communities have sought to restrict police use of force (Adams, 1999). Reducing police 
misconduct was another goal of some agencies in implementing community policing 
(Lersch, 2005). According to Bittner, community policing has forced American police to 
increasingly include peacekeeping in their role and to grant some authority over their 
actions to the people (Brodeur, 2007).  
Another contemporary movement in policing strategy was the emergence of 
Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), which shifted the focus from means to ends. However, 
POP also emphasized the importance of working with citizens to produce safety and 
order (Goldstein, 1990). It has been suggested that within the framework of POP, 
perpetrators of misconduct may be viewed as one type of problem (Walker et al., 2001). 
Both POP and COP have further increased public expectations of the police in terms of 
both means and ends. Officers working in these frameworks have also been expected to 
maintain closer relations with community members, thereby increasing the importance of 
legitimate and illegitimate officer behaviors.  
Another policing strategy has been more aggressive tactics and zero tolerance, 
ideas based on broken windows theory (Adams, 1999). Broken windows involves 
focusing on less serious quality of life and order maintenance offenses but concern has 
been raised that attention to a broader group of non-serious offenders will increase the 
amount of force and abusive force used by police (Adams, 1999). Even though American 
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police have defined their mandate as law enforcement, even the most noted police 
practitioners in this nation have argued that the end measure of crime control should not 
be the only concern (Bratton, 1999). Rather, police should be concerned about the means 
used to achieve these crime outcomes as well (Bratton, 1999; Skolnick, 1999). 
Police officer-involved vehicle collisions are socially undesirable and should be 
minimized. Still, such outcomes are commonly accepted by practitioners and larger 
society as unfortunate but inevitable results of the police role and mandate. Gradually, 
this blasé attitude has shifted and today police are held to the highest professional and 
personal standards yet. In addition to evolving public expectations, highly publicized 
crashes and research on less visible but more common officer collisions have 
demonstrated the negative impact of these events on agencies and the public.  
Negative Officer Outcomes and Police Effectiveness 
The significance of individual acts of police misconduct has been shown to have 
negative impacts beyond threats to the liberty and freedom of citizens and the existence 
of the police institution itself. Indeed, the negative impact of police misconduct is varied 
and far-reaching. In the past 50 years, police officer behaviors in the form of excessive 
force against citizens have led to riots in many of America’s major cities (Feagin & 
Hahn, 1973). These events have created negative publicity, led to expensive litigation, 
created operational difficulties for addressing those volatile situations, and reformed 
entire police organizations. Those riots also inspired the belief that citizens obeyed laws 
and cooperated with police only when they viewed the institution with legitimacy (Reiss, 
1971).  
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Research by Tyler (1990) showed compliance with the law depended upon 
legitimacy and legitimacy depended on the fairness of agents of the law including police. 
Empirical research on police-citizen encounters has also supported this finding and found 
citizens were more likely to comply with police demands (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 
1996; McCluskey, Mastrofski, & Parks, 1999) and assist police by reporting crimes 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008) when they viewed police as legitimate. A 
meta-analysis by Mazerolle, Bennett, Davis, Sergeant, & Manning (2013) identified eight 
evaluations of police interventions based on procedural justice principles that were 
designed to increase cooperation (N=2) or compliance (N=6) with police. The 
evaluations were based on data collected from community (N=1), offender (N=4), and 
victim (N=1) samples. Mazerolle et al. (2013) found seven out of eight increased either 
cooperation or compliance with the police.  
Beyond the individual encounter, researchers have also shown that police 
legitimacy is positively related to citizen-reported satisfaction and confidence in the 
institution and perceived effectiveness in crime prevention (Tyler, 2004). Bayley (2002) 
argued, “In order to become effective at preventing crime, police need to be protective of 
human rights so that they can enlist the willing cooperation of the public” (p. 143). A 
procedural justice model of policing has proposed the use of procedural justice principals 
when interacting with citizens as a way to increase compliance with the law and 
cooperation with the police without threats of force or fear of punishment (Schulhofer, 
Tyler, & Huq, 2011). 
Researchers have also shown that perceptions of police legitimacy were related to 
crime rates in the jurisdictions they patrolled. Kane (2005) conducted research in New 
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York City and disaggregated the 74 precincts into low, high, and extreme disadvantage 
using U.S. Census Bureau data. He operationalized police legitimacy as the number of 
instances of career-ending police misconduct recorded by the NYPD from 1975 to 1996. 
Kane (2005) found no relationship between misconduct and violent crime in low 
disadvantage neighborhoods. In high disadvantage neighborhoods police misconduct had 
a significant effect on violent crime and in extreme disadvantage communities police 
misconduct had a strong effect on violence. In fact, police misconduct was the strongest 
predictor of violent crime in his models. Ethnographic researchers, such as Elijah 
Anderson (1999), have also explained how a lack of faith in police leads residents of 
inner city neighborhoods to engage in criminal behaviors as a means of protecting 
themselves.  
Undesired police behaviors, even those committed by officers with laudable 
intentions, may lead to antisocial responses by the public and thereby increase the 
difficulty of achieving public safety and crime control. Bayley (2002) argued, “when 
police violate the rule-of-law…they also raise the likelihood that encounters with the 
public will generate hostility and violence” (p. 143). Bayley (2002) concluded “that it is 
in the interests of the police, both individually and collectively, to adhere to the rule-of-
law…In short, a stronger, evidence-based case can be made that defending human rights 
enhances police effectiveness than that doing so hampers it. Illegality in policing is a 
risky and generally unproductive strategy” (p. 146). In a comprehensive review of 
research on police use of force published by the National Institute of Justice, Adams 
(1999) described the relationship between the police and public as follows: 
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“Police are drawn from the community, and as police they continue to operate as 
members of the community they serve. The community, in turn, enters into a solemn and 
consequential relationship with the police, ceding to them the power to deprive persons of 
‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ at a moment’s notice and depending on them 
for public safety. Without police, the safety of the community is jeopardized. Without 
community support, police are dispossessed of their legitimacy and robbed of their 
effectiveness” (p. 1). 
A tarnished reputation in the eyes of the public is not the only harm to law 
enforcement agencies when officers exceed their powers and violate the rights of citizens. 
Liability in the form of civil settlements has demonstrated that undesired officer events 
can also have a negative impact on effectiveness by damaging budgets. For instance, 
Bayley (2002) reported legal liability for misconduct in New York City from 1994 to 
2002 at $176.9 million. Bayley (2002) also cited an article in the Los Angeles Times that 
estimated liability from the Rampart scandal alone at $125 million. These funds could 
have been used on salaries for additional officers, increased training and safety 
equipment, and other more effective ways. An unpublished paper by Skolnick in 2001 
reported that Los Angeles may vacate up to 1,500 convictions due to the Rampart scandal 
as well. Again, this represents a considerable loss of public resources. Weisburd et al. 
(2001) summarized the problem and wrote, “Every year, incidents of police abuse of 
authority cost local communities tens of millions of dollars in legal damages. Tax dollars 




Monitoring Co-Occurring Negative Officer Outcomes 
Concern in the United States regarding unwarranted police officer use of force 
and coercion, especially against minority and young citizens, has been reflected in the 
great deal of attention from the police practitioner and researcher communities over the 
past 50 years. The courts also played a significant role in calling for less harmful police 
and holding offending officers and agencies accountable. Beginning around 1970, federal 
funding has spurred research on negative officer behaviors including deadly force, 
excessive force, racial profiling and other forms of citizen maltreatment, and vehicle 
pursuits. Police agencies have responded with increased training, more restrictive 
policies, and sweeping changes in accountability mechanisms. Agencies have improved 
channels for receiving information regarding negative officer behaviors from citizens and 
have used early intervention systems to monitor officers disproportionately involved in 
negative outcomes.  
The fields of medicine and public health have closely monitored the co-
occurrence of undesired outcomes, which is termed comorbidity, in rating the 
performance of organizations such as hospitals. In criminal justice, the expected 
correlation between officer involvement in vehicle collisions and in other undesired 
behaviors has been manifested in many ways by police leaders including the increased 
deployment of early intervention systems (EIS), also known as early warning systems 
(EWS). These tools vary enormously but are designed to identify problematic officers, 
most often by tracking officer representation in formal citizen complaints filed with their 
employing agencies (Walker et al., 2001). In fact, early intervention systems that track 
complaints about a variety of behaviors they view as unacceptable have been required as 
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conditions of federal consent decrees between police agencies and the United States 
government. Some agencies also include other forms of internal data such as peer 
complaints and internal investigations, vehicle pursuits, firearm discharges, conducted 
energy device use, and other non-deadly and lethal force events.  
Although little empirical investigation has been devoted to the causes and 
correlates of officer-involved crashes, many findings from the broader literature that has 
examined undesired police behaviors appear applicable to explaining vehicle collisions as 
well. Another one of the emerging findings regarding officer-involved vehicle collisions 
is that some portion are caused by officer actions that have violated agency policies. Is it 
possible that those officers who violate agency driving policies may also violate policies 
related to use of force and other important officer activities? Agencies’ risk managers 
have also recently instructed practitioners to simultaneously monitor a host of other 
concerning but less costly on-duty behaviors in hopes of reducing civil liabilities from 
crashes, which in some agencies have averaged millions of dollars per year (Rubin, 
2012).  
The Prevalence of Negative Officer Outcomes 
Promoting a safe society was the original motivation for forming the police 
institution, which still derives much of its legitimacy from citizens’ views regarding the 
extent to which police officers help accomplish this function. Political and social unrest 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s challenged the ability of police to regulate themselves and 
created another shift in American policing that would open the door to external oversight 
and interested independent researchers. Police organizations have increasingly kept data 
on undesired police events often as partial conditions of consent decrees with the United 
49 
States Department of Justice (Police Executive Research Forum, 2013). The federal 
government responded to social unrest with increased funding for research on police use 
of force, deadly force, and other potentially concerning topics. The combination of 
funding and data increased the motivation and ability of researchers to study police.  
Negative officer outcomes have been studied using a variety of methods that have 
generated inconsistent estimates of events such as use of force, as might be expected. 
Police actions such as use of force and collisions are difficult to measure observationally 
because they are rare events. Observing a sufficient number of incidents may be 
expensive and time consuming. In addition to being infrequent, many actions such as 
corruption take place in private or in virtual space. The sensitive nature of misconduct 
events may also introduce bias due to reactivity, a problem confronting all observational 
studies where the subjects know they are being observed. Because of these difficulties, 
observational studies of police misconduct have typically been one part of larger 
examinations of police behavior. For instance, Reiss (1968), who served as research 
director for President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, studied police-citizen encounters in Boston, Chicago, and 
Washington, D.C. during 1966. Reiss was interested in the ways citizen age, race, gender, 
and class, demeanor, role in the encounter, emotional state, and sobriety impacted police 
demeanor or “manner,” which included formal behaviors and informal actions such as 
threats (Friedrich, 1977). Observers collected data on 840 eight hours shifts that included 
3,955 encounters with 11,422 citizens (Friedrich, 1977). 
Others have studied negative officer outcomes with official law enforcement 
agency data. Fyfe and Kane (2006) examined misconduct in the NYPD from 1975 to 
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1996, which was operationalized as personnel records that indicated employment 
termination. The study period was roughly anchored by the endings of the Knapp 
Commission (1972) and Mollen Commission (1994) and included officers involved with 
both scandals (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). The study first identified all officers who had been 
separated from the NYPD for misconduct during the time frame, a total of 1,542 (Fyfe & 
Kane, 2006). Next, each of these officers was matched to a randomly selected member of 
their respective academy classes from 1948 to 1996 (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). Several other 
publications have been based on these data as well (e.g., Kane & White, 2009, 2013). 
Overall, two conclusions from the body of research on negative officer outcome 
prevalence are relevant to this study: negative officer outcomes (1) are rare in the United 
States and (2) are clustered within small groups of officers who have accounted for 
disproportionate amounts of unwanted outcomes in their agencies. 
Negative Officer Outcomes are Rare in the United States 
Judging from the extensive negative effects that undesired police behaviors have 
had in the United States, one may suspect that such actions are common but this is not the 
case. The lack of standard definitions for officer actions such as use of force in addition 
to the observational, self-report, and official police records that have been used to 
measure these events has resulted in varied estimates. Still, it is clear that police use of 
force, misconduct, and other undesired events are rare in the U.S. The National Institute 
of Justice reviewed prior research on police use of force and concluded that the belief that 
police use force infrequently is known with substantial confidence as fact (Adams, 1999).  
In 1977, political scientists Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker collected information on 
police-citizen encounters in 24 departments in the metropolitan areas of Rochester, New 
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York, St. Louis, Missouri, and Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida for the Police Services 
Study (PSS). Worden and Shepard (1996) reanalyzed the PSS data and found excessive 
force in approximately one percent of police-citizen encounters (Worden, 1996). An 
observational study by Bayley and Garofalo (1989) reported information about 467 
potentially violent encounters between NYPD officers and citizens, 37 of which resulted 
in use of force (7.9 percent).  
Other estimated use of force rates have been based on official police or criminal 
justice records. A longitudinal study of employment termination records found 1,543 
NYPD officers were dismissed for misconduct from 1973 to 1996, a group that 
represented about 2 percent of the 78,000 total officers employed by the NYPD during 
the 22 year study period (Kane & White, 2013). The Christopher Commission (1991), 
one of the more famous investigations of a police agency that focused on the LAPD after 
the beating of motorist Rodney King, found that force was used in 1 percent of arrests 
made by officers in that department. Croft (1985) researched the Rochester and Syracuse 
(New York) police departments and found a use of force rate of 0.94 per 1,000 calls for 
service. It must be kept in mind that estimates based on calls for service, police-citizen 
encounters, potentially violent encounters specifically, and during arrests will produce 
vastly different estimates of police use of force, all else being equal.  
The co-occurrence of force used by police and suspects makes excessive force or 
brutality difficult to identify because police may use legitimate force and even lethal 
force to defend themselves against attacking suspects. Garner et al. (1996) reported that 
Phoenix police officer used force in 22 percent of arrests while suspects used force 
against the police in 14 percent of these arrests. Bayley and Garofalo (1989) studied 467 
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encounters and found 31 incidents where police used force against suspects and 11 times 
when suspects used force against police. Overall, Alpert and Dunham’s (1997) research 
on the balance between citizen and officer force (the “Force Factor”) found that officers 
typically followed the use of force continuum and used force equal to that encountered 
from resisting suspects. 
In addition to varied means of identifying and recording undesired behaviors, 
different ways of operationalizing the dependent variable have also caused variations in 
estimated rates of undesired police events including use of force. Research that has used 
broad definitions of use of force and included grabbing or handcuffing suspects has 
produced larger estimates of use of force than research limited to more serious events. 
The reason for this is clear when considering the findings of Alpert and Dunham (1999), 
who examined 882 official Control-of-Persons Reports from late 1993 through the end of 
1995 that were completed by supervisors in the Miami-Dade Police Department and 
found that 64 percent of use of force events in Miami involved grabbing or holding 
suspects. Garner and Maxwell (1999) found that police officers in 6 jurisdictions used 
handcuffs in 82 percent of all arrests but that their use of other forms of physical force 
and weapons was far less frequent. Closely related to the type and amount of force used, 
measuring force using citizen injuries has resulted in smaller estimates than studies that 
included non-injury force events as well. Differences in the minimal amount of force 
required for an event to be recorded as an official use of force event have an immense 




Negative Outcomes are Clustered Within Small Groups of Officers 
It is also clear that negative outcomes are clustered within relatively small groups 
of officers who account for disproportionate numbers of these acts in their respective 
agencies. The Christopher Commission (1991) investigated the LAPD after the beating of 
Rodney King and found that out of 8,450 sworn officers employed over the 4 year study 
period, 183 had received 4 or more complaints of excessive force or improper tactics and 
44 officers had 6 or more complaints. Two-thirds of LAPD officers over the four year 
study period had no citizen complaints (Christopher Commission, 1991). The Kolts 
Commission (1992) investigated neighboring LASD and also found that excessive force 
complaints were clustered within a relatively small group of officers. In Boston, the St. 
Clair Commission (1992) randomly sampled complaints and found 10 percent of officers 
accounted for 45 percent of all complaints filed from 1989 to 1990. To provide an 
exception, the Knapp Commission (1972) investigated a scandal in the New York City 
Police Department that was made famous by New York Times reporting and the movie 
Serpico. The Knapp Commission (1972) revealed that over one-half of plainclothes 
officers were committing financially-motivated corruption in the NYPD at the time. 
Twenty years later, the Mollen Commission (1994) was convened to investigate further 
corruption in the NYPD. However, the Mollen Commission (1994) found a more isolated 
problem than existed two decades earlier. 
In the police research literature, Lersch (1998b) found only 59 out of 
approximately 500 officers averaged more than 1 citizen complaint per year in a large, 
Southeastern agency. Lersch (2002) later reported 181 out of 280 patrol officers received 
no complaints, 54 received 1 complaint, 29 received 2 complaints, 10 received 3 
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complaints, and 6 officers received 4 or 5 citizen complaints. Brandl et al. (2001) 
demonstrated that less than 10 percent of officers in a large, Midwestern police 
department received 25 percent of citizen complaints that alleged excessive force by the 
agency. In criminological research beyond policing it has been repeatedly shown that 
small groups of offenders have accounted for disproportionate amounts of crime (Braga, 
2012; Chaiken & Chaiken, 1984; Greenwood & Abrahamse, 1982; Peterson & Braiker, 
1981; Williams & Lucianovic, 1979; Wolfgang et al., 1972). The effects of this research 
on criminal justice in the U.S. have been reflected in selective incapacitation correctional 
policies (Auerhahn, 1999; Harvard Law Review, 1982) and three strikes legislation 
(Clark, Austin, & Henry, 1997). 
Explaining Negative Officer Outcomes 
 
Threats have evolved over time and today vehicle collisions are one of the leading 
causes of death in the United States. The addition of cars, trucks, and motorcycles to the 
fleets of police agencies nationwide has proven advantageous in many ways, but has also 
been very costly. Still, police officer-involved motor vehicle collisions have only recently 
become a focus among police practitioners and researchers. On the other hand, larger 
bodies of research exist on other troubling police activities including use of force and 
deadly force specifically, citizen complaints for a variety of behaviors, and vehicle 
pursuits. It appears that many of the research findings regarding other undesired officer 
behaviors may also apply to officer involvement in vehicle collisions. Unfortunately, 
additional research into the correlates of police car crashes is needed until these 
similarities are clear. Still, several lessons from the existing literature will be used to 
theoretically support and methodologically inform this study.  
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Police research is often categorized by theoretical paradigm or unit of analysis. 
Binder and Scharf (1980) examined violent encounters between police and citizens by 
characteristics of the officers, citizens, and encounters. The same year, Sherman (1980) 
reviewed quantitative research on four police behaviors including police violence 
(justified or unjustified use of physical force against citizens) using a framework of five 
explanations: individual characteristics of officers; situational, organizational, and 
community characteristics; and legal variables. Sherman (1980) concluded that “The 
present state of the field is best characterized as a series of bivariate assertions about the 
impact of certain variables on police behavior” (p. 70). Since that time, multivariate 
analyses have become more common in the police behavior literature. Similarly, 
researchers of police misconduct specifically have explored sociological, psychological, 
organizational correlates (Worden, 1996), and anthropological explanations (Kappeler et 
al., 1998). Because previous researchers of a wide range of police officer behaviors have 
considered individual-level, situational- and environmental-level, and organizational-
level explanations, the current study follows this trend through the next few sections.  
Individual-Level Explanations of Negative Outcomes 
Police reformers since Theodore Roosevelt have assumed that the individual 
characteristics of officers were relevant to their behaviors (Fogelson, 1977). Indeed, a 
variety of individual-level explanations mostly psychological in nature have been offered 
for police officer misconduct. This body of research has assumed that officers were 
predisposed to a particular orientation that may lead to undesired behaviors, officers who 
were referred to as bad apples, rotten apples, or rogue officers. The logic for the 
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individual-level argument lies in research that has demonstrated small percentages of 
officers have accounted for the vast majority of misconduct in their respective agencies. 
Age and Experience. The effects of age and length of service have been difficult to 
separate because the majority of police have been hired between the ages of 21 and 30 
(Sherman, 1980). Cohen and Chaiken (1972) examined a single cohort and found that the 
officers who were oldest when appointed were less likely to receive citizen complaints 
for discourtesy, excessive force, and racial slurs. Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) 
examined three years of citizen complaint data from a large Southeastern agency and 
found younger and less experienced officers were more likely to be problem officers 
(those with five or more complaints) than older and more experienced officers. Brandl et 
al. (2001) took a similar approach with a single year of excessive force complaints and 
found significant age differences between low- and high-complaint groups of officers in a 
large Midwestern police department, with the latter averaging an additional 5 years of 
age. Brandl et al. (2001) also found significant differences between low- and high-
complaint groups of officers in mean length of service as the low-complaint averaged 
12.3 years of service compared with only 7.3 years for the high-complaint group. 
Regression models with the entire sample of 800 officers demonstrated statistically 
significant effects of age and length of service (Brandl et al., 2001). In the NYPD, 
increased age at appointment and increased length of service were among the most 
influential protective factors with respect to career-ending misconduct from 1975 to 1996 
(Kane & White, 2009; 2013). On the other hand, Worden (1996) found no effect of age 
on officer use of force with observations of officers from 24 police departments.  
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Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found a negative relationship between officer age and 
the number of citizen complaints and internal affairs investigations. However, Wolfe and 
Piquero (2011) reported years of service had a positive relationship with complaints and 
internal investigations based on data from the Philadelphia Police Department. Other 
researchers have uncovered an effect of experience but not age on officer use of force 
(Bayley & Garofalo, 1989).  
Alpert and Dunham (1999) found a negative relationship between officer age and 
the amount of force used but cautioned this effect may have been due to differences in the 
assignments of younger and older officers, which was not measured in their study. 
Adams (1999) also noted that the deployment of younger officers in high crime areas 
may explain the overall relationship between age and use of force found in the literature. 
Adams (1999) explained that agencies often rely on seniority when assigning officers so 
older officers receive more favorable assignments. 
Harris (2009, 2010, 2010, 2011) has applied aspects of the life course framework 
of developmental psychology, and more recently criminology, to explain the complaint 
careers of officers from a large, Northeastern agency. First, Harris (2009) tracked citizen 
complaints among officers and found they rose quickly in the first few years, peaked at 
year 3, then declined to year 14. Second, Harris (2010) used the same data and the career 
criminal framework and found three trajectories for the relationship between experience 
and misconduct. The low-rate officers had consistent rates of misconduct over their 
careers, the mid-rate trajectory were very similar to the aggregate findings from his 
earlier (2009) research, and the high-rate of complaint group of officers began receiving 
complaints of misconduct earlier in their careers and ultimately received more complaints 
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over their careers. These high complaint officers sound similar to the life-course-
persistent antisocial individuals identified by Moffitt’s (1993) research on criminal 
offending. All three groups of officers were very similar after year 14 (Harris, 2010). 
Finally, Harris (2011) expanded the length of careers examined beyond the initial 14 
years and found the group of officers with the highest complaint rates had increased 
complaints from years 16 to 23. 
A few studies have focused on the stability of deviance among officers by 
examining misconduct that took place at earlier ages. Cohen and Chaiken (1972) found 
prior job dismissal and military discipline were related to rule violations but not prior 
arrests for petty crimes. Success in the police academy and during probation also reduced 
misconduct and disciplinary actions (Cohen & Chaiken, 1972). Research in the NYPD 
found significant risk factors for career-ending misconduct in general and criminal 
misconduct specifically included prior criminal histories, public order offense histories, 
and prior employment disciplinary and reliability problems (Kane & White, 2013). Kane 
and White (2013) further reported the individual-level predictors of officer misconduct 
were consistent over a 22 year period in the NYPD. The Mollen Commission (1994) also 
found prior arrests among many of the suspended and dismissed officers.  
Gender. Increasing the number of female police has been suggested as a means of 
reducing the amount of force used by police (Christopher Commission, 1991; Skolnick & 
Fyfe, 1993). However, this relationship has received mixed support in the empirical 
literature. No gender differences in use of force were reported by Alpert and Dunham 
(1999), but research by Steffensmeier (1979), Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996), Lersch 
(1998a), and Hickman, Piquero, and Greene (2000) have found female officers received 
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fewer citizen complaints than their male counterparts. Hickman et al. (2000) reported that 
nearly all of the gender gap found in the Philadelphia Police Department’s official 
records of discipline was due to differences in charging—not processing.  
Researchers have also found no significant differences between male and female 
officers in terms of serious, career-ending, misconduct events (Kane & White, 2009; 
2013). Kane and White (2013) did note that women who were fired for misconduct were 
more likely to be for drug possession or administrative/probationary failures than their 
male counterparts and summarized their finding as follows: “Female officers who got 
into trouble tended to be problems for the organization, while men tended to be problems 
for the community” (p. 13). Others have reported that women received fewer complaints 
of excessive force in particular (Brandl et al., 2001). The Christopher Commission 
(1991), which examined the LAPD actions after pursuing and famously beating motorist 
Rodney King, also concluded that female LAPD officers committed less misconduct, 
especially in the form of excessive violence. Worden (1996), on the other hand, 
uncovered no significant effect of gender on excessive force in multivariate analyses of 
the PSS data. 
Race/Ethnicity. Increased minority representation in policing has also been suggested to 
reduce violence encounters with citizens (Fyfe, 1988; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
1981). This argument is particularly relevant in minority neighborhoods that have been 
traditionally patrolled by White officers. Skolnick (1999) argued that race and ethnicity 
“are bona fide occupational qualifications for urban police departments” (p. 3). The result 
is that minority officers in some agencies have been disproportionately assigned to 
minority neighborhoods as a way of decreasing social distance and increasing trust. 
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The effects of race and ethnicity on officer misconduct are unclear and 
inconsistent. Brandl et al. (2001) found no racial differences between groups of officers 
who had received high and low numbers of citizen complaints regarding excessive force. 
Hickman et al. (2001) found no significant race differences in the formal documentation 
of complaints or findings of guilt. Kappeler, Sapp, and Carter (1992) found no race effect 
on guilty determinations either. Kerstetter, Rasinski, and Heiert (1996) examined a 
sample of citizen complaints to the Chicago Police Department in 1985 and found both 
White and Black investigators were more likely to make a not sustained disposition when 
the citizen was the other race but that officer race was non-significant.  
Alpert and Dunham (1999) found no overall effect between ethnicity and officer 
use of force but determined that officers used more force in encounters with suspects of 
the same race than other races. This finding was consistent for White, Black, and 
Hispanic officers in the Miami-Dade Police Department. Alpert and Dunham (1999) 
offered several possible explanations for this finding. First, it could have been due to an 
agency practice of assigning officers to areas with citizens of the same ethnicity (Alpert 
& Dunham, 1999). Second, diversification of Miami neighborhoods could have made 
officers more comfortable interacting with and using force against citizens of their own 
ethnicity (Alpert & Dunham, 1999). Third, officers may have been hesitant to use force 
against citizens of other races because of the racial and political implications of such 
events in the city (Alpert & Dunham, 1999). Earlier, Reiss (1972) found Black officers in 
three large cities used more unjustified force generally and specifically against Black 
citizens. 
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A handful of studies have found minorities overrepresented among negative 
officer outcomes. Cohen and Chaiken (1972) followed the cohort of NYPD officers hired 
in 1957 and found a significant race effect on citizen complaints. Friedrich (1980) 
reported Black police were more likely to use force but less likely to use excessive force. 
Lersch (1998a) found minority officers were overrepresented among male but not female 
officers who received citizen complaints. Lersch (1998c) also examined internal and 
citizen complaints in a large, Southeastern police department and found minority officers 
were significantly more likely to receive complaints and to have complaints those 
sustained by internal affairs although there were no significant race differences in 
departmental disciplinary actions. There were differences in the types of complaints 
White and minority officers received, however, with minority officers more likely to 
receive complaints specifically related to demeanor, poor performance, and improper 
conduct, while White officers were more likely to be associated with departmental rule 
violations, avoiding duty, and excessive force. Rojek and Decker (2009) found Black 
officers disproportionately represented in five years of official internal and citizen 
complaint data from a Midwestern police department. However, Black and White officers 
were treated equally in terms of findings of guilt and discipline (Rojek & Decker, 2009). 
Another study of police misconduct found race was the strongest predictor of career-
ending misconduct in the NYPD, where Black officers were 3.27 times more likely to be 
dismissed than White officers over a 2 decade period (Kane & White, 2009; 2013). 
Latino officers were also significantly more likely to be dismissed from the NYPD for 
misconduct than their White coworkers (Kane & White, 2009; 2013).  
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Education. Chief August Vollmer connected American police officer’s with the 
University of California, Berkeley in the early 20th century (Vollmer & Schneider, 1917). 
Since that time, formal education has been repeatedly recommended as a means of 
improving the behaviors and performance of police (Carter & Sapp, 1990; Goldstein, 
1977; Roberg & Bonn, 2004; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1981; Worden, 1990). In 
turn, increased education has been offered as a solution by advisory panels and 
committees including the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice (1967), the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals (1973), the National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for 
Police Officers (1978), and the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (1979). 
The federal government supported this position with the 1968 Law Enforcement 
Education Program that provided education grants and loans to police officers (Carter & 
Sapp, 1990). However, research on the impact of education on undesired officer 
behaviors has been inconsistent. In 2004, the National Research Council concluded that 
there was not enough evidence available to support the call for higher education as a 
means of improving policing. Several have even speculated that college education may 
have negative effects on policing. At the individual-level, it has been suggested that 
burnout occurs when educated officers are not provided opportunities to use what they 
have learned (Trojanowicz & Nicholson, 1976). Concern has also been expressed that 
increased education requirements will lead to the exclusion of minority and female 
officers (Decker & Huckabee, 2002).  
Mixed findings have been found with respect to the impact of education on use of 
force. Analyzing the POPN data, Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) found a negative 
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relationship between use of force and educational attainment. Later, Paoline and Terrill 
(2007) examined this relationship between three categories of officer education using the 
POPN data and found that those with some college used less verbal force than those with 
a high school education but that only a four year college degree decreased physical force 
significantly. Rydberg and Terrill (2010) found that officers with some college used less 
force in encounters with citizens. Worden (1996) found no difference in the use of 
excessive force by those with and without bachelor’s degrees but higher amounts of 
reasonable force among those with four year degrees. Another area of officer use of force 
behavior that has demonstrated mixed effects of officer education is involvement with 
shootings. For example, Sherman and Blumberg (1981) found that officers with college 
degrees were equally likely to use their firearms as their less educated peers. On the other 
hand, McElvain and Kposowa (2008) found that those with college degrees were less 
likely to be in shootings.  
Cohen and Chaiken’s (1972, 1973) study of an officer cohort found that those 
with some college education received fewer citizen complaints over their careers with the 
NYPD. Similar results were found decades later by Kane and White (2009; 2013), who 
reported that having an Associate’s or Bachelor’s degree when hired were among the 
strongest protective factors to career-ending police misconduct in the NYPD. More 
educated officers in Dade County, Florida received fewer citizen complaints and 
complaints of excessive force specifically (Cascio, 1977). Other research found that 58 
percent of Florida officers’ highest educational attainment was a high school degree but 
these officers accounted for 75 percent of disciplinary cases in the state (Cunningham, 
2006). Florida officers with a four year college degree represented 24 percent of officers 
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in the state but only 11 percent of state disciplinary cases (Cunningham, 2006). Lersch 
and Kunzman (2001) found deputies in a large, Southeastern sheriff’s office with college 
degrees received significantly fewer complaints and had significantly fewer sustained 
administrative violations than those with high school or GED diplomas. Researchers have 
also found that college education increased officer acceptance towards limits on use of 
force (Smith & Ostrom, 1974; Worden, 1990). Telep (2011) found that a pre-service 
bachelor’s degree significantly decreased officer attitudes that were supportive of abuse 
of authority, based on survey data collected by the Police Foundation (Weisburd, 
Greenspan, Hamilton, Bryant & Williams, 2001; Weisburd, Greenspan, Hamilton, 
Williams, & Bryant, 2000). 
However, Truxillo, Bennett, and Collins (1998) found no relationship between 
having a college degree and disciplinary problems. Croft (1985) found no educational 
differences between groups of officers who received high and low numbers of excessive 
force complaints, nor did Brandl et al. (2001). Still others have found mixed effects of 
education on use of force. For instance, Kappeler, Sapp, and Carter (1992) found a 
negative relationship between educational level and the number of sustained citizen 
complaints but no difference in sustained internal complaints. Pate and Fridell (1993) 
analyzed nationally representative data from 1,111 agencies and found a beneficial effect 
of education on officers who worked in sheriff’s offices but a weak or nonexistent 
relationship among officers in city departments. Null findings could potentially be 
explained by Van Maanen’s (1975) argument that education should not have a strong 
impact on officer behavior because it will be overwhelmed with the effects of officer 
socialization. Others have speculated that the impact of college depends on the type of 
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degree (National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers, 1978) 
and whether the education took place before or after becoming an officer (Worden, 
1990). The inconsistent prior findings with respect to the impact of education on 
undesired officer behaviors indicate that future research is necessary. Of course, some 
have argued that policing is more of a craft than a profession and have therefore 
prioritized the importance of specialized training over formal education (Bayley & 
Bittner, 1997; Paoline & Terrill, 2007).  
Productivity. Productivity has been offered by practitioners and researchers alike as a 
means of explaining officer involvement in a disproportionately high amount of vehicle 
collisions and other concerning events. However, the direct relationship between officer-
level measures of productivity and undesired behaviors has received little empirical 
attention in the literature. Exceptions include a study by Lersch (2002), who examined 
citizen complaints in a large agency over one year and found the total number received 
by individual officers was significantly related to several measures of productivity: the 
mean number of arrests, traffic citations, and field reports. Brandl et al. (2001) also 
discovered a positive relationship between arrests and citizen complaints in one large 
Midwestern police department. More specifically, officers who received 3 or more citizen 
complaints of excessive force made an average of 24.2 arrests for index crimes and 
averaged 177.8 arrests total that year, while the group of officers who received 2 
complaints made only 12.8 arrests for index offenses and 62.9 total arrests on average. 
However, Brandl et al. (2001) also found significant differences in assignments between 
groups of high- and low-complaint officers, with the former disproportionately assigned 
to the highest crime areas. In a model with all 800 officers, the effect of assignment 
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disappeared but the significant impact of arrest numbers on citizen complaints made 
remained significant. Brandl et al. (2001) concluded that “the strongest evidence 
provided in this study was that complaints were related to arrests made” (p. 527). The 
cross-sectional nature of the study made it impossible to tell if arrests led to complaints, 
or if excessive force led to arrests. The studies were focused on one agency apiece and 
individual beats were not disaggregated by Brandl et al. (2001) and Lersch (2002). 
One argument is that officer productivity is positively related to the number of 
situations, and in some cases their seriousness, that could potentially result in undesired 
outcomes, all else being equal. Officers with low productivity measures may avoid 
collisions, use of force, pursuits, and other negative outcomes because they lack the 
requisite conditions. Such logic is supported by Alpert and Dunham’s (1997) “Force 
Factor” that showed officers used levels of force proportionate to those encountered from 
resisting suspects. Thus, particularly productive officers may be exposed to increased risk 
of situations requiring use of force or leading to excessive force. This hypothesized 
relationship may be particularly strong when productivity is measured by arrests because 
prior researchers have shown excessive force occurs most often during arrest (Adams, 
1999). The potential relationship between officer productivity and misconduct was also 
supported by survey findings by Weisburd et al. (2000, 2001) and the Police Foundation, 
who solicited responses from 919 officers to the following statement: “An officer who 
makes many arrests will get many complaints.” Weisburd et al. (2001) found 46.6 percent 
of officers agreed with this statement and another 11.3 percent strongly agreed. 
Contributions by Klinger (1997) and Smith, Makarios, and Alpert (2006) have 
explained how negative outcomes may be related to the effects productivity levels have 
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on officer’s perceptions of neighborhoods and individual residents. Both explanations 
suggest that officers who make many arrests in high crime areas eventually begin to 
regard much crime as normal. It reasons that officers may come to view negative 
outcomes in those areas as within the norms of acceptable officer behaviors as well. A 
positive relationship between productivity and misconduct such as this may help explain 
increased complaints from disadvantaged areas found by Kane (2002). Klinger (1997), 
among others, also noted that police in such areas have fewer resources to devote to each 
incident. Shortcuts that take the form of misconduct may result from officers striving for 
productivity.  
Increased productivity also may increase the likelihood that an officer is falsely 
reported for undesired behaviors. Toch (1995) explained, “An officer may also be highly 
productive and may initiate a larger-than-usual amount of enforcement activity. He may 
disrupt the felonious plans of many disgruntled (and complaint-prone) offenders” (p. 95). 
Case in point, Skolnick (1999) reported being told by police that drug dealers have 
frequently filed complaints against the most effective officers. Thus, productivity may be 
positively related to the number of arrests, use of force incidents, and other situations that 
increase the likelihood of negative outcomes, all else being equal, but extremely 
productive officers may be more likely to receive complaints for imagined behaviors too. 
Productivity may also explain some of the more aforementioned research findings 
regarding the impact of officer characteristics, including officer age, experience, and 
gender, on undesired behaviors. For example, Friedrich (1977) and Worden (1989) have 
both argued that younger officers were more aggressive on the job. Friedrich (1977) 
reanalyzed data collected by Reiss (1967) in metropolitan areas and found less 
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experienced officers made more arrests, had more citizen contacts, and took more crime 
reports. He also found more experienced patrol officers were friendlier to non-offenders 
(Friedrich, 1977). Researchers have shown female officers, when compared with their 
male colleagues, made fewer arrests (Bloch & Anderson, 1974; Morash & Greene, 1986; 
Sherman, 1975) and fewer overall citizen contacts (Bloch & Anderson, 1974).  
Personality Type. Other interested parties have focused on officer personality 
characteristics, especially as related to brutality (e.g., Christopher Commission, 1991). 
Worden (1996) reviewed prior research on police use of force and also determined five 
personalities more likely to use force were officers who viewed their roles in terms of 
crime fighting. Scrivner (1994) surveyed a national sample of police psychologists 
regarding the characteristics of officers who had been referred to them for excessive 
force. Scrivner (1994) found five profiles of officers who committed excessive force: 
“officers with personality disorders…that are manifested in antisocial, narcissistic, 
paranoid, or abusive tendencies,” “officers whose previous job-related experience places 
them at risk…such as justifiable police shootings,” “officers who have problems at early 
stages in their police careers…[that] consists of young and inexperienced officers, 
frequently seen as hotdogs, badge happy, macho, or generally immature,” “officers who 
develop inappropriate patrol styles…particularly sensitive to challenge and provocation,” 
and “officers with personal problems…such as separation, divorce, or even perceived 
loss of status” (p. 3).  
Only a few have applied criminological theories to understand the personalities of 
misbehaving officers and many have analyzed surveys collected by Greene and Piquero 
(2001) from 483 officers in the Philadelphia Police Department. Hickman et al. (2001) 
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utilized Tittle’s (1995) control balance theory, which focused on the amount of control 
one was subjected to relative to the amount of control they could exercise, and found 
officers with control deficits were more likely to report hypothetical misconduct to 
superiors than colleagues with control surpluses. Another theoretically driven study from 
this data was provided by Pogarski and Piquero (2003), who tested the effects of 
elements of deterrence theory on misconduct and found “deterrence considerations… 
figure prominently in police misconduct decisions,” especially certainty and celerity (p. 
381). Other studies based on the Philadelphia data were conducted by Chappel and 
Piquero (2004), who examined social learning theory, and Lawton (2007), who utilized a 
racial threat framework.  
Noble Cause Beliefs. Instead of presuming that police were naturally antisocial and 
trying to explain why most officers still made the decision to not act in deviant ways, an 
argument known as the noble cause assumes these individuals are good and attempts to 
explain why a few act in an undesired way. This hypothesis was explained by Bayley 
(2002), who argued that the traditional view of police as lacking prosocial values has 
been misguided. Instead, Bayley (2002) stated, “The problem is that they believe that the 
violation of law and of human rights is sometimes required for effective law 
enforcement” (p. 134). Bayley (2002) drew a clear line between officers who committed 
misconduct for personal gain, which included promotions and direct financial benefits, 
and those “who have engaged in questionable practices because they believe such 
practices enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement, [for whom] the situation is 
morally more ambiguous” (p. 146). Many previous researchers have also hypothesized 
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the presence of some form of noble cause beliefs among those predisposed to the policing 
occupation. 
Muir (1977) was among the first to suggest that public safety could not always be 
achieved legally, and thus the morality of police behaviors that were used to handle 
offenders should not be judged in legal terms only. A few years later, Klockars (1980) 
evoked the popular movie Dirty Harry and argued that police were committed to good 
ends (arresting dangerous suspects) but at the same time were legally bound by available 
means of achieving those ends. Noble cause corruption was explained by Crank and 
Caldero (2000) as being “a profound moral commitment to make the world a safe place 
to live. Put simply, it is getting bad guys of the street” (p. 35). Crank, Flaherty, and 
Giacomazzi (2007) specifically defined the noble cause as related to misconduct: “the 
achievement of a good greater than the harm caused by any illegal behavior of the police” 
(p. 105). Crank et al. (2007) tested the noble cause in the Ada County (Idaho) Sheriff’s 
Office with twelve scale items on a survey distributed to 59 deputies and found deputies 
were not uniformly committed to the noble cause, that the noble cause was a multi-
dimensional construct. Regarding the effect of crime on noble cause beliefs, Crank et al. 
(2007) found only limited support for the alternative hypothesis: serious crime, youth 
issues, street crime, citation problems, and a combined measure of crime and disorder 
were not related three measures of noble cause. The deputies did support the use of 
deception when they perceived problems with domestic and alcohol crime, public order 
problems, and general disorder. Wolfe and Piquero (2011) tested the effects of noble 
cause beliefs on the numbers of citizen complaints, internal affairs division 
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investigations, and departmental disciplinary charges and found no significant effects on 
officer misconduct. 
Organizational-Level Explanations of Negative Outcomes 
Individual-level research on police misconduct takes a rotten apple approach but 
organizational-level research suggests a rotten barrel is to blame (Armacost, 2003). 
Organizational research has helped explain the clustering of problems in agencies and 
longstanding historical problems (Walker, 1992). For example, Kane and White (2013) 
reported the NYPD has had commissions formed to investigate misconduct 
approximately every 20 years since the mid-1800s. Misconduct in the LAPD has tended 
to revolve around brutality as reported by the Christopher Commission (1991) and a 
follow-up report five years later (Bobb, Epstein, Miller, & Abascall, 1996). Brutality was 
also a focus of the Kolts Commission (1992) in the LASD and research by Cohen and 
Chaiken (1968) in Long Beach. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) argued that 20 officers 
watching the beating of Rodney King for over 2 minutes by officers who expected them 
to cover up the incident is difficult to explain with the rotten apple theory.  
Scrivner (1994) surveyed a group of police psychologists regarding police 
brutality and concluded, “The multiplicity of profiles belies the popular stereotype of a 
few bad apples being responsible for most excessive force incidents” (p. 1). Scrivner 
(1994) added, “Excessive force needs to be considered a result not only of individual 
personality traits but also of organizational influences” (p. 1). Both the Christopher 
Commission (1991) and Kolts Commission (1992) reports questioned the use of 
psychological screening to identify officers at risk of excessive force. All research on 
individual-level explanations of officer behavior has been limited by the fact that police 
72 
have historically been selected from a homogenous pool of applicants (McManus, 1969; 
Grant & Grant, 1996). The result has been little variation in many officer-level variables. 
However, numerous characteristics of police organizations, mostly related to culture, 
have been offered to explain misconduct by their employees.  
Culture. The influence of police organizations on officer behaviors including misconduct 
may be understood in two parts: the occupational culture of police broadly and the 
specific organizational cultures of individual police organizations. Worden (1996) 
defined police occupational culture as “outlooks and norms that are commonly found 
among patrol officers in   police agencies” (p. 29). Organizational culture was a focus of 
the Christopher Commission (1991), which described the policing style of the LAPD and 
the failure of management to stop the actions of a small minority of problematic officers. 
The Christopher Commission (1991) noted that the LAPD was too aggressive in their 
tactics and this was explained by the agencies focus on statistics such as arrest numbers. 
The Christopher Commission (1991) examined personnel files of the problem officers 
and found positive performance evaluations that rarely noted the complaints they had 
received and continued promotions. Thus, the LAPD formally and informally rewarded 
tactics that resulted in arrests and overlooked complaints in promotional considerations. 
The Kolts Commission (1992) investigated the LASD and found this agency also 
rewarded aggressive tactics and overlooked instances of excessive force and resulting 
lawsuits in their evaluations of deputies. The Human Rights Watch (1998) examined 14 
agencies in the U.S. and reported, “Those who claim that each high-profile case of abuse 
by a rogue officer is an aberration are missing the point: problem officers frequently 
persist because the accountability systems are so seriously flawed” (p. 33). Another study 
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concluded that while the individual-level predictors of police misconduct were invariant, 
changes in the NYPD’s hiring and retention practices, drug testing policies, and 
punishment of misconduct led to changes in the annual rates of misconduct in the NYPD 
from 1975 to 1996 (Kane & White, 2013).  
Orientation towards arrest was also a primary factor in Wilson’s (1968) work on 
organizational culture and officer behaviors. Research on political culture increased in the 
United States during the 1960’s and Wilson (1968) expanded this research into police 
organizations. Wilson (1968) also created a 2x2 typology of organizational styles or 
strategies including the watchmen style, legalistic style, and service style that were based 
on how frequently and formally agencies interacted with citizens, including arrests. 
Wilson (1968) explained how each operational style impacted the way street officers 
behaved and also described pertinent organizational factors such as supervision and 
discretion. Wilson’s (1968) work is considered a classic but research results have not 
provided strong support for his claims about local political style and police activities in 
observational research (Liederbach & Travis, 2008) or official arrest data (Zhao & 
Hassell, 2005). 
 Kappeler et al. (1998) developed a comprehensive anthropological framework for 
understanding police misconduct. Kappeler et al. (1998) argued that the unique 
occupational culture of policing provides individual officers with a working personality 
including a worldview that distinguishes between insiders and outsiders, police and 
others. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) similarly argued how police organizations created 
subcultural conditions that fostered a siege mentality among members. According to 
Kappeler et al. (1998), the police worldview reinforced the ‘us versus them’ mentality 
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when officers were taught about their unique coercive powers, when they were isolated 
from others due to the paramilitary nature of policing, and when they eventually believed 
they alone created order. In addition, the police subculture emphasized bravery, 
autonomy, and secrecy (Kappeler et al., 1998). Cultural themes or rules of behaviors that 
shaped interactions have been developed by police that included isolation from society 
and solidarity among police (Kappeler et al., 1998). Lastly, postulates or specific 
statements that directed the behaviors of individual officers emphasized how to maintain 
isolation and solidarity (Kappeler et al., 1998).   
Secrecy. Secrecy is a key component in research that has examined the so-called code of 
silence as an aspect of police culture (Alpert, Noble, & Rojek, 2015). Westley (1956) 
conducted interviews and two years of direct observation and concluded that secrecy was 
an important aspect of the police subculture. He found most officers would not report or 
testify against their partners for stealing (Westley, 1956). Officers who follow the so-
called code of silence have been less likely to report misconduct by colleagues (Knapp 
Commission, 1972; Mollen Commission, 1994). With a particular focus on secrecy, the 
Mollen Commission (1994) documented three types of perjury committed by officers: 
testimonial, documentary, and falsification of reports. These behaviors were so 
widespread in the NYPD that the Mollen Commission (1994) created a new term for the 
practice: testilying. Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found code of silence beliefs were related 
to the number of self-reported internal affairs division investigations, in an unexpected 
direction, but not the number of citizen complaints or departmental disciplinary charges 
the Philadelphia officers received. Klockars, Ivkovic, Harver, and Haberfield (2001) 
provided hypothetical scenarios to officers and found the seriousness of misconduct was 
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strongly related to officers’ willingness to report the actions to superiors as well as the 
levels of discipline they felt was warranted.  
Treatment of Employees. Research has also demonstrated that officer behaviors also 
depend upon the extent to which they are treated with fairness and justice by their 
organizations10. Organizational justice consists of distributive justice or the fairness of 
outcomes, procedural justice or the decisions that precede an outcome, and interactional 
justice, which is the interpersonal treatment received from an authority figure when 
enacting organizational procedures. Wolfe and Piquero (2011) analyzed data collected by 
Greene and Piquero (2001) in the Philadelphia Police Department regarding the impact of 
perceived organizational justice on self-reported numbers of formal citizen complaints, 
internal affairs investigations, and charges resulting from violations of the discipline 
code. They found officers who viewed their employer as just were less likely to receive 
citizen complaints, internal investigations, and departmental disciplinary charges. The 
cross-sectional nature of the data barred the authors from determining if officers reported, 
investigated, or disciplined for misconduct reacted by viewing the department as unfair or 
unjust, or if perceived lack of organizational justice led to misconduct. Friedrich (1977) 
found no differences between more and less satisfied police officers in their treatment of 
citizens.  
Finances. An economic argument has been made to explain misconduct in several large 
agencies. For instance, Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) reported that LAPD officers they had 
spoken with viewed losses in civil court “as a reasonable price for the presumed deterrent 
effect of the department’s most violent responses to lawbreaking…the cheapest way to 
                                                          
10 In a meta-analysis, Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) found counterproductive work 
behaviors were negatively related to distributive and especially procedural justice. 
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deter potential offenders is to encourage cops to be aggressive—or proactive—and to 
tolerate and foot the bill for their excesses” (p. 205). Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) concluded 
that in large agencies “verdicts and settlements are cheaper than paying for enough new 
cops to make a real difference in a department’s ability to mount a street presence” (p. 
207). A study of the NYPD over several decades concluded that agency finances were 
associated with the observed decline in career-ending misconduct from 1974 to 1979 
(Kane & White, 2009, 2013). Kane and White (2009, 2013) noted that it was during this 
time a financial crisis forced the agency to decrease its size from 32,000 to 21,000 
officers in a few months. No new officers were hired by the NYPD for the next five years 
(Kane & White, 2009, 2013). Kane and White (2009, 2013) concluded with respect to the 
financial argument, “the manpower shortage forced the department to become more 
tolerate of its officers’ misdeeds” (p. 70). Later, the emergence of the NYPD from that 
fiscal crisis led to hiring of officers between 1980 and 1984 before their background 
investigations had been completed and subsequent increased misconduct (Kane & White, 
2009, 2013). This argument may explained findings of the Christopher Commission 
(1991) that reported supervisors were aware of who the problematic officers were but had 
not attempted to control their behaviors. Limited agency finances may also impact the 
amount of hours officers are asked to work for the police department as well as the 
amount of secondary hours they work when off-duty.  
Situational-Level Explanations of Negative Outcomes 
Researchers have also examined situational characteristics of police misconduct, 
which have been referred to as “rotten branches” and “rotten pockets” (Armacost, 2004). 
For instance, Sherman (1974) referred to the 77th Precinct of the NYPD where the 
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infamous Buddy Boys worked who were eventually convicted of robbery, theft, bribery, 
extortion, and drug dealing as a rotten pocket. The most relevant situational-level 
variables to this study are neighborhood conditions and suspect resistance.  
Neighborhood Conditions. Ecology of crime research has demonstrated that structural 
conditions, particularly those found in inner-city America, were related to crime in those 
areas (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Klinger’s (1997) ecology of patrol explanation focused on 
the impact of levels of crime and argued that officers exposed to increased levels of crime 
had altered understandings of normal crime and victim deservedness. Klinger (1997) 
theorized that as crime increased officers became more cynical, viewed victims as not 
deserving police attention, viewed crime as increasingly normal, and had fewer resources 
at their disposal per incident. A similar argument to Klinger (1997) was made by Smith et 
al. (2006) who applied script theory to the study of citizen demeanor. Script theory 
suggested officers’ repeated situations with disrespectful suspects may cause them, over 
time, to begin to view such behaviors as normal (Smith et al., 2006). Smith et al. (2006) 
noted that this may have created disconnect between officer and observer perceptions of 
disrespect, which thereby biased observational studies on this topic.  
This line of research has also been extended to focus on police misconduct as the 
dependent variable. As Toch (1995) reasoned, “The most obvious variable that could 
produce a spurious high-incident-of-force officer (that is, one whose frequent use of force 
may not be problematic) is his or her assignment. Some officers may face a profusion of 
situations requiring the lawful exercise of force. These situations may result from locally 
high rates of crime, or from a proliferation of subjects who assault police officers or 
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physically resist legitimate arrests” (p. 95). The Christopher Commission (1991) also 
noted the importance of levels of crime on officer misconduct.  
Kane (2002) examined the effect of social disorganization on police misconduct. 
Kane (2002) merged the NYPD data on career-ending misconduct with Census data to 
examine the effects of social ecological conditions. He found that aspects of social 
disorganization—structural disadvantage and population mobility—were associated with 
changes in levels of misconduct by NYPD officers from 1975 to 1996. Kane (2002) 
argued that systemic resource deprivation, barriers to upward mobility, political 
marginalization, and disrupted social networks prevented residents of these areas from 
filing allegations of misconduct. Disadvantaged communities also offered unique 
opportunities for misconduct, Kane (2002) suggested. Lersch (1998b) examined citizen 
complaints to one large police department in the Southwest within the census-tract 
context that they occurred and found those tracts with above average numbers of 
complaints had fewer white residents, lower median income, lower educational level, 
higher poverty levels, and higher unemployment levels. After disaggregating the 
complaints into four types, Lersch (1998b) found complaints of excessive force 
specifically were more likely to originate in disadvantaged census tracts.  
Suspect Resistance. Police are called upon to handle situations and suspects when no 
other recourse is available to citizens. Many suspects are not cooperative, as might be 
predicted by the need for a police response in the first place. Not surprisingly, research 
has shown that suspects’ behaviors during their interactions with police are important in 
predicting the officers’ own actions. In fact, Garner et al. (1996) found that suspects’ 
actions were the strongest predictor of police use of force in Phoenix. Ethnographic 
79 
research by Anderson (1999) demonstrated how behaviors used to project a tough image 
and thereby protect residents of violent inner-city neighborhoods may have placed them 
at risk of violence from the police. 
Research on the situational effects on police officer behavior began with Reiss 
(1968), who utilized a theoretical framework based on the social nature of encounters and 
tools of systematic social observation. Reiss (1968) found 48 percent of excessive force 
cases occurred when suspects challenged officer authority or physically resisted arrest. 
Shortly thereafter, Chevigny (1969) examined use of force complaints to the New York 
City Civil Liberties Union and found disrespect was the primary cause. Westley (1970) 
examined officers’ views towards force and reported 37 percent thought excessive force 
was justified by citizen’s disrespect towards officers. Alpert and Dunham (1999) found 
that 97 percent of use of force events in Miami involved resisting suspects and one-
quarter of suspects assaulted arresting police officers. Overall, this body of literature has 
demonstrated that negative police officer outcomes are more likely to occur when 
suspects were resisting. 
Conclusion 
Police were borne from a societal need for a public institution that could settle 
disputes involving citizens and were granted authority use coercive force and exceptional 
tools to accomplish this goal. Some amounts of force were expected and thus legitimized. 
Balancing public governmental roles in promoting societal safety and success with the 
rights of private citizens has been a foundational concern since the institutions of 
democratic government and public police were established in this nation. Interest in 
police officer behaviors has centered on their use of coercive force against citizens, a 
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tenuous balance considering the reduction of force between strangers forms their societal 
foundation. Geographic and temporal differences in public expectations, along with 
events that have highlighted officer misconduct, have altered the breadth and types of 
concerning police behaviors worldwide.  
Officer misconduct, broadly speaking, remains important to monitor because it 
has direct consequences on citizen support of the police institution, agency finances and 
even crime. The costs of police misconduct to individual agencies and officers are also 
too high to overlook. Finally, researchers have shown officer actions that are viewed 
unfavorably by the public and damage citizen perceptions of their legitimacy also 
undermine police effectiveness. Because the police exist precisely to reduce harmful 
events in society, including vehicle collisions, officers who contribute to negative 
outcomes thereby threaten the foundational role of the institution.  
Empirical research findings have been mixed with respect to the relevance of 
officer-level variables on negative police outcomes. An NIJ examination of prior research 
concluded with modest confidence that, “use of force appears to be unrelated to an 
officer’s personal characteristics, such as age, gender, and ethnicity” (Adams, 1999, p. 6). 
Similar conclusions regarding officer use of force were reached by Alpert and Dunham 
(1999), who concluded as follows: “officer characteristics did not make much of a 
difference in whether force was used or in the level of force used” (p. 51). In earlier 
research, the United States Commission on Civil Rights (1981) also found problematic 
officers were of all genders, races, and ethnicities. Regardless of statistical significance, 
however, the reasons for these relationships appear as though they would apply to most if 
not all forms of negative outcomes.  
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Furthermore, studies that have considered the effects of age, experience, gender, 
race and ethnicity and other officer characteristics have usually failed to account to the 
differential assignment of officers in the United States based on these characteristics. For 
instance, young and unexperienced officers are disproportionately assigned high-crime 
areas due to the provision of preferential assignments based on seniority in many 
agencies. Agencies may also be more likely to give young and male officers more 
challenging assignments because they are believed to be more physically capable. 
Minority officers may be more likely to work in high crime areas if agencies attempt to 
match the ethnicities of officers with the neighborhoods they are assigned to patrol. These 
more challenging assignments with higher call volumes may also lead to more collisions. 
In addition to inconsistent research findings, the rotten apple approach to 
examining undesired officer behaviors has been criticized because municipalities may 
only be liable if an officer’s actions are related to a “custom or policy” of their agency 
(Armacost, 2003, p. 471). Thus, administrators responsible for entire organizations can 
merely remove those problematic individuals and prevent blame on their employers. Not 
surprisingly, the rotten apple approach has been criticized for preventing organizational 
reform (Knapp Commission, 1972). Finally, research at the individual-level has ignored 
the importance of organizational and situational variables, which some believe are more 
amenable to change (Armacost, 2003). 
Research on negative officer outcomes has also been conducted at the 
organizational and situational levels. Once again, similarities among explanations of 
officer use of force, deadly force, excessive force, complaints for a variety of reasons, 
and pursuits suggest some relationships among these undesired officer events. For 
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instance, agencies that reward risk-taking by officers may report more negative outcomes 
than more safety-oriented organizations. Secrecy related to numerous negative outcomes 
may also be a cultural value in some agencies. Other agency concerns such as poor 
finances or treatment of employees could also have wide-ranging effects on officers. 
Lastly, situational-level research has demonstrated that negative outcomes are more 







This study is based on a survey of patrol officers and their supervisors (sergeants 
and lieutenants only), which addressed the following three interrelated research 
questions: (1) What are the effects of officer involvement in deadly force events, vehicle 
pursuits, complaints for excessive force, and complaints for other reasons on their 
involvement in vehicle collisions? (2) Are the effects of negative outcome involvement 
on vehicle collision involvement different among the subset of at-fault collisions 
specifically? (3) Are these effects different for officers in one collision as compared with 
their peers in multiple collisions during the previous four years? These questions were 
answered with a survey of officers in the Prince George’s County Police Department11.  
Chapter Four begins with a description of the research site and particular attention 
is paid to PGPD officer involvement in vehicle collisions and other negative outcomes. 
Next, the data collection procedures are detailed. Finally, the missing data strategy, 
measurement of variables, and analytical method are explained and justified. 
The Prince George’s County Police Department 
Site Description 
Prince George’s county is located in an urban area of Maryland that borders 
Washington, D.C. and is 37 miles south of the city of Baltimore (Prince George’s 
                                                          
11 Funding for this study was provided by a Research Mentorship Grant awarded by the 
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of South Carolina. 
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County, 2013a). According to the United States Census Bureau (2015), Prince George’s 
county is part of the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area. In 
2010, the county was 482.69 square miles in size and had a population of 863,420 
persons, for a population density of 1,788.8 persons per square mile (United States 
Census Bureau, 2015). In comparison, the population density for the state of Maryland 
was 594.8 (United States Census Bureau, 2015). When the last U.S. Census was 
conducted in 2010, Prince George’s county was the second most populous county in the 
state of Maryland (United States Census Bureau, 2015). The estimated population of 
Prince George’s county in 2014, the year this study was conducted, was 904,430 (United 
States Census Bureau, 2015). In 2013, an estimated 22.7 percent of residents were 18 
years of age or less and 51.9 percent of the population was female. In terms of racial 
composition, 26.6 percent of residents were white only and 65.1 percent were black or 
African American only. Hispanics comprised 16.2 percent of Prince George county 
residents in 2013. During the period of 2009 to 2013, the median household income was 
$73,623 and 9.4 percent of county residents were living below the poverty level (United 
States Census Bureau, 2015). 
The Prince George’s County Police Department is a large agency with an 
authorized strength of 1,420 sworn officers and 263 civilians (Prince George’s County, 
2013b). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 2008 Census of State and Local 
Law Enforcement Agencies, the PGPD was the 47th largest law enforcement agency in 
the country overall and the 28th largest local police department in the U.S., based on an 
estimated 1,578 actual full-time sworn officers (Reaves, 2011). Of these officers in the 
PGPD, approximately 1,093 were assigned to duties including answering calls for service 
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from the public (Reaves, 2011). PGPD patrol officers are divided into six Districts, which 
have headquarters spread across the nearly 500 square mile county (see Appendix A for a 
map of the PGPD Districts). The Districts are divided into Sectors and the Sectors are 
divided into Beats. The agency began in 1927 and was reorganized in 1931 (Prince 
George’s County, 2013b). Rapid growth has characterized the county population and 
police department during its existence and they now serve over 800,000 residents (Prince 
George’s County, 2013b). In 2001, the PGPD handled over 500,000 calls for service 
(Prince George’s County, 2013b).  
Crime statistics for Prince George’s county and the Prince George’s County 
Police Department are available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (n.d.) 
Uniform Crime Reporting program and from the Maryland State Police (n.d.). The FBI 
data is reported at the agency-level while the data provided by the Maryland State Police 
is at the county-level. FBI UCR information for the PGPD is limited to raw numbers of 
offenses reported. Crime rates per 100,000 people are not available for the county. 
According to the FBI, crime rates are not provided for agencies that reported less than a 
complete years’ worth of data. FBI data show there were 3,955 total violent crimes 
reported to the PGPD during 2012, the most recent year for which data is available. The 
most frequent violent crime in the county was robbery (N=1,996), followed by 
aggravated assault (N=1,765), forcible rape (N=145), and murder and nonnegligent 
manslaughter (N=49). There were 24,192 total property crimes reported to the PGPD 
during 2012, which included 15,115 larceny-thefts, 4,758 burglaries, and 4,319 motor 
vehicle thefts. Crime data for the entire county is compiled by the Maryland State Police 
and available in raw numbers and rates per 100,000 residents. Unfortunately, the county-
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level data cannot be disaggregated by law enforcement agency. County-level data 
indicate a larger number of crimes than those limited to the PGPD. For instance, Prince 
George’s county witnessed a total of 63 murders, 173 rapes, 2,260 aggravated assaults, 
and 2,450 robberies in 2012—a total of 4,946 violent crimes. The state data show that 
this translates into a violent crime rate of 562 crimes per 100,000 people, based on a 2012 
population of 879,645. They also demonstrate that 2012 was the fourth straight year of 
declining violent crime rates with a 5.2 percent drop from 2011 rates. The property crime 
rate in Prince George’s county has also been falling since 2008 and was 3,539 per 
100,000 residents in 2012.  
PGPD Officer Involvement in Vehicle Collisions 
Information on PGPD officer involvement in vehicle collisions is available from 
the agency, organizations that promote the interests of the law enforcement community 
including the ODMP and LEOMF, and local media accounts. In terms of official agency 
data on collisions, the PGPD provided data on all officer-involved collisions reported to 
the agency from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2012. This database had been 
maintained by Sergeant Major Walters in fleet management for many years and more 
recently by Sgt. Ashton. Information on all collisions reported to the agency involving 
officers, not only those that resulted in injuries or deaths, and detailed repair cost 
estimates were among the strengths of these data. In addition, the PGPD provided a 
database with worker’s compensation claims that resulted from on-duty vehicle collisions 
during the same four year period. These data provided context to the issue of officer-
involved collisions in the PGPD. These data also demonstrate that the PGPD is a suitable 
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site to study vehicle collisions because the agency provides a sufficiently large sample of 
crashes. 
During the four year study period of 2009 through 2012, a total of 1,147 collisions 
involving PGPD officers were officially recorded by the agency. The damages to the 
PGPD vehicle fleet totaled $2,504,082.00 over this 4 year period—an average of 
$626,020.50 per year. Sixty two collisions resulted in no damages to the involved 
vehicles. Another 139 vehicles sustained damage estimated at $100.00 or less. The 
highest estimated damage to a single vehicle was $ 26,950.00. Damages equal to or in 
excess of $10,000.00 were sustained by 39 PGPD vehicles. Motor vehicles classified as 
totaled numbered 148, which did not include the vehicles removed from the fleet but kept 
by the agency for salvage parts. 
The PGPD fleet management database also included brief details regarding officer 
and citizen injuries associated with collisions involving their officers from 2009 to 2012. 
Out of the 1,147 collisions, 170 collisions resulted in injuries to 190 PGPD officers. 
Fewer collisions (N = 109) led to citizen injuries. Still, 147 citizens were reported to have 
been injured in collisions involving PGPD officers. The specific details of the citizen 
injuries are unknown. 
Details of the officer injuries may be gleaned from the worker’s compensation 
claim database. A total of 311 worker’s comp claims were made as the result of injuries 
sustained during on-duty vehicle collisions. There were recoveries for 6.4 percent (N = 
20) of these claims. The workers’ comp recoveries from 2009 to 2012 for motor vehicle 
collisions totaled $205,707.59—an average of $51,426.90 per year. The average amount 
recovered in these 20 cases was $10,285.38. The maximum amount an officer received 
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for worker’s comp was $32,000.00 for a tibia and fibula broken in a collision. The 
minimum recovery was $1,094.29 for unspecified back pain. 
Historically, the PGPD has witnessed six officer deaths that were classified as 
“vehicular accidents” and the deaths of two additional officers attributed to “vehicle 
pursuit” out of 28 total line of duty deaths (ODMP, 2015). These do not include the two 
PGPD officers killed by “vehicular assault” in 1982 and 2008. The first PGPD officer 
death due to a vehicle collision was Private Edward Dennis Merson, who was killed in a 
crash while on patrol September 1, 1937. More than 55 years would elapse before the 
next officer, Lieutenant Roger Peck Fleming, would die while driving a PGPD vehicle. 
The death of Lt. Fleming took place on October 27, 1992 during a pursuit on the 
Baltimore-Washington Parkway. On February 28, 1994, Sergeant John Louis Bagileo 
was killed when his vehicle collided with a utility pole while responding to a call for 
officer backup. Officer Kilonzo Musili Masembwa was also killed after his patrol vehicle 
collided with a utility pole on November 10, 2000 while responding to back up fellow 
officers. Sergeant Anthony Michael Walker, who was serving as president of the Prince 
George’s County Fraternal Order of Police at the time, was in a single vehicle crash and 
died 10 days later on November 15, 2003.  
The five year period from March, 2010 to March, 2015 has been the most tragic 
in the agency’s history, in terms of vehicle deaths, with the loss of four officers. Corporal 
Thomas P. Jensen died on March 9, 2010 from injuries he sustained 10 days earlier after 
crashing into a utility pole responding to a burglary call. On August 20, 2012, Officer 
Adrian Morris was killed and his partner, Officer Michael Risher, was injured when their 
vehicle left the roadway and crashed during a pursuit on Interstate 95. Officer First Class 
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Kevin D. Bowden was killed two months later in October, 2012 while off duty. Recently, 
Officer Brennan Rabain was killed while driving his patrol vehicle off-duty, which is 
allowed by the agency, with his girlfriend in the car. The passenger reportedly thought 
Officer Rabain was going to pull over a speeding vehicle when he lost control and 
crashed into a fence. These fatal PGPD officer-involved collisions and the co-occurrence 
of vehicle pursuits and fatal collisions in the PGPD demonstrate that this is an appropriate 
site to study vehicle collisions and vehicle pursuits. 
The deaths of Officers Jensen, Morris, and Bowden led to a heightened awareness 
of the safety hazard posed by vehicle collisions in the PGPD and, more importantly, 
action on the part of a few key executives in the agency. The awareness began in late 
2012 with then-Assistant Chief Kevin Davis who later left the PGPD to lead the 
neighboring Anne Arundel County Police Department (Stawinski, 2014). At the time, 
Chief Mark A. Magaw was determined to prevent future tragedies in the agency and 
Assistant Chief Davis realized that over one-quarter of PGPD officer deaths were due to 
vehicle collisions (Stawinski, 2014). Despite similarities among the deaths of Officers 
Bagileo and Jensen and those of Officers Fleming and Morris, the PGPD discovered that 
collisions “reached beyond assignment or speed or experience and into every corner of 
the department—a cultural dynamic” (Stawinski, 2014). Several noteworthy changes 
have been implemented in the PGPD since that time. 
Beginning in early 2013, Assistant Chief Kevin Davis and Deputy Chief of the 
Bureau of Patrol, H. P. “Hank” Stawinski, began giving a weekly presentation during in-
service training. This presentation every Tuesday afternoon has focused on the driving-
related deaths of their colleagues in the agency and is termed “Arrive Alive.” The 
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purpose of these discussions was to shift the agency culture regarding safe vehicle 
operations. The weekly training sessions began with the agency leaders noting that an 
internal audit of PGPD officers found approximately 45 percent used safety belts while 
the rate among the general public in Maryland was estimated at 90 percent. Next, Davis 
and Stawinski addressed several key aspects of the agency driving culture. According to 
Stawinski, “The first cultural dynamic identified was the tendency to marginalize the 
dangers of driving because it was done at all times of day, in all conditions, and in every 
manner from patrol to pursuit.” This oversight among officers had led to the belief among 
some that seatbelts posed a tactical disadvantage and thereby actually decreased officer 
safety. The leaders noted that PGPD data on the other hand showed that the odds of a 
vehicle collision were higher than those for an armed confrontation. The second “cultural 
dynamic” addressed by Deputy Chief Stawinski and then-Assistant Chief Davis was 
driving too fast and a general tendency towards “over response,” which the agency 
defined as “driving too quickly to less urgent calls for service.” These observations were 
based on PGPD reviews of in-car camera footage, red light and speed camera violations, 
and collision reports. Additionally, several PGPD officers killed in collisions were 
travelling near or in excess of 100 miles per hour. The Arrive Alive presentation was 
actually updated in April, 2014 with video from PGPD dash cameras to demonstrate the 
issue with an actual collision. The third and final topic addressed in the Arrive Alive 
training session has been the fact that “today’s patrol officer must contend with many 
more distractions inside their cruiser than at any time in the past.” In addition, the public 
can drive in an unexpected manner when confronted by emergency vehicles. PGPD 
officers are encouraged to pay close attention to such concerns while driving in order to 
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reduce distractions and reaction times. The PGPD’s message to officers regarding these 
three aspects of safe agency driving culture is the following: “Slow down, Buckle up, Pay 
attention, Arrive alive.” The agency also began showing eight video testimonials from 
mothers, fathers, spouses, and friends of PGPD officers killed in vehicle collisions. In 
fact, the Arrive Alive presentation now features stories of PGPD officers exclusively in 
an attempt to personalize the message for the agency. Another strong message is sent by 
the fact that in-service training sessions are held in the PGPD Training Academy 
classroom where Officers Jensen, Morris, and Bowden also sat. 
The PGPD has also used other methods of increasing awareness of safe vehicle 
operations throughout the agency. Arrive Alive stickers were placed on the dashboards of 
PGPD vehicles. Weekly safe driving messages have been created and broadcast over the 
law enforcement radio channels every six hours. A visual reminder for officers to buckle 
up was updated at the exit of the employee parking lot at PGPD headquarters located at 
7600 Barlowe Road in Landover. The new sign provided a stark visual contrast with the 
previous. Another strong visual message is the severely damaged patrol car now stationed 
outside the District Five Station in Clinton.  
Assistant Chief Kevin Davis and the chair of this dissertation, Dr. Geoff Alpert 
had met years earlier and realized their shared interests in reducing officer-involved 
vehicle collisions. At the invitation of Dr. Alpert, Assistant Chief Davis travelled to 
attend a meeting of the CalPOST SAFE Driving Campaign in May, 2013 to share his 
agency’s efforts at reducing collisions. A few months later, the PGPD formed a research 
partnership with USC to conduct this study. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Davis left the PGPD 
to become Chief of the neighboring Anne Arundel County Police Department. This study 
92 
continued under the leadership of Deputy Chief Stawinski, Major Peter Eliadis, and Mr. 
Carlos Acosta of the PGPD. 
PGPD Officer Involvement in Other Negative Outcomes 
Law enforcement officer involvement in risky, potentially harmful, and socially 
undesirable behaviors has been a longstanding interest among policing researchers. As 
discussed in the review of the extant literature, the negative officer outcomes of interest 
have shifted over the course of American history from acts of corruption and brutality to 
more common and less extreme actions. Two internal accountability measures that have 
been used in U.S. police organizations including the PGPD to control the behaviors of 
their employees are internal affairs units and early intervention systems. The PGPD 
Internal Affairs Division operates an early intervention system (IAPro). At a meeting at 
PGPD headquarters early in the planning stages of this study, a member of internal affairs 
reported that the PGPD monitors officer involvement in deadly force events and vehicle 
pursuits, as well as officer receipt of citizen complaints. This study operationalized 
negative outcomes as those currently monitored by the PGPD in order to allow the 
agency to decide precisely which officer behaviors they were most concern with. In 
addition to deadly force and vehicle pursuit involvement, this study includes receiving 
citizen complaints for excessive force and for all other reasons among negative outcomes. 
Empirical research on problematic police behaviors in the United States has 
typically been conducted in large agencies for several reasons. One of the foremost 
reasons is that a sufficiently large sample is needed and deadly and excessive force, 
vehicle pursuits, and citizen complaints are rare events. As one of the largest law 
enforcement agencies in the country, the Prince George’s County Police Department has 
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employed officers who have been involved in a number of negative outcomes over the 
years and serves as an appropriate site for this research. For instance, the previous section 
provided two examples of when vehicle pursuits led to deadly collisions for PGPD 
officers. Data on deadly force, vehicle pursuits that did not end with fatalities, and citizen 
complaints were not available from the PGPD. Thus, information presented herein was 
gleaned from reports by the U.S. Department of Justice. A few media accounts are also 
cited. In the following section, examples are provided of PGPD officer involvement in 
deadly force, excessive force, and other concerning events.  
Federal oversight of the PGPD began in July, 1999, when the Department of 
Justice began an investigation into misconduct in the canine section (United States 
Department of Justice, 2004a). The government alleged that the PGPD violated 42 U.S.C. 
Section 14141 by engaging in a pattern or practice of excessive force in the canine 
section and also referenced the county’s failure to adopt and implement proper 
management practices and procedures (United States Department of Justice, 2004a). As a 
result, the PGPD was under a consent decree from 2004 to 2007. Among the 
requirements in the consent decree were limiting the deployment of canines in situations 
that presented a significant risk of bites to suspects wanted for felonies or reasonably 
believed to be armed. They also required supervisor approval before the deployment of 
canines and limited the circumstances when a canine may be allowed to bite or apprehend 
a suspect. Reports became required for all apprehensions and bites even if arrest or injury 
did not result.  
On the same day in 2004 that the PGPD entered into a consent decree regarding 
the canine section, the agency and county also entered into a memorandum of agreement 
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with the Department of Justice that lasted until 2009 (Davis, 2009). The monitoring 
resulted from an investigation that began October, 2000 into widespread use of excessive 
force in the agency (United States Department of Justice, 2004b). The agency made a 
series of reforms under the watch of an external monitor that included the installation of 
video recorders in over 600 vehicles, a computerized tracking system, and internal review 
of officer-involved shootings (Davis, 2009). The PGPD was required to review and revise 
its use of force policies and procedures. For instance, every use of force incident required 
notification of supervisors who needed to respond to the incident, interview and examine 
suspects, and document the events (United States Department of Justice, 2004b). The 
PGPD was also required to “enhance and expand” its early warning system to include the 
following: all uses of force; the number of OC spray and foam canisters, and ammunition 
for pepperball launchers used by officers; all injuries to prisoners; all instances in which 
force is used and a subject is charged with “resisting arrest,” “assault on a police officer,”  
disorderly conduct,” or “obstruction of justice;” all critical firearm discharges, both on-
duty and off-duty; all complaints (and their dispositions); all criminal proceedings 
initiated, as well as all civil or administrative claims alleging misconduct, and all civil 
lawsuits served upon, the county, or its officers, or agents, resulting from PGPD 
operations or the actions of PGPD personnel; all vehicle pursuits; and all disciplinary 
action taken against officers (United States Department of Justice, 2004b).  
The memorandum of agreement between the PGPD and the U.S. Department of 
Justice ended in 2009. At the time the agreement ended, it was reported that the FBI was 
investigating the PGPD for shooting dogs owned by a nearby mayor who was cleared of 
all charges and that the Maryland State’s Attorney was investigating at least two fatal 
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shootings by PGPD officers (Davis, 2009). In 2011, a PGPD officer pled guilty in federal 
court to cocaine trafficking, extortion, and firearms offenses and in 2014 was sentenced 
to 10 years in prison (Associated Press, 2014). In March, 2015, a pursuit involving PGPD 
officers ended when the suspect crashed and killed an innocent victim in another vehicle 
after injuring an officer during a traffic stop. 
In summary, the Prince George’s County Police Department appears to be an 
appropriate site for studying the relationship between officer involvement in vehicle 
collisions and other negative outcomes including deadly and excessive force, vehicle 
pursuits, and citizen complaints for several reasons. As one of the largest law 
enforcement agencies in the nation, the PGPD provides a relatively large sample of patrol 
officers—the focus of this study. The large sample increases the likelihood that rare 
events will have occurred over time. Indeed, information from the agency, U.S. DOJ, and 
local media demonstrate the PGPD officers have been involved in collisions, deadly force 
situations, vehicle pursuits, and other high-risk and potentially harmful on-duty 
behaviors. Relevant to data collection procedures, the consent decree with the U.S. DOJ 
required the PGPD to maintain records of and include in their early intervention system 
all instances of deadly force, vehicle pursuits, and citizen complaints. 
Data Collection 
This study examines the relationships between police officer-involved vehicle 
collisions and other negative outcomes as defined by the PGPD. Negative outcomes are 
defined as deadly force events, vehicle pursuits, and receiving citizen complaints for 
excessive force and other reasons. The research questions are explored with surveys of 
PGPD patrol officers and their supervisors. Original data collection was necessary in this 
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case because of the novelty of the research questions and overall lack of prior empirical 
investigation into collisions in particular. In order to collect information on such 
potentially sensitive events, a research partnership was formed between USC and the 
PGPD12.  
Officer Surveys 
Officer-involved motor vehicle collisions have been studied using officer 
interviews and focus groups (e.g., Wehr et al., 2012), analyses of official records (e.g., 
Gustafson, 2009, 2012, 2015; Noh, 2011; Rix et al., 1997; Wolfe et al., 2015), and officer 
surveys (e.g., Hansen et al., 2015). An officer survey was selected for the current study 
because this design offered several advantages over other methodological approaches13. 
First, the officer survey enabled the collection of attitudinal information that could not be 
observed and/or background information that would not be included in official agency 
records. Self-reported data collected from citizens instead of officers would suffer from 
the same limitations. Second, the survey elicited information from 329 officers in the 
PGPD regarding their experiences over a 4 year timeframe—a sample that would have 
been cost-prohibitive for observational, interview, or other qualitative approaches. Third, 
the anonymous survey was designed to reduce issues regarding the social undesirability 
of negative outcomes, some of which may not have been reported to supervisors or peers. 
Although these concerns were not removed entirely, they were diminished in scale 
                                                          
12 A Research Mentorship Grant was awarded by the Department of Criminology and 
Criminal Justice at USC to cover printing and shipping costs as well as travel expenses 
for survey distribution and collection. 
13 The original design and non-disclosure agreement called for a mixed methods approach 
consisting of officer surveys and records of deadly force, pursuits, and collisions that are 
kept by the PGPD internal affairs unit.  
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relative to research based on official agency reports, focus groups, or individual officer 
interviews. 
Another advantage of the survey-based research design was the collection of 
information regarding all on-duty collisions, not only those that were reported to 
supervisors or some other member of the PGPD. The research design thereby improved 
upon prior studies of officer-involved vehicle collisions that have been limited to official 
government records of fatal collisions (e.g., Gustafson, 2012, 2015; Noh, 2011), serious 
collisions causing injury or death that were recorded by employing agencies (e.g., 
Gustafson, 2009; Rix et al., 1997), or collisions that met requirements for reporting to the 
state department of motor vehicles (e.g., Wolfe et al., 2015). An officer survey was also 
an advantageous means of measuring involvement in deadly force events and vehicle 
pursuits, both of which may go unreported for a variety of reasons. Although these 
benefits could be achieved in theory with observational methods, the associated costs 
would be prohibitive. Another way of collecting information directly from officers about 
negative outcomes while reducing concerns regarding social desirability bias is asking 
them to respond to hypothetical scenarios. For this reason and others, many researchers 
have collected self-reported misconduct data with officer surveys as well. For instance, 
Greene and Piquero (2000) administered surveys in the Philadelphia Police Department 
to a random sample of 504 officers from the population of 3,810 at the rank of patrol 
officer, sergeant, or lieutenant that elicited expected responses to hypothetical misconduct 
situations. Misconduct was operationalized in these vignettes as relatively favorable 
responses to hypothetical scenarios involving theft, excessive force, and accepting gifts 
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and meals. However, it is unknown how closely officer’ responses to hypothetical 
scenarios are related to their actual behaviors on the street.  
Another benefit of measuring negative officer outcomes with an officer survey 
instead of official records is that temporal variations have been found in the reporting of 
these behaviors by citizens and the official recording by agencies. First of all, differences 
have existed in citizen expectations of police over the course of American history. 
Second, procedures required for filing complaints have been eased for citizens. As a 
result of these changes and others, concerning officer behaviors are now more likely to be 
reported to employing agencies when observed by the public. Furthermore, calls for 
increased accountability have improved investigations of citizen complaints and other 
allegations of negative officer outcomes. In the PGPD and several other organizations 
nationwide, increased attention has been paid to on-duty collisions. In sum, differences 
may exist in official agency records of deadly force, pursuits, complaints, and collisions 
that are not driven by officer behaviors. Accurately measuring objective differences in 
negative PGPD officer outcomes was prioritized over the measurement of subjective 
differences in the recording these behaviors by the PGPD, which is also an important 
issue but beyond the scope of this research. 
The PGPD Officer Driving Experience Survey 
 Data for this study were collected with a survey of patrol officers and their 
supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants only) in the Prince George’s County Police 
Department. The study was limited to patrol, as opposed to including PGPD detectives, 
administrators, and those working non-patrol duties because the patrol division spends 
the most time behind the wheel on a per officer basis. Those PGPD officers killed in 
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vehicle collisions have exclusively been assigned to patrol as well. The survey instrument 
was pretested on November 6, 2014 by four members of the University of South Carolina 
Police Department who included one lieutenant, one sergeant, one corporal, and one 
officer. Included with the survey were a one page cover letter (see Appendix B) that 
explained the project and provided contact information for the author and Institutional 
Review Board at USC. The survey and cover letter were approved by the PGPD, 
Fraternal Order of Police, and dissertation committee. The survey packet also included a 
letter of support from Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 89 President Dean M. Jones, 
which emphasized the voluntary nature of the project but also asked officers for their 
participation (see Appendix C). The survey instrument, cover letter, and support letter 
were compiled in postage-paid envelopes that could be sealed after completion and 
returned in person or via mail to USC. 
Data were collected in the PGPD from patrol officers and their immediate 
supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants only), who were asked to participate in a survey 
concerning attitudes and experiences regarding driving, collisions, and policing broadly 
speaking. The surveys were administered at roll call meetings in district stations from 
November 13 to 16, 2014. The author attended roll calls in an attempt to solicit 
participation in the study from as many officers as possible across various shifts. A total 
of 19 roll calls were visited by the author over the course of 5 days. This included the day 
shift roll call meetings at 6:30 am, the evening shift roll calls at 3:30 pm, and the 
midnight shift roll call meetings at 11:30 pm, in addition to several swing shifts. Surveys 
in Districts One through Five were distributed in-person while those in District Six were 
dropped off with supervisors to hand out to their officers. 
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The author was given time at the beginning or end of each roll call meeting to 
introduce himself, describe the purpose of the study, and emphasize the anonymous 
nature of the survey (i.e., no identifying information would be collected and all raw data 
would be stored in the author’s locked office). Officers who volunteered to participate 
were then provided a questionnaire to be completed and returned in a sealed envelope 
(officers could either hand the envelope directly to the author or mail it with the paid-
postage at a later time). In addition, an online survey option was created and the link was 
included on the cover letters and emailed to patrol officers and supervisors in a final 
attempt to contact those officers who were not present at the roll calls. This in-person 
data collection procedure was modeled after research conducted by Hansen et al. (2015) 
on officer-involved collisions in eight California law enforcement agencies. 
A total of 329 surveys were returned that included 273 in-person, 54 by mail, and 
another 2 completed online. Captain Yuen in the Bureau of Patrol estimated that the 6 
PGPD district stations had 981 sworn officers at the time of this research, which equates 
to a 33.5 percent response rate. Alternatively, the BJS (2008) Census of State and Local 
Law Enforcement Agencies indicates that in 2008 there were 1,093 PGPD officers 
assigned to duties including civilian calls for service (Reaves, 2011). Based on this 
official government estimate of PGPD patrol strength in 2008, the 329 surveys represent 
a 30.1 percent response rate. In similar research conducted in eight California law 
enforcement agencies, Hansen et al. (2015) reported that at least one-third of patrol 
officers are absent from any given roll call meeting due to court appearances, sick leave, 
vacation leave, and other reasons. Response rates using this adjustment to the available 
PGPD patrol officer population are 50.3 percent based on the PGPD staffing estimate and 
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45.1 percent based on 2008 BJS figures (Reaves, 2011). Out of the 329 returned surveys, 
228 were returned with no missing data on any of the measures used in this study. 
Another 101 surveys were missing information on 1 or more variables. Because only 69.3 
percent of the surveys were complete, a strategy for addressing missing data was 
necessary. A copy of the survey instrument is available in Appendix D. 
Missing Data Strategy 
 Missing data is a common problem in real (not simulated) datasets (Royston & 
White, 2011). Nearly one in three surveys in this study (30.7 percent) had with missing 
information on one or more variables of interest. Analyses of a dataset with missing cases 
can result in biased and/or inefficient parameter estimates and biased standard errors 
(White, Royston, & Wood, 2009). All methods of dealing with missing data make 
assumptions about the nature of the missing data. Little and Rubin (2002) described three 
types of missing data, each of which should be dealt with differently. Data missing 
completely at random (MCAR) means that the probability of data being missing does not 
depend on observed or unobserved values (Little & Rubin, 2002). When all missing data 
in a dataset are MCAR, the missing data are ignorable and a complete case analysis may 
be conducted using listwise deletion. Listwise deletion is appropriate with data MCAR 
because the cases with no missing data may be assumed to be a random sample of all 
cases including those with data missing on one or more variables. A loss of power is the 
only drawback of handling data MCAR with listwise deletion. For instance, listwise 
deletion reduced the sample size in this study (N=329) to between 225 and 229 
depending on whether the model, a decrease of approximately one-quarter to one-third 
(see Appendix E). However, complete case analyses make more assumptions about the 
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missing data than current approaches including multiple imputation. Data missing at 
random (MAR) means that the probability of data being missing does not depend on the 
unobserved data, conditional on the observed data (Little & Rubin, 2002). A variety of 
imputation procedures have been developed for handling data MAR. Finally, data 
missing not at random (MNAR) means that the probability of data being missing does 
depend on the unobserved data, conditional on the observed data. MAR and MNAR 
cannot be distinguished with observed data alone (White et al., 2010). Multiple 
imputation, which was used in this study, assumes data is MAR although it may be used 
with MNAR data in certain circumstances (White et al., 2010).  
Multiple Imputation Model 
 Multiple imputation is a simulation-based statistical method of handling missing 
data (StataCorp, 2013). Multiple imputation was designed in 1970 to deal with missing 
data in survey research (Rubin, 1976). It has increased in popularity greatly since that 
time (StataCorp, 2013; White et al., 2010). Multiple imputation uses the distribution of 
observed data to estimate possible missing data values, which include random 
components to account for uncertainty of estimates (White et al., 2010). This process is 
repeated multiple times and results in datasets that are analyzed individually and 
identically to obtain parameter estimates (White et al., 2010). These parameter estimates 
are combined into an overall estimate and variance-covariance matrix using Rubin’s rules 
based on asymptotic theory and Bayesian statistics to obtain estimated coefficients, 
standard errors, and confidence intervals (White et al., 2010). The combined variance-
covariance matrix accounts for both within-imputation and between-imputation 
uncertainty (White et al., 2010). Multiple imputation produces unbiased estimates and 
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standard errors (White et al., 2010). Single imputation, which is an alternative to multiple 
imputation, does not capture between-imputation uncertainty and results in standard 
errors that are too small (White et al., 2010). Multiple imputation is available in many 
statistical software packages today (Horton & Kleinman, 2007). A multiple imputation 
program called ICE was written for Stata versions 9.2 and above (Royston, 2004, 2005). 
Stata version 11 included the first multiple imputation system (Royston & White, 2011). 
The current study used StataCorp’s (2013) Stata version 13.1 for Windows.  
 Missing data that is monotone means that there is a pattern to the missing data 
structure. An example is when missing data on one item means that all of the following 
items on that survey also are missing. The missing data in the current study is not 
patterned. This distinction is important because monotone missing data can be imputed 
sequentially without iteration (White et al., 2010). Multiple imputation by chained 
equations (MICE) is an approach developed to handle missing values on several variables 
that are not monotone missing, whereby an imputation model is built for each variable 
with missing values. Unlike single imputation, MICE requires iteration that accounts for 
possible dependence among the estimated parameters (StataCorp, 2013). Because there is 
a model for each variable, MICE is able to simultaneously handle different types of 
independent and control variables. This was important because the current study includes 
continuous, ordinal, nominal, and binary covariates. MICE has also been termed fully 
conditional specification and sequential regression multivariate imputation. According to 
StataCorp (2013), “The general idea behind MICE is to impute multiple variables 
iteratively via a sequence of univariate imputation models, one for each imputation 
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variable, with fully conditional specifications of prediction equations: all variables except 
the one being imputed are included” (p. 7). 
One of the reasons that MICE is a popular method of handling missing data is the 
ability to impute different types of variables (StataCorp, 2013). There are several options 
available for imputing continuous variables including linear regression, truncated 
regression, interval regression, poisson regression, and negative binomial regression. 
Linear regression is the default when there are more than 5 values but the other methods 
were developed to address truncated, censored, and overdispersed variables. In addition 
to truncated regression, an alternative method developed for continuous data with a 
restricted range is predictive mean matching (PMM), which was used in this study. PMM 
only samples from values that are actually observed in the data and this usually results in 
imputed values that closely match observed values in the data (Royston and White, 2011; 
StataCorp, 2013). This is beneficial when the assumption of normality may be violated 
and when extrapolation beyond the observed values is unnecessary (StataCorp, 2013). 
PMM was used to impute the 4 independent variables and the 11 continuous control 
variables so that their minimum and maximum values did not exceed those actually 
reported by PGPD officers. The dichotomous, nominal, and ordinal variables were 
imputed using logistic, multinomial logistic, and ordinal logistic regression, respectively. 
Standard texts on multiple imputation suggested creating three to five imputed datasets, 
however, the trend has been towards larger numbers of imputations (Royston & White, 
2011; White et al., 2010). Graham, Olchowski, and Gilreath (2007) suggested more than 
20 imputations when the fraction of missing data was between 0.1 and 0.3. This study 
used 50 imputations. 
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Description of Measures and Sample 
Dependent Variables 
The outcome of interest is PGPD officer involvement in on-duty vehicle 
collisions. Collisions were limited to those involving on-duty officers because many of 
the predictors are based on officers being on duty. Officers were instructed to limit their 
responses to on-duty vehicle collisions that occurred during the previous four year period 
only (November, 2010 to November, 2014). Collision involvement is operationalized 
several different ways to determine whether the effects of involvement in vehicle 
pursuits, deadly force events, excessive force complaints, and complaints for other 
reasons on vehicle collisions varies among officers with multiple collisions and among 
the subset of at-fault collisions. 
Considering the effects of negative outcomes on any vehicle collision 
involvement and on the frequency of on-duty collisions allows for the possibility that 
repeat offenders are quantitatively and qualitatively distinct from their peers with zero or 
only one collision. For instance, Hansen et al. (2015) found different variables predicted 
involvement in zero versus one versus two or more on-duty collisions among patrol 
officers in eight California agencies. Collision frequency was measured in the survey as a 
count but was recoded for this study to indicate involvement in zero, one, or multiple 
collisions.   
There exists some debate in the literature regarding whether it is best to study all 
negative police outcomes or the subset of preventable negative outcomes only. This 
debate has been most evident concerning the measurement of all use of force incidents 
versus excessive force incidents only but an analogous issue arises in the current study 
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regarding the study of all vehicle collisions versus preventable collisions only. On the one 
hand, police officers are largely defined by their authorized use of force in particular 
conditions so some amount of force is unfortunately unavoidable. This suggests that it 
may be more fruitful to focus on excessive force incidents only, which are far less 
frequent in nature and are more likely to result in complaints of brutality. However, 
definitions of excessive force are subjective. For example, Klockars (1996) suggested the 
following test: “Excessive force should be defined as the use of more force than a highly 
skilled police officer would find necessary to use in that particular situation” (p. 8). 
However, it was unclear how these highly skilled police officers could be identified and 
how many were likely to exist in an agency. Definitions of excessive force also vary 
across time and place, for instance, between the police, courts, and public (Adams, 1999). 
For these reasons, some have advocated for examining all use of force incidents to 
remove the inherent subjectivity in defining excessive force specifically (Adams, 1999). 
Adams (1999) supported his position with an analogy to hospitals tracking mortality 
rates, which could be caused by misbehavior or many other factors, as a means of 
identifying problematic outliers. The current study will examine all collisions as well as a 
subset of at-fault collisions, recognizing the subjectivity in this determination made by 
agency investigators. An earlier study of serious collisions in England and Wales found 
that only 7 percent were preventable by the officers involved (Rix et al., 1997). 
On-Duty Collision Involvement. On-duty collision involvement is a dichotomous 
outcome variable defined as one or more on-duty crashes in the previous four years (1 = 
yes; 0 = no). This variable enabled estimates of the effects of negative outcome 
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involvement on officers with zero collisions compared to their peers who had been in at 
least one collision during the study period. 
On-Duty Collision Frequency. Officers were asked to report the number of total on-
duty collisions they had been involved in during the past four years. On-duty collision 
frequency is a trichotomous recode of the count variable (i.e., zero collisions, one 
collision, two or more collisions). This recoding was necessary to account for the highly 
skewed distribution of the collision frequency variable. It enabled comparisons of the 
effects of negative outcome involvement on vehicle collisions for officers with only one 
collision and their peers in the PGPD with two or more collisions in the previous four 
years. 
At-Fault Collision Involvement. Analyses were also conducted on a subset of collisions 
where the officer was judged by the PGPD to be at-fault for any reason. Analyses of the 
subset of at-fault collisions was necessary to see if a difference existed between the 
characteristics that make an officer more likely to be involved in any collisions as 
compared with preventable collisions attributed specifically to officers’ actions. Previous 
researchers have followed a similar path when examining other negative outcomes, for 
instance, citizen complaints and a subset of founded complaints. Similar to on-duty 
collision involvement, at-fault collision involvement was first modeled as a dichotomous 
variable that indicated one or more at-fault collisions in the past four year period (1 = yes; 
0 = no). 
At-Fault Collision Frequency. At-fault collision frequency is a measure of the number 
of on-duty vehicle collisions in the prior four years that were ultimately found by the 
PGPD to be preventable. At-fault collision frequency was initially measured as a count 
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but was recoded trichotomously (i.e., zero collisions, one collision, two or more 
collisions) for this study.   
Independent Variables 
The primary area of inquiry for this study is the relationship between officer 
involvement in vehicle collisions and their involvement in other negative outcomes. 
Negative outcomes were operationalized as those currently monitored by the PGPD 
internal affairs unit’s early intervention system (IAPro) that included involvement in 
vehicle pursuits and deadly force events in addition to receiving complaints for excessive 
force and for all other reasons. This design thereby allowed the PGPD to determine the 
events they deemed concerning and worth monitoring to identify problematic officer 
behaviors. Use of force events broadly speaking are too numerous for officers to be able 
to specify an accurate number over the four year study period and would thereby 
introduce unnecessary error into the study. For this reason, use of force events were 
limited to deadly force incidents and those that resulted in citizen complaints of excessive 
force. 
Vehicle Pursuits. Respondents estimated the number of vehicle pursuits they were in 
during the previous four years. The number of self-reported pursuits involving PGPD 
officers ranged from 0 to 60 during the period of November, 2010 to November, 2014. 
Deadly Force Events. Officers were asked to report the number of deadly force events 
they had been involved in during the previous four year period. Officers were instructed 
that deadly force events were defined as times when officers used force likely to cause 
death or serious injury, including, but not limited to, the use of a firearm. PGPD officers 
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reported involvement in 0 to 10 incidents involving deadly force over the 4 year study 
period. 
Excessive Force Complaints. Excessive force may be defined in two ways: too much 
force in one incident, or appropriate amounts of force in too many incidents (Adams, 
1995). Citizen complaints for excessive force in the current study are based on perceived 
use of too much force in a single incident. A survey question asked officers to report how 
many excessive force complaints they received in the past four years. The maximum was 
an officer who reported 7 to 8 excessive force complaints. These were averaged so the 
number of excessive force complaints ranged from 0 to 7.5. 
Other Complaints. Finally, PGPD officers reported the number of complaints they had 
received for all other reasons during the previous four years. The other complaints 
variable ranged from 0 to 10. The purpose of this variable was to capture the variety of 
problematic behaviors that officers can commit, which was noted by Klockars (1996) 
when he stated, “police can engage in all sorts of objectionable behavior without 
transgressing criminal or civil definitions of excessive force” (pp. 6-7). 
Control Variables 
A variety of control variables were included in this study to isolate the effect of 
involvement in vehicle pursuits, deadly force incidents, excessive force complaints, and 
complaints for other reasons on officer-involved vehicle collisions in the PGPD. Control 
variables were necessary because they had non-zero correlations with the dependent 
variable(s) as well as one or more independent variables. Failure to control for variables 
correlated with the dependent and independent variables could have resulted in 
misspecified models and thus misleading and potentially incorrect conclusions. The 
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control variables were selected based on theory, prior research, and practical 
considerations regarding the number of predictors that could be included. This became 
particularly important when the final sample size was considerably smaller than expected. 
Variables were included to control for officer demographics and background information 
as well as officer attitudes toward a variety of job-related items including supervision in 
the PGPD, productivity and workload, and limitations on their behaviors.  
A number of attitudinal questions that have been used by prior researchers to 
study officer-involved vehicle collisions, use of force, and other negative outcomes were 
included on the survey instrument. Several scales informed by theory and prior research 
were proposed based on these attitudinal measures. Scales were created because they are 
an efficient data reduction device (Babbie, 2013), which was necessary to specify 
regression models with 6 to 10 cases per independent variable as recommended by Neter, 
Wasserman, and Kutner (1989). There are a maximum of 34 variables in the models with 
329 cases, or 9.68 cases per variable, which was a conservative interpretation of Neter et 
al.’s (1989) recommendations. Scale factor and reliability analyses were conducted on the 
proposed scales before they were created and included in this study. These steps resulted 
in dropping one or more items from several of the proposed scales. In other cases, the 
proposed scales were not created because they did not meet the following requirements. 
First, Principal axis factor (PAF) analyses determined whether or not the items that 
comprised the proposed scales in-fact loaded onto a single factor in the data. Following 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), only those items with minimum factor loadings of 0.32 
were retained and combined into additive scales. Next, reliability analyses were 
conducted on the scales and Cronbach’s alpha values were examined. A total of 29 
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individual survey items that were measured on 5-point Likert scales were summed to 
create the following 8 scales. 
Productivity Links. Several statements allowed officers to voice their sentiments 
regarding the relationship between officer productivity and involvement in five types of 
negative outcomes. Respondents indicated the strength of their agreement on a four-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree) to the following statements: (1) 
“An officer who makes many arrests will get in many vehicle collisions,” (2) “An officer 
who handles many non-crime calls for service will get in many vehicle collisions,” (3) 
“An officer who makes many arrests will get many citizen complaints,” (4) “An officer 
who makes many arrests will get in many deadly force events,” and (5) “An officer who 
makes many arrests will get in many vehicle pursuits.” Principal axis factor analysis 
showed that the first of the five items had a factor loading of only 0.27 so it was 
discarded. The remaining four items (factor loadings > 0.53) were summed to create the 
productivity links scale, which demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (α = 0.74).  
District Productivity. Officers were provided a series of four questions that asked them 
to rate the productivity of their district relative to neighboring districts (1 = much lower to 
5 = much higher). The following questions were included to comprise the district 
productivity scale: (1) “How would you rate the number of violent crime arrests made by 
your district relative to neighboring districts?” (2) “How would you rate the number of 
non-violent crime arrests made by your district relative to neighboring districts?” (3) 
“How would you rate the number of calls for service handled by your district relative to 
neighboring districts?” (4) “How would you rate your district’s overall level of 
productivity relative to neighboring districts?” Principal axis factor analysis showed that 
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the four items loaded onto a single factor (factor loadings > 0.72). Scale reliability 
analysis demonstrated strong internal consistency (α = 0.91). 
Officer Productivity. Officers were also asked to rate their own productivity levels 
relative to peers in the PGPD with a similar set of four questions as follows: (1) “How 
would you rate the number of violent crime arrests you make relative to other PGPD 
officers?” (2) “How would you rate the number of non-violent crime arrests you make 
relative to other PGPD officers? (3) “How would you rate the number of calls for service 
you handle relative to other PGPD officers?” (4) “How would you rate your overall level 
of productivity relative to other PGPD officers?” Responses were provided on a five 
point Likert-type scale (1 = much lower to 5 = much higher). As expected, these four 
items loaded onto a single factor (factor loadings > 0.78) and were therefore summed 
together to create the officer productivity scale (α = 0.91). 
Preferred Assignment. As another means of measuring officers’ sentiments towards 
productivity and workload, three questions asked officers about the characteristics of 
their preferred assignment. The survey items read as follows: (1) “If given the choice, 
would you prefer to work in an area with a high level of violent crime?” (2) “If given the 
choice, would you prefer to work in an area with a high level of calls for service?” (3) “If 
given the choice, would you prefer to work on a particularly busy shift? (1 = yes; 0 = no). 
The three items loaded onto a single factor (factor loadings > 0.71) and showed strong 
internal consistency (α = 0.78) so they were added together to create the preferred 
assignment scale.  
Supervision Behaviors. Respondents reported also on supervision practices in the 
PGPD. More specifically, they were asked a series of questions to gauge the perceived 
likelihood that supervisors would enforce certain policies. Specifically, officers were 
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asked, “How likely are supervisors in your agency to enforce policies related to:” (1) 
seatbelt use, (2) collision reporting, (3) speeding in violation of policy, (4) emergency 
driving, (5) pursuit driving, (6) excessive force, and (7) misconduct? For each item, 
officers were asked to respond on a five-point, Likert-type scale from (0 = N/A (no such 
policy in department), 1 = very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = likely, 4 = very likely). Similar 
measures of supervision were used by Hansen et al. (2015) in a survey of eight California 
law enforcement agencies. Although Hansen et al. (2015) focused on supervision of 
agency driving policies regarding seatbelt use, cell phone use, texting, speeds, emergency 
responses, and vehicle pursuits, their study still evidenced that supervision of agency 
policies could indeed impact collision involvement.  
Principal axis factor analysis indicated that the seven supervision behavior items 
loaded onto two factors. The first factor included supervision of seatbelt use, speeding, 
and emergency driving (factor loadings > 0.57). These three items were combined to 
create the routine events supervision scale (α = 0.75). The remaining items that measured 
the likelihood of supervisors enforcing PGPD policies regarding collision reporting, 
pursuit driving, excessive force, and misconduct loaded together (factor loadings > 0.64) 
and were therefore summed into the rare events supervision scale (α = 0.90). 
Driving Limitations. Several items were based on the Police Foundation (Weisburd et 
al., 2001) use of force survey but were altered for this study to focus on officer views 
toward limitations on driving instead of use of force. According to Weisburd et al., the 
Police Foundation use of force survey instrument was based on their earlier work (i.e., 
Pate & Hamilton, 1992; Wycoff & Oettmeier, 1993), the Criminal Justice Commission 
(1995) survey of the Queensland Police Service, and consulting with a number of 
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policing scholars. The following statements were included to measure PGPD officers 
views towards limitations on their driving: (1) “It is sometimes acceptable to drive 
outside of policy to catch someone who physically assaulted an officer,” (2) “It is 
sometimes acceptable to drive outside of policy during routine patrol,” (3) “Police 
department rules about driving should not be any stricter than required by law,” (4) 
“Always following the driving policies is not compatible with getting the job done,” (5) 
“Police officers are not permitted to drive as is often necessary in policing,” and (6) 
“Officers in the PGPD violate driving polices more often than necessary.” The final 
question was reverse-coded for consistency. Responses were measured on a four-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). Principal axis factor analysis 
demonstrated that these six survey items loaded onto two factors. One factor included the 
first four items (factor loadings > 0.36), which were summed to create the driving 
limitations scale (α = 0.63)14. The internal consistency of this scale is slightly lower than 
recommended by many, in terms of validating a scale, but it was included to account for 
some of variation in the dependent variables. Higher scores on the scale indicate less 
favorable views towards agency limitations on police officer driving behaviors. 
Other Limitations. Other survey items remained as originally posited by the Police 
Foundation (Weisburd et al., 2001) and likewise focused on officer attitudes regarding 
use of force in a broader context beyond driving. Following Weisburd et al., three items 
were included to measure attitudes towards limitations on officers’ behaviors in a broader 
context beyond driving: (1) “In order to do their jobs, patrol officers must sometimes 
overlook department policies,” (2) “In order to do their jobs, patrol officers must 
                                                          
14 The final two items from the originally proposed six-item scale were not combined 
because of negative bivariate Pearson’s correlation coefficients. 
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sometimes overlook laws and legal guidelines,” and (3) “It is okay for police officers to 
use more aggressive tactics than they otherwise would use if the community has asked 
them to do so.” Respondents indicated the strength of their agreement on a four-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). These statements loaded 
together (factor loadings > 0.59) and were therefore combined as originally proposed to 
create the three-item other limitations scale (α = 0.69). This scale demonstrated internal 
consistency just slightly lower than the oft-recommended 0.7. Higher scores on this scale 
indicate less favorable views towards limitations on officer behaviors other than those 
related to on-duty driving. 
Officer Characteristics. Fourteen officer demographic and background variables were 
also included as controls in this study. Three of these control variables were nominal 
(race/ethnicity, educational attainment, and district assignment) and were therefore 
entered into the models as sets of dummy variables. Thus, there were actually 22 
variables that assessed officer characteristics in the regression models that are explained 
in the following chapter. Officer age was measured continuously in years15. Male officers 
have frequently been found to be overrepresented in negative officer outcomes including 
collisions (Noh, 2011; Rix et al., 1997). Accordingly, this study includes controls for 
officer gender with the variable male (1 = yes; 0 = no). Officer race/ethnicity was 
measured with dummy variables for the following categories: African American, 
                                                          
15 The survey also included an item to assess respondents’ law enforcement experience, 
which was measured continuously in years. However, when included together, age, law 
enforcement experience, and officer rank exhibited multicollinearity issues as evidenced 
by Variance Inflation Factor values above 2.5 and Pearson’s bivariate correlation 
coefficients greater than 0.7. Law enforcement experience was removed because it had 
the largest VIF and because when age was removed the Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
between law enforcement experience and officer rank remained above 0.7. 
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Caucasian, Hispanic, and Other (1 = yes; 0 = no)16. Education was measured in terms of 
attainment, which is more common in the policing research than achievement or 
undergraduate major. Officers were asked to select their highest level of education from 
the following five options: high school, less than two years of college, Associate’s 
degree, and Bachelor’s degree or higher17 (1 = yes; 0 = no). Officers reported whether or 
not they were in a committed relationship (i.e., married or in a long-term relationship) (1 
= yes; 0 = no) and whether they have any children (1 = yes; 0 = no). These variables were 
necessary because, as informal social controls, they have insulated officers from 
involvement in collisions (Hansen et al., 2015) and other problematic officer behaviors 
(see, e.g., White & Kane, 2013). To account for potential differences between officers 
and supervisors (see, e.g., Hansen et al., 2015; Kane & White, 2009), a dummy officer 
rank measure was included in the models (1 = yes; 0 = no)18. Officers also reported 
which PGPD district (1-6) they were assigned to, which was measured with a set of 
dummy variables because there was no natural ordering to the district assignments. 
Officers were also asked to report if they had any prior military experience (1 = 
yes; 0 = no). This study also controlled for previous employment as a sworn officer by 
another law enforcement agency with the prior policing experience variable (1 = yes; 0 = 
no). These two measures were included to control for potential differences in driving 
                                                          
16 Caucasian officers served as the reference group in all analyses. 
17 The survey instrument included categories for Bachelor’s degree and graduate degree 
(Master’s degree, Juris Doctor, Ph.D.). These two categories were combined into 
Bachelor’s degree or higher because few PGPD officers reported having earned graduate 
degrees. Bachelor’s degree or higher served as the reference group in all analyses. 
18 The survey instrument included categories for three ranks: officer, corporal, and 
supervisor (sergeant or lieutenant). Officer rank was dichotomized for this study because 
only two supervisors reported involvement in two or more collisions, which presented 
perfect prediction problems in the multinomial regression models. 
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training in particular between these officers and their peers in the PGPD. To account for 
general propensity towards traffic collisions, the off-duty collisions variable assessed the 
number of off-duty collisions each respondent was involved in during the four year study 
period. Officer fatigue due to long work-weeks, secondary employment, and lengthy 
daily commutes is positively related to collision involvement (e.g., Vila, 2000). To 
account for these differences, officers were asked to report their average, weekly number 
of law enforcement hours they spent working for the PGPD in addition to the average, 
weekly number of other employment hours outside the PGPD. Respondents also provided 
the average length in minutes of their round-trip daily commute to work at the PGPD. The 
final three measures were continuous variables. 
Summary of Measures 
 This study examines the relationship between officer involvement in on-duty 
vehicle collisions and other negative outcomes. The outcome of interest—officer 
involved vehicle collisions—will be measured several different ways. The effects of 
negative outcome involvement are also considered on a subset of collisions deemed by 
the agency to be preventable. The four independent variables include officer involvement 
in deadly force situations, vehicle pursuits, citizen complaints for excessive force, and 
citizen complaints for all other reasons. In order to isolate the effects of these predictors 
on collisions, 26 control variables are included in this study. The controls include 8 scales 
that measure constructs such as promotional ambitions, attitudes regarding supervision, 
and views towards restrictions on driving. Control variables are also included for officer 
demographic and employment background variables. Descriptive statistics for the sample 
are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Sample description. 
 Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval Min.-Max. 
Dependent Variables:      
On-Duty Collision Involvement   0.451 0.028   0.396   0.505 0-1 
On-Duty Collision Frequency    0.654 0.049   0.566   0.742 0-2 
At-Fault Collision Involvement   0.296 0.025   0.246   0.345 0-1 
At-Fault Collision Frequency    0.353 0.033   0.289   0.417 0-2 
Independent Variables:      
Vehicle Pursuits   1.962 0.263   1.445   2.479 0-60 
Deadly Force Events   0.121 0.389   0.045   0.198 0-10 
Excessive Force Complaints   0.370 0.052   0.268   0.472  0-7.5 
Other Complaints   0.836 0.095   0.650   1.023 0-10 
Control Variables:      
Male     0.871 0.019   0.835   0.908 0-1 
Age   32.068 0.426 31.231 32.906 22-57 
Race-Ethnicity      
     African American   0.392 0.027   0.339   0.445 0-1 
     Caucasian   0.426 0.028   0.372   0.480 0-1 
     Hispanic   0.084 0.015   0.053   0.114 0-1 
     Other    0.099 0.017   0.066   0.131 0-1 
Educational Attainment      
     High School   0.131 0.019   0.095   0.168 0-1 
     2 years or Less of College   0.360 0.027   0.307   0.412 0-1 
     Associate’s Degree   0.122 0.018   0.086   0.158 0-1 
     Bachelor’s Degree or Higher   0.387 0.027   0.334   0.440 0-1 
In Committed Relationship   0.758 0.024   0.711   0.805 0-1 
Have Children   0.472 0.028   0.418   0.527 0-1 
Officer Rank   0.677 0.026   0.626   0.728 0-1 
District      
     1   0.195 0.022   0.152   0.238 0-1 
     2   0.239 0.024   0.193   0.286 0-1 
     3   0.183 0.021   0.141   0.225 0-1 
     4   0.220 0.023   0.175   0.265 0-1 
     5   0.092 0.016   0.061   0.124 0-1 
     6   0.071 0.014   0.043   0.099 0-1 
Prior Policing Experience   0.135 0.019   0.097   0.172 0-1 
Prior Military Experience   0.249 0.024   0.202   0.297 0-1 
Law Enforcement Hours    46.862 0.619 45.646 48.079 5-92 
Other Employment Hours   5.461 0.421   4.634   6.289 0-40 
Daily Commute  50.015 2.149 45.788 54.243 1.5-300 
Off-Duty Collisions   0.301 0.037   0.229   0.373 0-5 
Productivity Links 8.891 0.121   8.653   9.128 4-16 
Peer Productivity  13.929 0.202 13.532 14.326 4-20 
Officer Productivity  12.554 0.176 12.208 12.899 4-20 
Preferred Assignment  1.998 0.067   1.867   2.130 0-3 
Routine Events Supervision  9.330 0.111   9.111   9.549 3-12 
Rare Events Supervision  14.000 0.145 13.713 14.285 3-16 
Driving Limitations  10.318 0.120 10.082 10.554 4-16 
Other Limitations  6.657 0.098   6.463   6.851 3-12 




Prior research suggests that repeat officer “offenders” are quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from their peers in terms of use of force incidents (Christopher 
Commission, 1991), corruption (Mollen Commission, 1994), and vehicle collisions 
(Hansen et al., 2015). Accordingly, two modeling strategies were used to assess whether 
officer involvement in on-duty vehicle collisions was impacted by their involvement in 
other negative on-duty outcomes. First, binomial logistic regression was used to 
determine the extent to which the independent variables predicted involvement in any on-
duty collisions, net of statistical controls (see Table 5.1). This step in the analysis 
assessed whether officers involved in vehicle pursuits and deadly force events, in 
addition to those who received complaints for excessive force and other reasons, were 
more likely to be involved in any on-duty collisions compared to their counterparts who 
were not involved in these events in the prior four year period. In other words, the 
binomial model distinguished between officers with any on-duty collision experienced 
compared to those with none. This process was repeated with a subset of collisions that 
were ultimately judged to be preventable and therefore the drivers were ruled at-fault (see 
Table 5.3).  
A multinomial logistic regression model was used to gauge whether negative 
outcome involvement is associated with repeated involvement in on-duty collisions (see 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Using on-duty collision frequency (the categorical operationalization 
of on-duty collision experience) as the dependent variable and letting “two or more 
collisions” serve as the reference category, the multinomial model explores whether self-
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reported involvement in pursuits, deadly force situations, complaints for brutality, and 
complaints for other reasons, predict officer likelihood of experiencing “zero” versus 
multiple and “one” versus multiple on-duty collisions. This strategy assesses whether 
other negative on-duty outcomes are associated with the risk of being a repeat-on-duty 
collision “offender.” Once again, the process was repeated with the subset of at-fault 
collisions (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6) but control variables measuring PGPD District 
assignment and prior law enforcement employment were removed from the analysis of 
at-fault collision frequency due to issues of perfect prediction. 
Several model diagnostic tests were used to determine whether harmful levels of 
collinearity would bias the regression parameter estimates. First, none of the bivariate 
correlations between the independent variables reach the traditional │.70│threshold 
(Pearson correlation coefficients < 0.63). Second, the variance inflation factors failed to 
reach the commonly used thresholds of 2.5 (Allison, 2001), 4.0 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007), or 10 (Menard, 1995; Neter et al., 1989). It appears that harmful levels of 
collinearity are not a concern in the following analyses. Identical regression models were 
fit to a subset of surveys that had no missing data on any variables. This analytical step 
was conducted to check the robustness of the results based on multiply imputed data. 







 Chapter Five provides the results of four regression models that examine the 
impact of officer involvement in deadly force, vehicle pursuits, and citizen complaints on 
involvement in on-duty vehicle collisions. This approach allows for the examination of 
all on-duty collisions and the subset of on-duty collisions ruled by the PGPD to be 
preventable. The binary and multinomial logistic regression models also compare the 
effects of negative outcomes given different amounts of on-duty and at-fault collision 
involvement. Tables presenting the complete case analyses are provided in Appendix E.  
Any On-Duty Collision Involvement 
Table 5.1 presents the results of a binary logistic regression model that examines 
the effects of deadly force, vehicle pursuits, citizen complaints for excessive force, and 
other citizen complaints on involvement in any vehicle pursuits between November, 2010 
and November, 2014, net of statistical controls (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989)19. All four 
negative officer outcomes are measured continuously. The results indicate that receiving 
citizen complaints for reasons other than excessive force has a statistically significant 
impact on officer involvement in one or more vehicle collisions during the same four year 
timeframe (b = 0.280, p ˂ 0.01). This result is replicated in the analysis of complete 
                                                          
19 Statistics that estimate quantities can be combined across multiply imputed datasets 
using Rubin’s rules although some must be transformed to be normally distributed. 
Statistics that are not estimators cannot be combined, which include likelihood ratio test 
statistics, chi-square statistics, and goodness of fit test statistics (White et al., 2010). 
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Table 5.1. Logistic regression of undesired events on on-duty collision involvement. 
 
 Any On-Duty Collisions (1 = yes) 
 b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:   
Vehicle Pursuits     0.044 (0.042) 1.045 
Deadly Force Events     0.117 (0.411) 1.124 
Excessive Force Complaints     0.173 (0.191) 1.189 
Other Complaints     0.280 (0.106)** 1.323 
Control Variables:   
Male   - 0.105 (0.423) 0.900 
Age   - 0.034 (0.028) 0.966 
Race-Ethnicity   
     African American   - 0.543 (0.328) 0.581 
     Hispanic   - 0.576 (0.518) 0.562 
     Other      0.001 (0.466) 1.001 
Educational Attainment   
     High School     0.497 (0.429) 1.644 
     2 years or Less of College   - 0.029 (0.319) 0.971 
     Associate’s Degree     0.308 (0.445) 1.361 
In Committed Relationship   - 0.155 (0.329) 0.856 
Have Children     0.025 (0.328) 1.025 
Officer Rank     0.202 (0.394) 1.224 
District   
     2   - 0.500 (0.475) 0.607 
     3     0.481 (0.444) 1.618 
     4   - 0.394 (0.429) 0.674 
     5   - 1.200 (0.620)* 0.301 
     6   - 0.214 (0.643) 0.808 
Prior Policing Experience     0.095 (0.402) 1.099 
Prior Military Experience     0.139 (0.320) 1.150 
Law Enforcement Hours    - 0.021 (0.013) 0.979 
Other Employment Hours   0.065 (0.020)*** 1.067 
Daily Commute   - 0.001 (0.004) 0.999 
Off-Duty Collisions      0.996 (0.259)*** 2.707 
Productivity Links     0.019 (0.073) 1.021 
Peer Productivity    - 0.034 (0.059) 0.966 
Officer Productivity    - 0.021 (0.053) 0.979 
Preferred Assignment    - 0.067 (0.121) 0.936 
Routine Event Supervision      0.043 (0.087) 1.044 
Rare Events Supervision      0.028 (0.064) 1.028 
Driving Limitations    - 0.076 (0.074) 0.927 
Other Limitations      0.032 (0.096) 1.032 
Constant     1.779 (2.131) 6.046 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 
and odds ratios (OR). ***p ≤ .001 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test).  
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surveys only (N=228) as well (b = 0.403, p ˂ 0.01) (see Table E.1). Odds ratios 
demonstrate that each citizen complaint received for reasons other than excessive force 
increases the relative odds of 1 or more on-duty collisions instead of 0 by 32.3 percent. 
Another way of interpreting these effects is calculating the predicted probability 
of collision involvement for officers conditional on different numbers of other citizen 
complaints, holding all other variables in the model at their mean values. An advantage of 
this approach is straightforward interpretation—the probability of failure given different 
possible values of independent and/or control variables. A disadvantage of this approach 
is that a single officer cannot actually represent the mean of all variables. For instance, an 
officer cannot have the mean number of children (0.47) reported in the PGPD survey.  
The probability of 1 or more vehicle collisions during the study period given 0 
citizen complaints for reasons other than excessive force was 44.8 percent when all other 
variables are held at their means. However, the probability of being in at least 1 collision 
is 51.7 percent for officers who receive 1 citizen complaint for any reason except force, 
which increases to 58.6 percent among officers with 2 other citizen complaints. The 
probability of collision involvement increases to 71.1 percent for officers with 4 citizen 
complaints for reasons except force. In summary, the probability of being in 1 or more 
on-duty collisions in the previous 4 years is less than 50 percent for PGPD officers with 0 
complaints but the probability exceeds this threshold among officers with 1 or more other 
complaints when all other covariates in the model are held at their mean values. Deadly 
force, pursuits, and force complaints are not significantly associated with on-duty 
collisions, which is also true in the complete case analysis. 
 
124 
 Three control variables exhibit statistically significant effects on involvement in 
one or more collisions during the four year study period. The number of off-duty 
collisions is a significant predictor of involvement in on-duty collisions in the PGPD (b = 
0.996, p ˂ 0.001). More specifically, each off-duty collision increases the relative odds of 
an officer being in at least 1 collision as opposed to 0 collisions by 170.7 percent. The 
probability of being in an on-duty collision when all other predictors are held at their 
mean values is 43.2 percent for officers given 0 off-duty collisions, 67.3 percent for 
officers in 1 off-duty collision, and 84.8 percent for officers in 2 off-duty collisions. Off-
duty collision frequency was also significantly associated with on-duty collision 
involvement in the complete case analysis (b = 1.287, p ˂ 0.001). 
Secondary employment is also significantly related to on-duty collision 
involvement (b = 0.065, p ˂ 0.001). A significant relationship between secondary 
employment and any collision involvement was also found in the complete case analysis 
(b = 0.068, p ˂ 0.01). Each hour worked outside of the PGPD increases the relative odds 
of 1 or more on-duty collisions versus 0 collisions by 6.7 percent. The probability of 
being in an on-duty collision is 41.8 percent given no employment outside the PGPD. 
However, the probability increases to 49.9 percent for officers working an average of 5 
hours per week in second jobs and 58.0 percent for officers with an average of 10 hours 
per week of secondary employment.  
Finally, officers assigned to District Five are significantly less likely than officers 
in District One to be in one or more on-duty collisions (b = - 1.200, p ˂ 0.05). The 
relative odds of 1 or more collisions instead of 0 collisions is 69.9 percent lower for 
officers in District Five than their peers in the comparison group (District One). Every 
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officer patrolling District Five has a probability of any on-duty collisions in the previous 
4 years equal to 28.3 percent while each peer in District One has a probability of 1 or 
more collisions equal to 56.7 percent when all other covariates are held at their means. 
Overall, officers in District One are approximately twice as likely as officers District Five 
to be in an on-duty collision in the last four years. There are no significant effects of 
District assignment in the complete case analysis of any collision involvement. 
To summarize the results so far, the number of citizen complaints received for 
reasons other than excessive force, the number of off-duty collisions, the number of hours 
worked outside the PGPD, and assignment to District One as opposed to District Five all 
significantly increase the likelihood of involvement in one or more vehicle collisions 
during the four year study period among PGPD patrol officers and their supervisors. 
Deadly force incidents, vehicle pursuits, and citizen complaints for force were not 
significantly related to any collision involvement.  
On-Duty Collision Frequency 
 The results of a multinomial logistic regression that examines the frequency of 
officer on-duty collision experience are provided in Table 5.2, which presents a 
comparison of officers in zero collisions versus one collision and Table 5.3, which 
compares officers in zero versus two or more collisions and officers in one collision 
versus multiple collisions. Consistent with the previous binomial logistic regression that 
considers 0 versus 1 or more on-duty collisions, the number of citizen complaints for 
reasons other than excessive force is significantly associated with being in 0 collisions 
versus 1 collision (b = - 0.365, p ˂ 0.01). Every citizen complaint for a reason except 
force decreases the relative odds of 0 collisions instead of 1 collision by 30.5 percent. For 
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Table 5.2. Multinomial regression of undesired events on on-duty collision frequency. 
 
 Zero vs. One 
 b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:   
Vehicle Pursuits    - 0.024 (0.052) 0.976 
Deadly Force Events    - 0.032 (0.436) 0.969 
Excessive Force Complaints    - 0.161 (0.216) 0.851 
Other Complaints    - 0.365 (0.117)** 0.695 
Control Variables:   
Male      0.262 (0.491) 1.299 
Age    - 0.010 (0.032) 0.991 
Race-Ethnicity   
     African American      0.809 (0.403)* 2.246 
     Hispanic      0.375 (0.613) 1.455 
     Other     - 0.305 (0.529) 0.737 
Educational Attainment   
     High School    - 0.307 (0.545) 0.735 
     2 years or Less of College    - 0.067 (0.385) 0.935 
     Associate’s Degree    - 0.041 (0.546) 0.960 
In Committed Relationship    - 0.140 (0.415) 0.869 
Have Children      0.234 (0.398) 1.264 
Officer Rank      0.177 (0.447) 1.194 
District   
     2      0.277 (0.567) 1.320 
     3    - 0.299 (0.534) 0.741 
     4      0.597 (0.518) 1.816 
     5      1.211 (0.757) 3.356 
     6      0.159 (0.751) 1.172 
Prior Policing Experience      0.415 (0.520) 1.514 
Prior Military Experience    - 0.083 (0.384) 0.920 
Law Enforcement Hours       0.019 (0.017) 1.019 
Other Employment Hours     - 0.040 (0.024) 0.961 
Daily Commute       0.000 (0.004) 1.000 
Off-Duty Collisions     - 0.947 (0.286)*** 0.388 
Productivity Links      0.043 (0.086) 1.044 
Peer Productivity       0.003 (0.068) 1.003 
Officer Productivity     - 0.011 (0.062) 0.989 
Preferred Assignment       0.000 (0.146) 1.000 
Routine Event Supervision       0.004 (0.102) 1.004 
Rare Events Supervision       0.014 (0.071) 1.014 
Driving Limitations       0.181 (0.091)* 1.199 
Other Limitations     - 0.134 (0.119) 0.875 
Constant    - 1.141 (2.576) 0.320 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 
and odds ratios (OR). ***p ≤ .001 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test).  
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Table 5.3. Multinomial regression of undesired events on on-duty collision frequency. 
 
 Zero vs. Two or More One vs. Two or More 
 b (SE) OR b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:     
Vehicle Pursuits   - 0.070 (0.052) 0.932   - 0.046 (0.050) 0.955 
Deadly Force Events   - 0.111 (0.457) 0.895   - 0.079 (0.274) 0.924 
Excessive Force Complaints   - 0.234 (0.243) 0.792   - 0.073 (0.235) 0.930 
Other Complaints   - 0.139 (0.130) 0.870 0.225 (0.115)* 1.253 
Control Variables:     
Male   - 0.116 (0.577) 0.891   - 0.378 (0.621) 0.686 
Age     0.119 (0.043)** 1.264     0.129 (0.047)** 1.137 
Race-Ethnicity     
     African American     0.299 (0.441) 1.349   - 0.510 (0.510) 0.600 
     Hispanic     0.925 (0.716) 2.522     0.550 (0.806) 1.734 
     Other      0.589 (0.660) 1.801     0.894 (0.707) 2.444 
Educational Attainment     
     High School   - 0.379 (0.589) 0.685   - 0.071 (0.677) 0.931 
     2 years or Less of College     0.213 (0.424) 1.238     0.281 (0.483) 1.324 
     Associate’s Degree   - 0.584 (0.575) 0.558   - 0.543 (0.665) 0.581 
In Committed Relationship     0.454 (0.436) 1.575     0.595 (0.501) 1.813 
Have Children   - 0.472 (0.438) 0.624   - 0.707 (0.499) 0.493 
Officer Rank   - 0.753 (0.555) 0.471   - 0.930 (0.590) 0.395 
District     
     2     0.851 (0.645) 2.301     0.573 (0.719) 1.774 
     3   - 0.844 (0.571) 0.430   - 0.545 (0.640) 0.580 
     4     0.452 (0.579) 1.571   - 0.145 (0.655) 0.865 
     5     1.413 (0.862) 4.106     0.202 (1.011) 1.224 
     6     0.176 (0.879) 1.193     0.018 (0.969) 1.018 
Prior Policing Experience   - 0.789 (0.625) 0.455   - 1.203 (0.625)* 0.300 
Prior Military Experience   - 0.409 (0.437) 0.664   - 0.326 (0.495) 0.723 
Law Enforcement Hours      0.020 (0.018) 1.020     0.001 (0.020) 1.001 
Other Employment Hours    - 0.099 (0.027)*** 0.906   - 0.059 (0.029)* 0.943 
Daily Commute      0.001 (0.005) 1.001     0.000 (0.006) 1.000 
Off-Duty Collisions   - 0.926 (0.298)** 0.396     0.021 (0.272) 1.021 
Productivity Links   - 0.075 (0.098) 0.928   - 0.118 (0.110) 0.888 
Peer Productivity      0.078 (0.079) 1.081     0.075 (0.086) 1.077 
Officer Productivity      0.070 (0.076) 1.072     0.081 (0.083) 1.084 
Preferred Assignment      0.220 (0.164) 1.246     0.220 (0.188) 1.246 
Routine Event Supervision    - 0.147 (0.121) 0.863   - 0.151 (0.136) 0.860 
Rare Events Supervision    - 0.158 (0.103) 0.854   - 0.172 (0.107) 0.842 
Driving Limitations    - 0.098 (0.097) 0.906   - 0.280 (0.115)* 0.756 
Other Limitations      0.067 (0.126) 1.070     0.201 (0.147) 1.223 
Constant     0.364 (2.808) 4.041     1.505 (3.158) 4.505 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 
and odds ratios (OR). ***p ≤ .001 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test).  
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instance, officers with 0 other citizen complaints have probabilities equal to 66.6 percent 
of being in 0 collisions and 18.7 percent of being in 1 collision when other covariates are 
at their mean values. However, the probability of 0 collisions decreases to 60.3 percent 
while the probability of 1 collision rises to 24.4 percent given 1 citizen complaint for a 
reason other than excessive force. Other complaint frequency is significantly associated 
with on-duty collision frequency in the complete case analysis (N=225) as well (see 
Table E.2). To summarize the effects of the independent variables in the two regression 
models presented thus far, the number of other citizen complaints is significantly related 
to collisions in the binary logistic model that assesses zero versus one or more collisions 
as well as the multinomial model that compares zero collisions and one collision. Deadly 
force, vehicle pursuits, and complaints for excessive force are not significantly associated 
with on-duty vehicle collision frequency.  
A more complicated story emerges regarding other citizen complaints when 
examining officers in multiple collisions over the past four years in Table 5.3. The 
relationship between other complaints and vehicle collisions is statistically nonsignificant 
when comparing officers in zero versus two or more collisions, and is significant but in 
the unexpected direction when comparing officers with one collision versus multiple 
collisions (b = 0.225, p ˂ 0.05). The relative odds of 1 collision versus multiple collisions 
increase by 25.3 percent for each complaint filed for a reason other than force. Similarly, 
when analyzing complete surveys only, other complaint frequency is not significantly 
related to being in zero versus multiple collisions, and the relationship between other 
complaints and collisions is also in the unexpected direction (b = 0.273, p ˂ 0.05). 
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When predicting the probabilities of collision outcomes among officers given 
different numbers of other complaints and holding the other variables at their mean 
values, it becomes evident that the impact of other complaints on collision involvement is 
quite different for repeat collision offenders. First, each citizen complaint for a reason 
other than force decreases the probability of 0 on-duty collisions and increases the 
probability of 1 such collision in a linear fashion. The probability of 1 collision is 18.7 
percent for officers given 0 other complaints, 24.4 percent for their peers with 1 such 
complaint, 31.0 percent for officers given 2 other complaints, 38.5 percent for officers 
given 3 other complaints, 46.5 percent for officers with 4 other complaints, and 54.6 
percent for those with 5 complaints for reasons other than excessive force. However, the 
probability of multiple collisions increases until the third complaint, at which point the 
probability of multiple collisions actually begins to decrease. The probability of 2 or 
more collisions given 0 other complaints is 14.7 percent, which rises to 15.3 and 15.6 
percent for officers with 1 and 2 other complaints, respectively. The probability of 
multiple collisions drops to 15.5 percent for officers given 3 other complaints, 14.9 
percent for officers with 4 complaints, and 14.0 percent for officers with 5 complaints for 
reasons except force. The number of deadly force situations, pursuits, and complaints for 
excessive force are not significantly associated with the number of on-duty collisions that 
officers are in.  
 Consistent with the binomial logistic regression model, secondary employment 
remains significantly associated with the number of on-duty collisions among PGPD 
patrol officers and their supervisors. For each 1 hour increase in the number of hours 
worked outside the PGPD, officers have 9.4 percent lower relative odds of 0 instead of 2 
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or more on-duty collisions (b = - 0.099, p ˂ 0.001), and 5.7 percent lower relative odds of 
being in 1 as opposed to multiple collisions (b = - 0.059, p ˂ 0.05). For officers not 
working elsewhere, the probability of 1 collision and multiple collisions in the past 4 
years is 21.1 percent and 10.0 percent, respectively, holding all other variables at their 
mean values. By far, the most probable outcome for officers not working second jobs is 
no on-duty collisions (68.9 percent). The probability of no on-duty collisions in the 
previous 4 years drops to 54.1 percent among officers working an average 10 hours per 
week outside the PGPD. Furthermore, the probability of multiple collisions in the past 4 
years is 10.0 percent for officers with no other employment, which increases to 14.8 
percent among officers working 5 hours per week outside the agency and 21.1 percent for 
officers working an average of 10 hours weekly in secondary employment. In the 
complete case analysis, secondary employment is only significantly related to being in 
zero as opposed to multiple collisions (b = - 0.102, p ˂ 0.01). 
The number of off-duty collisions also remains significantly related to the number 
of on-duty collisions during the same period, whereby each off-duty collision is 
associated with 61.2 percent lower relative odds of 0 collisions versus 1 on-duty collision 
(b = - 0.947, p ˂ 0.001), and 60.4 percent lower relative odds of 0 instead of multiple on-
duty collisions (b = - 0.926, p ˂ 0.01). The probability of 0 on-duty collisions is 67.8 
percent for officers in 0 off-duty collisions, which decreases to 45.2 percent given 1 off-
duty collisions and 24.4 percent among officers in 2 off-duty collisions. The probability 
of a single on-duty collision increases from 19.4 percent to 46.4 percent when comparing 
officers with 0 and 2 off-duty collisions, while the probability of multiple on-duty 
collisions increases from 12.8 percent 29.2 percent when officers in 0 off-duty collisions 
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are compared with peers in 2 off-duty crashes. Similar findings were found in the 
complete case analysis, whereby off-duty collision frequency is significantly associated 
with involvement in zero collisions versus one collision (b = - 1.202, p ˂ 0.01), and zero 
instead of multiple collisions (b = - 1.296, p ˂ 0.01). 
Officer age emerges as a significant predictor of the number of on-duty collisions 
in the multinomial logistic regression models. Each additional year of age increases the 
relative odds of being in 0 as opposed to multiple collisions by 26.4 percent (b = 0.119, p 
˂ 0.01), and increases the relative odds of 1 versus 2 or more on-duty collisions by 13.7 
percent (b = 0.129, p ˂ 0.01). The probability of multiple collisions is 15.3 percent 
among the average (32.1 years of age) officer in the PGPD, which drops to 0.9 percent 
among the oldest officers in the agency (57 years of age) when all covariates are held at 
their mean values. However, the probability of 1 collision in the past 4 years is higher for 
57 year old officers (32.6 percent) than 32 year old officers (23.4 percent). In the 
complete case analysis, officer age is only significant when comparing officers in zero 
and multiple collisions (b = 0.104, p ˂ 0.05). 
Another significant demographic variable in the multinomial model is 
race/ethnicity (b = 0.809, p ˂ 0.05), whereby the relative odds of 0 collisions as opposed 
to 1 collision are 124.6 percent higher among Black officers than White officers. While 
the probability of 0 collisions is 68.0 percent for Black officers and 54.2 percent for 
White officers, the probability of 1 collision is 15.9 percent for Black officers and 28.5 
percent for White officers. Black officers are also significantly more likely to report zero 
collisions instead of one collision in the complete case analysis (b = 1.121, p ˂ 0.05). No 
other racial/ethnic effects are found with respect to on-duty collisions.  
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Prior employment by another law enforcement agency is only a significant 
predictor when officers with one collision are compared with officers in multiple 
collisions (b = - 1.203, p ˂ 0.05). Officers who have worked for another agency have 70.0 
percent lower relative odds of being in 1 collision instead of multiple collisions than their 
peers who have only worked for the PGPD. The probability of 2 or more collisions is 
more than twice as high for officers who have worked for another law enforcement 
organization (28.0 percent) than their peers who have not worked elsewhere (13.8 
percent). Prior employment by another law enforcement agency is not a statistically 
significant predictor of on-duty collision frequency in the complete case analysis.  
The effects of responses to the driving limitations scale are inconsistent. Each 1 
unit increase in the driving limitations scale is associated with 19.9 percent higher odds 
of 0 collisions versus 1 collision (b = 0.181, p ˂ 0.05), but 24.4 percent lower odds of 1 
collision compared with multiple collisions (b = - 0.280, p ˂ 0.05). When only complete 
surveys are analyzed, the driving limitations scale is only significant when comparing 
officers in one collision to peers in multiple collisions (b = - 0.282, p ˂ 0.05). 
In summary, the number of citizen complaints for reasons other than excessive 
force is significantly associated with involvement in zero collisions versus one collision 
in a positive direction. The relationship between other complaints and being in zero 
versus multiple collisions is nonsignificant and the relationship between other complaints 
and one versus multiple collisions is negative. These inconsistent effects of other 
complaints on collisions suggest differences exist between officers in one collision and 
their peers in multiple collisions that are not accounted for by any of the other covariates 
in the model. Off-duty collision involvement, secondary employment, and age also 
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remain significantly associated with on-duty vehicle collisions. Each of these control 
variables is significant in two out of three comparisons in the multinomial logistic model. 
Black officers are significantly more likely than their White peers to be in zero versus 
one on-duty collision. There are no other effects of race/ethnicity on collision frequency. 
Prior employment by another law enforcement agency also emerged as a significant 
predictor in one comparison (one collision versus multiple collisions) but not the other 
two. Finally, responses to the driving limitations scale are significant in two comparisons 
but in opposite directions. 
Any At-Fault Collision Involvement 
 Table 5.4 presents the results of a binary logistic regression that examines the 
effects of the number of deadly force events, vehicle pursuits, and citizen complaints on 
any at-fault collision involvement during the four year study period. At-fault collisions 
are a subset of on-duty collisions reported to the PGPD that are ultimately ruled to have 
been preventable. Counter to expectations, none of the negative outcomes are statistically 
significant predictors of being in one or more at-fault collisions. This is the first model in 
which other citizen complaints are not significantly associated with collisions. In a 
similar manner, none of the negative outcomes are significantly related to any at-fault 
collisions in the analysis of complete surveys only (N=227) (see Table E.4). 
Consistent with previous models, the number of off-duty collisions remains 
significantly associated with the subset of on-duty collisions that were found to be 
preventable (b = 0.498, p ˂ 0.05). Odds ratios show that the relative odds of being in 1 or 
more at-fault collisions as opposed to 0 in the previous 4 years increase by 64.5 percent 
with each off-duty collision. The probability of 1 or more at-fault vehicle collisions for 
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Table 5.4. Logistic regression of undesired events on at-fault collision involvement. 
 
 Any At-Fault Collisions (1 = yes) 
 b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:   
Vehicle Pursuits  0.040 (0.032) 1.041 
Deadly Force Events  0.217 (0.340) 1.242 
Excessive Force Complaints  0.010 (0.177) 1.010 
Other Complaints  0.140 (0.087) 1.151 
Control Variables:   
Male    - 0.234 (0.423) 0.791 
Age    - 0.048 (0.031) 0.953 
Race-Ethnicity   
     African American    - 0.104 (0.345) 0.901 
     Hispanic    - 0.628 (0.615) 0.534 
     Other       0.313 (0.472) 1.367 
Educational Attainment   
     High School      0.444 (0.448) 1.560 
     2 years or Less of College    - 0.271 (0.345) 0.763 
     Associate’s Degree      0.692 (0.448) 1.998 
In Committed Relationship    - 0.511 (0.339) 0.600 
Have Children      0.267 (0.351) 1.306 
Officer Rank      0.388 (0.422) 1.474 
District   
     2    - 0.511 (0.513) 0.600 
     3      0.509 (0.456) 1.663 
     4      0.004 (0.446) 1.004 
     5    - 0.712 (0.660) 0.491 
     6    - 0.111 (0.662) 0.895 
Prior Policing Experience      0.131 (0.416) 1.141 
Prior Military Experience      0.162 (0.345) 1.176 
Law Enforcement Hours     - 0.001 (0.013) 0.999 
Other Employment Hours       0.047 (0.020)*     1.048 
Daily Commute     - 0.002 (0.004) 0.998 
Off-Duty Collisions       0.498 (0.217)* 1.645 
Productivity Links      0.012 (0.080) 1.012 
Peer Productivity     - 0.018 (0.061) 0.982 
Officer Productivity     - 0.060 (0.057) 0.942 
Preferred Assignment       0.025 (0.132) 1.025 
Routine Event Supervision       0.117 (0.098) 1.124 
Rare Events Supervision       0.013 (0.070) 1.013 
Driving Limitations     - 0.106 (0.081) 0.899 
Other Limitations       0.042 (0.106) 1.043 
Constant      0.682 (2.220) 1.978 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 
and odds ratios (OR). ***p ≤ .001 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test).  
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officers in 0 off-duty collisions is 23.6 percent when all other variables in the model are 
held at their mean values. The probability of being in a preventable collision increases to 
33.7 percent for officers given 1 off-duty collision, 45.6 percent for officers in 2 off-duty 
collisions, and 57.9 percent for officers in 3 off-duty collisions. Off-duty collision 
frequency is also significantly associated with any at-fault collision involvement in the 
complete case analysis (b = 0.583, p ˂ 0.05). 
Once again, the average number of hours worked per week outside of the PGPD 
is a significant predictor of at-fault collision involvement (b = 0.047, p ˂ 0.05). Each hour 
of secondary employment increases the relative odds of 1 or more as opposed to 0 at-fault 
collisions by 4.8 percent. The probability of being in an at-fault collision during the past 
4 years is 21.7 percent for officers who are not employed outside the PGPD, all else 
being held at its mean value. The probability of a preventable collision increases to 26.0 
percent for officers working an average of 5 hours per week outside the PGPD and 30.8 
percent for officers working an average of 10 hours of secondary employment. Secondary 
employment is also significantly associated with at-fault collision involvement when 
analyzing complete surveys only (b = 0.054, p ˂ 0.05). 
To summarize this binomial logistic regression, off-duty collisions and secondary 
employment outside the PGPD significantly increase the likelihood of involvement in 
any on-duty collisions and any at-fault collisions specifically. Unlike the binary logistic 
regression model that examines all on-duty collisions, complaints for reasons other than 
force and district assignment are not significantly associated with at-fault collision 
involvement specifically. The effects of negative outcomes beyond other citizen 
complaints remain nonsignificant. 
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At-Fault Collision Frequency 
 The results of a multinomial logistic regression of undesired event involvement 
on at-fault collision frequency are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. The variables in this 
analysis are identical to previous models except prior employment by another law 
enforcement agency and PGPD District assignment are removed due to issues of perfect 
prediction20. Table 5.5 compares officers in zero at-fault collisions with officers in one at-
fault collision in the previous four year period. Table 5.6 presents two comparisons: 
officers in zero versus officers in multiple collisions and officers in one collision versus 
multiple collisions.  
As shown in Table 5.5, the number of complaints received for reasons other than 
force is significantly related to at-fault collision frequency (b = - 0.175, p ˂ 0.05). Each 
other complaint decreases the relative odds of 0 at-fault collisions instead of 1 collision 
by 16 percent. This significant relationship is not found in the complete case analysis (see 
Table E.5). The relationships between the number of complaints for reasons except force 
and the number of at-fault collisions are not statistically significant when comparing 
officers with zero versus multiple collisions or officers with one collision versus multiple 
collisions (see Table 5.6). The probability of 1 at-fault collision is 5.0 percent for officers 
given 0 other complaints, which increases to 5.9 percent for officers given 1 other 
complaint and 6.9 percent for officers given 2 complaints for reasons except force, 
holding all other variables at their means. The probability of multiple at-fault collisions 
remains at 2.1 percent for officers with 0, 1, and 2 other complaints. Deadly force, 
pursuits, and complaints for excessive force are not significantly associated with at-fault 
                                                          
20 In the complete case analysis (N=229), race/ethnicity is removed as well to address 
perfect prediction (see Tables E.5 and E.6). 
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Table 5.5. Multinomial regression of undesired events on at-fault collision frequency. 
 
 Zero vs. One 
 b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:   
Vehicle Pursuits    - 0.050 (0.039) 0.951 
Deadly Force Events    - 0.279 (0.348) 0.757 
Excessive Force Complaints    - 0.002 (0.177) 0.998 
Other Complaints    - 0.175 (0.090)* 0.840 
Control Variables:   
Male      0.278 (0.491) 1.321 
Age      0.010 (0.032) 1.010 
Race-Ethnicity   
     African American      0.442 (0.369) 1.556 
     Hispanic      1.080 (0.719) 2.944 
     Other     - 0.472 (0.488) 0.305 
Educational Attainment   
     High School    - 0.447 (0.478) 0.640 
     2 years or Less of College      0.238 (0.365) 1.268 
     Associate’s Degree    - 0.624 (0.476) 0.536 
In Committed Relationship      0.331 (0.364) 1.392 
Have Children    - 0.200 (0.380) 0.819 
Officer Rank    - 0.713 (0.453) 0.490 
Prior Military Experience    - 0.270 (0.363) 0.763 
Law Enforcement Hours       0.012 (0.015) 1.012 
Other Employment Hours     - 0.042 (0.021)* 0.959 
Daily Commute       0.003 (0.004) 1.003 
Off-Duty Collisions     - 0.385 (0.239) 0.681 
Productivity Links      0.031 (0.089) 1.031 
Peer Productivity     - 0.071 (0.049) 0.931 
Officer Productivity       0.070 (0.060) 1.072 
Preferred Assignment     - 0.154 (0.146) 0.857 
Routine Event Supervision     - 0.152 (0.107) 0.860 
Rare Events Supervision       0.045 (0.073) 1.046 
Driving Limitations       0.165 (0.085)* 1.180 
Other Limitations     - 0.128 (0.117) 0.880 
Constant      0.933 (2.130) 2.541 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 









Table 5.6 Multinomial regression of undesired events on at-fault collision frequency. 
 
 Zero vs. Two or More One vs. Two or More 
 b (SE) OR b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:     
Vehicle Pursuits    0.032 (0.126) 1.032     0.082 (0.127) 1.085 
Deadly Force Events  - 0.089 (0.746) 0.915     0.190 (0.739) 1.209 
Excessive Force Complaints  - 0.080 (0.549) 0.923   - 0.079 (0.563) 0.924 
Other Complaints  - 0.024 (0.216) 0.977     0.151 (0.220) 1.163 
Control Variables:     
Male    0.397 (0.881) 1.487     0.119 (0.924) 1.126 
Age    0.242 (0.096)** 1.274     0.232 (0.098)* 1.261 
Race-Ethnicity     
     African American  - 1.030 (0.827) 0.357   - 1.472 (0.868) 0.230 
     Hispanic  - 0.163 (1.115) 0.850   - 1.243 (1.270) 0.289 
     Other     0.096 (1.230) 1.101     0.568 (1.266) 1.764 
Educational Attainment     
     High School  - 0.393 (0.925) 0.675     0.054 (0.974) 1.055 
     2 years or Less of College    0.444 (0.784) 1.559     0.207 (0.831) 1.229 
     Associate’s Degree  - 1.074 (0.936) 0.342   - 0.450 (0.987) 0.637 
In Committed Relationship    1.434 (0.692)* 4.196     1.104 (0.733) 3.015 
Have Children  - 0.533 (0.791) 0.587   - 0.707 (0.499) 0.717 
Officer Rank    0.936 (1.071) 2.551   - 0.333 (0.841) 5.205 
Prior Military Experience    0.296 (0.917) 1.344     0.566 (0.956) 1.761 
Law Enforcement Hours   - 0.022 (0.027) 0.979   - 0.033 (0.029) 0.968 
Other Employment Hours   - 0.054 (0.046) 0.947   - 0.012 (0.048) 0.988 
Daily Commute   - 0.007 (0.009) 0.993   - 0.011 (0.010) 0.989 
Off-Duty Collisions  - 0.607 (0.298) 0.545   - 0.222 (0.374) 0.801 
Productivity Links  - 0.231 (0.159) 0.793   - 0.262 (0.172) 0.769 
Peer Productivity     0.032 (0.098) 1.033     0.104 (0.104) 1.109 
Officer Productivity     0.054 (0.134) 1.056   - 0.015 (0.142) 0.985 
Preferred Assignment     0.166 (0.297) 1.180     0.320 (0.320) 1.377 
Routine Event Supervision     0.014 (0.196) 1.014     0.166 (0.212) 1.180 
Rare Events Supervision   - 0.323 (0.218) 0.724   - 0.368 (0.225) 0.693 
Driving Limitations   - 0.161 (0.171) 0.851   - 0.327 (0.185) 0.721 
Other Limitations     0.155 (0.205) 1.168     0.283 (0.223) 1.327 
Constant    2.037 (4.911) 7.664     1.104 (5.151) 3.016 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 







collision frequency when analyzing the multiply imputed cases or the complete cases. 
The number of hours officers work outside the PGPD also remains statistically 
significant when examining at-fault collision frequency (b = - 0.042, p ˂ 0.05), whereby 
each hour of secondary employment per week decreases the relative odds of 0 collisions 
instead of 1 at-fault collision by 4.1 percent. Similar to the effects of other complaints, 
this relationship is nonsignificant in comparisons of officers with zero versus two or more 
at-fault collisions and one collision versus two or more at-fault collisions. The 
relationship between secondary employment and at-fault collision frequency is 
statistically nonsignificant in the complete case analysis. The probability of 1 at-fault 
collision is 4.6 percent for officers who do not work outside the PGPD. The probability 
of 1 collision increases to 5.6 percent for officers working an average of 5 hours per week 
in secondary employment and 6.8 percent for officers working 10 hours per week outside 
the PGPD. The probability of multiple collisions for an officer not working outside the 
PGPD is 1.6 percent when all else is held at its mean, which increases to 2.6 percent for 
officers working an additional 10 hours outside of the agency. Counter to expectations 
and previous models presented in this study, off-duty collision frequency is not 
significantly associated with at-fault collision frequency in the multiply imputed dataset. 
Off-duty collisions are also nonsignificant in the complete case analysis. 
Officer age is significantly related to the number of at-fault collisions officers are 
in during the previous four years. Each additional year of age is associated with 27.4 
percent higher relative odds of being in 0 versus multiple collisions (b = 0.242, p ˂ 0.01), 
and 26.1 percent higher odds of 1 collision versus multiple collisions (b = 0.232, p ˂ 
0.05). The average officer (32.1 years of age) has a probability of a single collision equal 
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to 5.7 percent and a probability of multiple collisions equal to 2.1 percent when all other 
variables are held at their mean values. Among the oldest officers in the PGPD (57 years 
of age) the probability of 1 collision decreases to 4.6 percent and the probability of 
multiple collisions drops below 0.0 percent. Age is also a statistically significant variable 
in the complete case analysis when comparing officers in 0 versus multiple collisions (b = 
0.243, p ˂ 0.05), and when comparing officers in 1 collision versus multiple collisions (b 
= 0.262, p ˂ 0.05). 
Every 1 unit increase in the driving limitations scale is associated with 18 percent 
higher odds of 0 at-fault collisions versus 1 collision (b = 0.165, p ˂ 0.05). However, 
nonsignificant effects in the opposite direction were found with respect to the likelihood 
of 0 versus multiple collisions and 1 collision versus multiple collisions. Responses to the 
driving limitations scale are nonsignificant predictors of at-fault collision frequency in 
the complete case analysis. Similar inconsistent effects are observed with respect to the 
driving limitations scale and all on-duty collisions.  
Finally, being in a committed relationship is a significant predictor of at-fault 
collision frequency (b = 1.434, p ˂ 0.05). The relative odds of being in 0 versus multiple 
collisions are 319.6 percent higher for officers in committed relationships. The 
probability of 0 collisions is 93.2 percent for officers in committed relationships and 87.2 
percent for officers who are not and the probability of multiple at-fault collisions is 
considerably lower for officers in committed relationships (1.5 percent) than their 
uncommitted peers (5.9 percent). In the complete case analysis, being in a committed 
relationship is also only relevant when comparing officers in zero and multiple collisions 
(b = 1.860, p ˂ 0.05). 
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  In summary, each complaint for a reason except excessive force increases the 
relative odds of being in one at-fault collision as opposed to zero collisions during the 
four year study period. The effects of other complaints on at-fault collisions are 
nonsignificant when comparing officers with zero versus multiple collisions and one 
collision versus multiple collisions. The effects of deadly force, vehicle pursuits, and 
citizen complaints for force are nonsignificant in this and all previous models. Secondary 
employment is also positively associated with at-fault collisions but only in comparisons 
of officers with zero collisions and one collision in the previous four years. Each year of 
officer age significantly decreases the likelihood of multiple collisions. Being in a 
committed relationship significantly increases the relative odds of zero versus multiple 
collisions only. On the other hand, responses to the driving limitations scale significantly 















DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter Six explains the approach of this study and limitations of the research 
methodology. Suggestions are provided for improving the design of this study in future 
research. Next, the significant results are highlighted and contextualized within the 
limited extant empirical literature on officer-involved vehicle collisions. The policy 
implications of the findings are noted in terms of reducing vehicle collisions in the Prince 
George’s County Police Department and other law enforcement agencies. Finally, 
concluding remarks are provided. 
Summary of the Study 
 Public police exist to reduce harms in society so it is logical to remain vigilant in 
monitoring the amount of harm caused by police officers in accomplishing this mandate. 
The American public has been particularly watchful over police due to our unique history 
and development as a nation. In the United States, problematic police officer behaviors 
have evolved over time and have included corruption, brutality, and less extreme acts of 
excessive force. Part of this evolution has been driven by technological advances in tools 
available to police officers including OC spray, CED devices, and other less-lethal 
weapons.  
In recent years, the threat posed by officer-involved vehicle collisions to the 
safety of police and the public has received increased attention from practitioners and 




incident- and officer-level in agencies across the United States (Noh, 2011; Wolfe et al., 
2015) and beyond (Rix et al., 1997). Others have approached the issue at a more macro-
level, for instance examining officer-involved collisions across states (Gustafson, 2012, 
2015). Many pressing questions remain that could help inform agency policies and 
practices, including whether or not officers in collisions are also disproportionately 
involved in other negative on-duty outcomes.  
The fundamental importance of researching negative officer outcomes such as car 
crashes is clear: these events are harmful and costly in many ways to all citizens. In this 
way, collisions are similar to other officer behaviors that threaten public and officer 
safety, erode confidence in the police, and have been addressed by agencies with officer 
training, policy changes, and closer supervision. There are several other reasons why 
officer involvement in one form of unwanted behavior, such as using too much force, 
may be related to vehicle collisions as well. First, Maryland and California law 
enforcement officials questioned whether or not officers in collisions were also 
disproportionately represented in other negative outcomes. Second, agencies co-monitor 
a variety of negative officer outcomes in hopes of identifying and addressing potentially 
problematic employees. Early intervention systems, a common means used by agencies 
to identify problematic officers, often monitor a variety of different behaviors at the same 
time including use of force, deadly force, citizen and internal complaints, and collisions 
(Alpert & Walker, 2000; Walker et al., 2001). Agencies also receive and investigate 
citizen complaints regarding numerous concerning officer behaviors as well. The 
approach of monitoring comorbidities, or the co-occurrence of negative outcomes, is 




outcome but researchers of negative officer events have tended to focus on the same 
characteristics of officers, agencies, and situations—suggesting particular variables may 
have predictive value across a variety of behaviors. Studies of negative outcomes at the 
officer-level, which suggests “bad apples” are to blame, is based on repeated research 
findings that small proportions of officers are responsible for a majority of negative 
outcomes in their agencies such as excessive force (Brandl et al., 2001; Christopher 
Commission, 1991; Kolts Commission, 1992; Lersch, 1998b, 2002). The clustering of 
problematic behaviors among a small proportion of the general public has been observed 
as well (Braga, 2012; Chaiken & Chaiken, 1984; Greenwood & Abrahamse, 1982; 
Peterson & Braiker, 1981; Williams & Lucianovic, 1979; Wolfgang et al., 1972). 
However, the empirical relationship between collisions and other negative officer 
outcomes had not been empirically tested. 
This study examined the relationship between officer involvement in vehicle 
collisions and deadly force, citizen complaints for excessive force and other reasons, and 
vehicle pursuits over a four year timeframe. The research questions were answered with a 
survey of patrol officers and their supervisors in the Prince George’s County Police 
Department, a large agency located in Maryland. The officer survey was anonymous and 
designed to maximize participation by PGPD officers. Survey distribution took place at 
daily roll call meetings across Prince George’s county over several days. An online 
survey option was provided in an attempt to reach nonrespondents. Each survey packet 
included a cover letter from the author that explained the project and a support letter from 
their Fraternal Order of Police President asking for their participation. Finally, the 




Review Board. In the end, a total of 329 PGPD officers responded to a series of questions 
regarding their involvement in negative outcomes in the past 4 years, in addition to a 
variety of demographic, employment, attitudinal, and other measures. The results 
provided several potential directions for reducing harmful events in law enforcement 
organizations, but first, a brief elaboration on the shortcomings of this study is in order. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study is based on a survey of patrol officers and their supervisors (sergeants 
and lieutenants only) in the PGPD. Several limitations of the research methodology and 
potential remedies are worthy of discussion. The survey methodology provides a means 
of collecting information on deadly force events, vehicle pursuits, and on-duty collisions 
that were not reported to the PGPD and are therefore not captured by official agency 
records. At the same time, this survey may provide a less complete picture of officer 
involvement in negative outcomes than official records due to the fact that only 
approximately one-third of PGPD patrol officers participated in the study21. Among the 
one-third of officers who did participate, approximately two-thirds answered all of the 
questions on the survey. Officer demographics were not available for the PGPD so a 
comparison of respondents and nonrespondents was impossible. Whether or not the 
survey respondents differ from the nonrespondents remains unknown and is a limitation 
of the design. In future research, a mixed methods approach based on an officer survey 
and official agency records may help alleviate these concerns.  
 A disadvantage of all self-reported data is that officers may underreport their own 
involvement in negative outcomes, especially those that violate agency policies or local 
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laws. Concerns regarding underreporting may be less severe in a survey-based study such 
as this that is conducted by an independent third-party compared to studies based on 
official agency records. After all, reporting negative outcomes to one’s employer may 
lead to internal investigations, disciplinary actions, and even terminations of 
employment. Anonymity was also provided to officers and would not have been possible 
with focus groups or officer interviews. Still, social desirability biases may be present in 
this survey-based study. 
Another potentially problematic aspect of the research design was the designation 
of at-fault collisions specifically. The primary concern is the subjectivity that has been 
discovered regarding internal police investigations of negative officer outcomes. For 
instance, Hickman (2006) examined the 2003 LEMAS survey results and found that 
complaints investigated by agencies with internal affairs divisions were more than twice 
as likely to be not sustained and to result in officers being exonerated as complaints 
reported to agencies with other mechanisms for investigating complaints. Hickman 
(2006) also reported that agencies that investigated use of force complaints outside of the 
chain of command received such complaints at a rate three times higher than agencies 
without this policy. Finally, the rate of sustained complaints was more than twice as high 
for agencies that allowed citizens the right to administrative appeal (Hickman, 2006). In 
the past 10 years, the PGPD instituted changes in their internal collision investigation 
procedures that may have altered the likelihood that collisions were deemed preventable. 
According to a member of the PGPD leadership, the agency removed responsibility for 
investigating collisions from an officer’s immediate supervisor to the agency’s 




preventable collisions increased dramatically. This study measured at-fault collisions that 
occurred in the previous four year period, during which there may have been changes in 
PGPG collision investigation procedures. 
A third potential weakness is measuring negative outcomes by asking officers 
about receiving citizen complaints. In this study, officers are asked to report the number 
of complaints they receive for force and for all other reasons separately in hopes of 
capturing negative outcomes beyond deadly force and pursuits. In fiscal year 2014, 198 
out of 873 total citizen complaints investigated by the PGPD (22.7 percent) were for use 
of force. In the policing literature, citizen complaints are among the most common means 
of measuring negative officer outcomes such as excessive force (e.g., Brandl et al., 2001; 
Christopher Commission, 1991; Kolts Commission, 1992; Pate & Fridell, 1993). One 
potential shortfall of citizen complaints that must be acknowledged is that members of 
the public and law enforcement officers may report vastly different interpretations of the 
same event.  
In some cases, citizen complaints may capture behaviors that would be illegal for 
private citizens but were permissible due to the wide authority granted to police officers. 
This is because the general public is not aware of all laws and policies regulating officer 
behaviors or is operating on limited knowledge of an event. Furthermore, there exists a 
social desirability bias among officers and citizens to downplay their responsibility for 
antisocial and potentially illegal behaviors when giving reports that may become the 
subject of citizen complaint investigations. Another potential source of discrepancy 




misconduct in some cases hoping for plea agreements on charges that may have resulted 
from their altercations (Adams, 1995). 
Irrespective of the underlying reasons, researchers have documented large 
differences in the ways police and the public interpret the same events. For instance, 
Rojek, Alpert, and Smith (2012) compared officer and citizen accounts of use of force 
incidents and found 42.9 percent of citizens claimed they had offered no resistance and 
another 23.8 percent claimed only passive resistance; none of the corresponding officers 
agreed with those assessments. Pate and Fridell (1993) found an average complaint 
substantiation rate of only 13 percent in their study of force. Finally, the 2003 LEMAS 
survey found a total rate of 6.6 citizen complaints regarding use of force per 100 sworn 
officers in large state and local agencies, while the rate of sustained complaints was just 
0.5 per 100 sworn (Hickman, 2006). Gaps clearly exist between the ways that citizens 
and law enforcement interpret potentially troubling events. 
Studying negative officer outcomes with complaints received and complaints 
sustained each has their downfalls and the more suitable choice depends on the research 
question at hand. The officer survey used in the current study inquired about complaints 
received instead of complaints sustained after investigation due to the aforementioned 
subjectivity in internal department investigations that have been found in the PGPD and 
other agencies. Police departments frequently monitor problematic officer behaviors by 
measuring the number of complaints received, some relying solely on this to identify 
problematic officers (Walker et al., 2001).  
Although measuring negative officer outcomes with complaints received instead 




complaint reception and investigation, it must be emphasized that subjectivity remains at 
the citizen complainant-level. To begin, citizens have provided differing accounts of the 
same officer misconduct events. Case in point, a Time/CNN poll found 92 percent of 
Black respondents but only 72 percent of White respondents thought the force used by 
LAPD officers against Rodney King was excessive (Lacayo, 1992). A similar racial 
divide was found in New York City among respondents to a New York Times poll of 
responses to the following statement: “Based upon current knowledge, the shooting of 
Amadou Diallo was tragic and there is absolutely no excuse for the way the police acted” 
(Barry & Connelly, 1999). While 89 percent of Black respondents agreed with this 
statement, the rate was only 61 percent among White poll takers (Barry & Connelly, 
1999). An even larger racial gap was found when New Yorkers were asked if most 
NYPD officers used excessive force, with 33 percent of White and 72 percent of Black 
respondents, respectively, answering in the affirmative (Barry & Connelly, 1999). More 
recently, a U.S. Department of Justice investigation into the death of Michael Brown by 
Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson reported vastly different eyewitness accounts of 
the shooting (Bosman, Robertson, Eckholm, & Oppel, 2015).  
Finally, the likelihood that a negative officer outcome that is witnessed by a 
citizen will actually be reported to the offending officer’s employing agency varies 
among individual members of the public. Walker and Bumphus (1992) found only one-
third of citizens who felt they had been subjected to misconduct reported the incident in 
an official complaint. In sum, differences in interpreting, reporting, and investigating 
complaints can result in variations between and within agencies that are unrelated to 




referred to citizen complaints as “one of the most badly abused police-based statistics” (p. 
113). Future researchers could directly ask officers about their involvement in excessive 
force and other complaint-worthy events instead of relying on citizen reports. Despite the 
limitations, citizen complaints are heavily relied upon by police departments (e.g., 
Walker et al., 2001) and researchers (e.g, Brandl et al., 2001; Christopher Commission, 
1991; Kolts Commission, 1992; Pate & Fridell, 1993) to identify negative police officer 
outcomes. 
In summary, this study examined the effects of undesired event involvement on 
vehicle collision involvement among patrol officers in the PGPD. It was not without 
limitations. First, the study was limited to self-reported data collected from PGPD 
officers. Whether or not the findings would be similar based on official PGPD records is 
unknown. Future researchers may wish to explore these relationships with agency records 
or a mixed methods approach. Observational methods may paint a different picture of 
negative outcomes in the PGPD although they may not be feasible due to the relative 
infrequency of such events. A final point is that the survey was distributed to patrol 
officers and their supervisors in one police department. Generalizability of the findings 
beyond patrol officers in the PGPD must therefore be cautioned. 
Summary of Findings 
 Four regression models were used to test the impact of deadly force, citizen 
complaints, and vehicle pursuits on vehicle collision involvement during the same four 
year period in the Prince George’s County Police Department. The effects of negative 
event involvement on collisions were assessed for all on-duty collisions and for a 




Separate models were also used to see if these effects varied when predicting any 
collision involvement as opposed to collision frequency from November, 2010 to 
November, 2014. 
The findings detailed in Chapter Five are summarized in the following 
paragraphs. Table 6.1 reports the statistically significant (p ≤ .05) effects with respect to 
all on-duty collisions and Table 6.2 provides the significant effects for the subgroup of at-
fault collisions. Four comparisons are presented in each of these tables. The first 
comparison in each table provides the results of the binomial logistic regression models, 
which assessed the effects of negative events on collisions for officers in zero and one or 
more collisions. The next three comparisons are from the multinomial logistic regression 
models that examined these effects among officers in zero collisions and one collision, 
zero and multiple collisions, and one collision and multiple collisions. The directions of 
the statistically significant effects are reversed for the binomial models for consistency 
with the multinomial models and ease of interpretation. The implications of these 
findings for reducing collisions in the PGPD and other agencies are discussed at-length in 
the next section. 
Any On-Duty Collisions 
One out of four independent variables predicted on-duty collisions. A statistically 
significant, positive relationship was discovered between the number of complaints 
received by officers for all reasons other than excessive force and the number of on-duty 
vehicle collisions during the same four year timeframe (see Table 6.1). This finding 
provides support for versatility in negative officer behaviors and prior research that found 




Table 6.1. Summary of significant effects on all on-duty collisions. 
 
 All On-Duty Collisions 
 0 vs. 1+ a 0 vs. 1 b 0 vs. 2+ b 1 vs. 2+ b 
Independent Variables:     
Vehicle Pursuits ns ns ns ns 
Deadly Force Events ns ns ns ns 
Excessive Force Complaints ns ns ns ns 
Other Complaints ( - ) ( - ) ns ( + ) 
Control Variables:     
Male ns ns ns ns 
Age ns ns ( + ) ( + ) 
Race-Ethnicity     
     African American ns ( + ) ns ns 
     Hispanic ns ns ns ns 
     Other  ns ns ns ns 
Educational Attainment     
     High School ns ns ns ns 
     2 years or Less of College ns ns ns ns 
     Associate’s Degree ns ns ns ns 
In Committed Relationship ns ns ns ns 
Have Children ns ns ns ns 
Officer Rank ns ns ns ns 
District     
     2 ns ns ns ns 
     3 ns ns ns ns 
     4 ns ns ns ns 
     5 ( + ) ns ns ns 
     6 ns ns ns ns 
Prior Policing Experience ns ns ns ns 
Prior Military Experience ns ns ns ns 
Law Enforcement Hours  ns ns ns ns 
Other Employment Hours  ( - ) ns ( - ) ( - ) 
Daily Commute ns ns ns ns 
Off-Duty Collisions ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) 
Productivity Links ns ns ns ns 
Peer Productivity  ns ns ns ns 
Officer Productivity  ns ns ns ns 
Preferred Assignment  ns ns ns ns 
Routine Events Supervision  ns ns ns ns 
Rare Events Supervision  ns ns ns ns 
Driving Limitations  ns ( + ) ns ( - ) 
Other Limitations  ns ns ns ns 
Note. ns =  statistically nonsignificant relationship (p ≤ .05).  
a Binomial logistic regression model. 




positive relationship between other complaints and on-duty collisions suggests that 
attempts to decrease behaviors that lead to complaints may reduce on-duty collisions as 
well. However, the number of complaints for excessive force, the number of deadly force 
events, and the number of vehicle pursuits were not significantly associated with on-duty 
collision involvement. The nonsignificant effects of other negative outcomes on 
collisions could be spurious or unique to the PGPD.  
It was originally hypothesized that a stronger effect on collisions would be found 
for certain types of citizen complaints than others. More specifically, it was expected that 
complaints for situations that were particularly risky, harmful, and/or forceful would have 
a strong, positive relationship with collisions while complaints for reasons such as 
profanity or failure to assist a citizen would have a weaker association with collisions. 
The primary justification for these hypothesized effects was that excessive force would 
be disproportionately found among the most productive, proactive, and risk-taking 
members of the PGPD. Simply put, officers who are in more interactions with suspects 
would be more likely to use force all else being equal. In turn, it was expected that more 
productive officers would also be exposed to increased driving-related risks including 
collisions. The fact that no relationship was found between collisions and complaints for 
excessive force but a significant effect was found between complaints for all other 
reasons on crashes was unexpected.  
A somewhat complicated relationship was found between citizen complaints for 
reasons other than force and on-duty collision frequency. First, each other citizen 
complaint increased the likelihood of involvement in any on-duty vehicle collisions in the 




collision instead of zero collisions in the multinomial model. However, other complaint 
frequency was not significantly associated with involvement in zero versus multiple 
collisions. Furthermore, the relationship between other complaints and on-duty collisions 
was in the unexpected direction when comparing officers in one collision and multiple 
collisions. Second, each other complaint decreased the probability of zero collisions and 
increased the probability of one collision in the previous four years in a linear manner. 
Other complaints also increased the probability of multiple collisions until the third 
complaint, at which point each additional other complaint actually began to decrease the 
probability of two or more collisions in the past four years. The inconsistent effects of 
other complaints on collision frequency suggest that officers in multiple collisions may 
be qualitatively and quantitatively different than their peers in zero or even a single 
collision during the previous four years. The reasons for this are unknown and deserve 
further empirical examination. One potential explanation may be that officers with repeat 
collisions have received counseling from a supervisor, a written reprimand, driving 
training, or some other intervention that decreased their collision propensity. The finding 
from the multinomial regression model that citizen complaints for reasons other than 
excessive force decreased the probability of officer involvement in multiple collisions as 
opposed to a single collision in the previous four years must be interpreted within the 
context of these results. The conclusion is each citizen complaint received for a reason 
except force significantly increased the probability of any on-duty collision involvement 
although the impact of other complaints on the number of on-duty collisions is less clear.  
Overall, two control variables were the most consistent predictors of PGPD 




positively associated with on-duty collision involvement in all four comparisons 
presented in Table 6.1. Consistent with recent findings by Hansen et al. (2015) from eight 
California agencies, PGPD officers who are in off-duty collisions are also more likely to 
be in collisions while at work. This finding suggests an underlying propensity towards 
collision involvement among certain officers that transcends the law enforcement 
environment. It implies that collision-reduction programs targeting the general public will 
decrease collisions involving those who work in law enforcement.  
Employment outside the PGPD was positively related to on-duty collision 
involvement in three out of four comparisons presented in the following table (all except 
zero collisions versus one collision). It appears that working outside the PGPD 
significantly increases the likelihood of collisions when the officers are back on duty. For 
instance, an additional 10 hours of work outside of the agency per week increases the 
probability of multiple on-duty collisions over a 4 year timeframe from 10 percent to over 
20 percent among PGPD patrol officers and their supervisors when all other variables are 
at their mean values. This is noteworthy because the PGPD allows officers to work up to 
20 hours per week in secondary employment (Spencer, 2010). These findings support 
prior research by Vila and colleagues who have reported links between secondary 
employment, officer fatigue, and on-duty collisions (e.g., Vila, 1996, 2000; Vila et al., 
2000). It is also possible that second jobs are indicative of financial strain due to family 
illness, spousal unemployment, or some other stressful situation that may contribute to 
fatigue.  
Among the remaining employment variables that included officer rank, PGPD 




number of hours worked at the PGPD per week, and daily commute to work and home, 
only assignment to District Five versus District One was a significant predictor and this 
relationship only held when examining any collision involvement (i.e. zero versus one or 
more collisions). Turning to the demographic control variables, age was a protective 
factor for involvement in multiple collisions. The negative relationship between age and 
on-duty collision frequency counters Wolfe et al. (2015), who found injury and fatality 
collisions were least prevalent among 20 to 29 year old officers in California. Also, Black 
officers were significantly more likely than White officers to be in zero collisions instead 
of one collision. There were no other significant effects of race/ethnicity on officer-
involved collisions.  
Nor were there any significant effects of gender, educational attainment, and 
informal social control (i.e. having children and/or being in a committed relationship) on 
collision involvement. Finally, of the eight scales that measured officer attitudes and 
behaviors regarding on-duty driving and other aspects of policing, only attitudes toward 
driving was a significant predictor of on-duty collisions and its effects were inconsistent 
(only statistically significant in two out of four comparisons in Table 6.1).  
 
At-Fault Collisions 
 The only negative outcome that was significantly associated with at-fault 
collisions was citizen complaints for any reason except excessive force (see Table 6.2). 
Of course, deadly force, vehicle pursuits, and complaints regarding force did not 
demonstrate any predictive value with respect to any on-duty collisions either. Similar to 
the analyses of any on-duty collisions, each other complaint decreased the probability of 




Table 6.2. Summary of significant effects on at-fault collisions. 
 
 At-Fault Collisions 
 0 vs. 1+  a 0 vs. 1 b 0 vs. 2+ b 1 vs. 2+ b 
Independent Variables:     
Vehicle Pursuits ns ns ns ns 
Deadly Force Events ns ns ns ns 
Excessive Force Complaints ns ns ns ns 
Other Complaints ns ( - ) ns ns 
Control Variables:     
Male ns ns ns ns 
Age ns ns ( + ) ( + ) 
Race-Ethnicity     
     African American ns ns ns ns 
     Hispanic ns ns ns ns 
     Other  ns ns ns ns 
Educational Attainment     
     High School ns ns ns ns 
     2 years or Less of College ns ns ns ns 
     Associate’s Degree ns ns ns ns 
In Committed Relationship ns ns ( + ) ns 
Have Children ns ns ns ns 
Officer Rank ns ns ns ns 
District     
     2 ns na na na 
     3 ns na na na 
     4 ns na na na 
     5 ns na na na 
     6 ns na na na 
Prior Policing Experience ns na na na 
Prior Military Experience ns ns ns ns 
Law Enforcement Hours  ns ns ns ns 
Other Employment Hours  ( - ) ( - ) ns ns 
Daily Commute ns ns ns ns 
Off-Duty Collisions ( - ) ns ns ns 
Productivity Links ns ns ns ns 
Peer Productivity  ns ns ns ns 
Officer Productivity  ns ns ns ns 
Preferred Assignment  ns ns ns ns 
Routine Events Supervision  ns ns ns ns 
Rare Events Supervision  ns ns ns ns 
Driving Limitations  ns ( + ) ns ns 
Other Limitations  ns ns ns ns 
Note. ns =  statistically nonsignificant relationship (p ≤ .05). na = excluded from model. 
a Binomial logistic regression model. 




frequency was not significantly related to at-fault collisions in the other three 
comparisons presented in Table 6.2.  
Off-duty collisions and secondary employment both increased the likelihood of 
at-fault collisions. This was similar to the findings regarding all on-duty collisions, 
although their effects were not as consistent when considering at-fault collisions 
specifically. Each hour worked outside the PGPD decreased the chances of avoiding at-
fault collisions entirely in the past four years. The significant, positive relationship 
between secondary employment and at-fault collisions was found when examining any 
at-fault collision involvement (i.e., zero versus one or more collisions) and when 
comparing officers in zero collisions with their peers in one collision. Every off-duty 
collision decreased the odds of being in one or more at-fault collisions during the past 
four years. However, no significant effects of off-duty collisions were found on at-fault 
collision frequency. Each off-duty collision significantly increases the probability of 
being in any on-duty collisions but does not have a significant impact on the number of 
on-duty collisions reported during the same four year period. 
Only one other significant relationship with at-fault collisions was found among 
the employment variables. Higher scores on the driving limitations scale were associated 
with an increased likelihood of being in zero collisions relative to one collision in the past 
four years. However, this significant relationship was not in the expected direction 
because higher scores on the scale indicate less accepting attitudes toward agency driving 
policies and other limitations on the way police officers are allowed to drive. The effects 
of the driving limitations scale on all on-duty collisions were inconsistent. Overall, the 




unclear. A better instrument than a four-item scale should be developed for measuring 
this concept. 
Once again, age was a protective factor for being in multiple collisions when 
examining at-fault collisions only. In fact, age was the only statistically significant 
variable when comparing officers with one at-fault collision to their peers with multiple 
at-fault collisions. The only other demographic variable that emerged when analyzing at-
fault collisions specifically was being in a committed relationship, which significantly 
increased the likelihood of zero instead of multiple collisions. Overall, officer 
demographics had little impact on at-fault collisions—similar to any on-duty collisions.  
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 Three consistent findings have implications for agency policy and practice that 
are detailed over the next few paragraphs. Suggestions are provided for addressing other 
citizen complaints, secondary employment, and off-duty collisions involving PGPD 
officers—all of which are significant factors in on-duty collisions. These solutions 
include increased pre-employment screening, training, supervision and monitoring of 
negative officer outcomes, and re-training when deficiencies are found. The goal is to 
provide actionable idea for agency leaders, supervisors, and other stakeholders in their 
attempts to reduce on-duty officer collisions. 
On-Duty Collisions and Other Citizen Complaints 
 The relationship between vehicle collisions and other negative on-duty officer 
outcomes was not as strong as hypothesized. Co-monitoring deadly force, vehicle 
pursuits, and excessive force complaints may not be among the most efficient means of 




reasons other than excessive force was significantly related to the probability of any on-
duty collisions and any at-fault collisions specifically. The positive relationship between 
collisions and other complaints during the same timeframe suggests that reducing the 
types of behaviors that lead to citizen complaints for reasons except force may also 
reduce on-duty collisions.  
 Concerns regarding negative officer outcomes have led to increased 
accountability and transparency among law enforcement agencies in the United States 
over the past half-century. Improvements in the reception and handling of citizen 
complaints have been some of the ways that police agencies have demonstrated their 
commitment to the public. Early intervention systems have been increasingly used by 
agencies to monitor their employees and flag those who stand out from their peers in 
terms of negative outcomes. Citizen complaints are an important component of EIS. 
Among law enforcement agencies operating an EIS in the United States, the most 
common way of identifying negative outcomes is with citizen complaints (Walker et al., 
2001).  
The PGPD was required to expand and improve its EIS as part of a memorandum 
of agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice (2004b). The agreement was the result 
of two government investigations of the PGPD pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. Section 14141, and the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. Section 3789d (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2004a, 2004b). One investigation began in 1999 regarding the deployment and 
supervision of canines and ended in a consent decree (U.S. Department of Justice, 




excessive force and supervision throughout the PGPD (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2004b). Both investigations were based on allegations that PGPD officers had deprived 
citizens of their constitutional rights (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004b). As part of the 
less formal memorandum of agreement, the PGPD was required to include in its EIS “all 
complaints (and their dispositions)” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004b, p. 19)22. The 
results of this study suggest that this complaint data may be useful in identifying officers 
in the PGPD with higher probabilities of on-duty collisions than their peers. The findings 
indicate that reducing citizen complaints via mechanisms such as improved screening, 
training, supervision, and discipline of officers may also reduce collisions. 
On-Duty Collisions and Secondary Employment 
The consistently positive relationship between secondary employment hours and 
on-duty collision involvement deserves further discussion. This variable was included in 
the current study as a control but its significant effects on collisions were more consistent 
than any other variable across the models presented in this study. This relationship 
suggests that secondary employment may be a fruitful area to examine in terms of 
decreasing on-duty collisions among PGPD officers. Reasonable restrictions concerning 
the number of hours that officers are permitted to work in secondary employment may be 
required to reduce costly on-duty collisions in the PGPD. 
In the PGPD, secondary employment is popular enough among patrol officers that 
it has been suggested a culture has formed around off-duty work (Zapotosky, 2010). The 
mean number of secondary employment hours worked per week on average was 5.46 and 
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the range was from 0 to 40 hours per week. The tradition of police officers holding 
second jobs has a long history in the United States. The practice was often referred to as 
“moonlighting” because the off-duty work often took place at night (Breads, 2012; 
Bureau of Governmental Research, 2011). Today, outside, secondary, extra-duty, or off-
duty employment is a frequent practice among police officers in some agencies who are 
hired part-time in the private sector. Off-duty police officers are commonly hired to 
provide security at private businesses such as shopping malls and nightclubs, crowd 
control at large events including festivals and concerts, and personal security for 
individuals (Bureau of Governmental Research, 2011). Details are a specific form of 
secondary employment where there is the potential for off-duty officers to exercise their 
sworn law enforcement powers (Bureau of Governmental Research, 2011). Off-duty 
officers in some details wear their police uniforms and drive their take-home patrol 
vehicles. In jobs where officers work in a law enforcement capacity, private employment 
provides a public good by increasing the numbers of officers in communities without the 
use of taxpayer funds. Law enforcement agencies benefit from increased policing and 
deterrence in their jurisdictions and officers benefit from a means of supplementing their 
law enforcement agency salaries, which are quite low in many parts of the country.  
The negative aspects of police officers working second jobs in the United States 
have also been documented (see Bureau of Governmental Research, 2011). Officers work 
in many second jobs including private security and some concerns are directly related to 
the type of secondary employment. One arises when police officers use deadly force 
while working for a private security business (Bureau of Governmental Research, 2011; 




government, the authorized use of force and coercion while off-duty is questionable. A 
second issue specifically concerns the types of private businesses that off-duty officers 
work for. Second jobs with the potential for corruption or a conflict of interests are 
particularly troubling. Corruption may be in the form of preferential treatment for 
employers, direct payment for non-enforcement of certain laws, or threats of non-
enforcement for those who do not offer off-duty details to officers in their areas (Bureau 
of Governmental Research, 2011). Secondary employment can also reflect negatively on 
their agencies when it involves profiting from vices such as working in bars or nightclubs 
(Bureau of Governmental Research, 2011). Secondary employment in liquor stores and 
establishments that serve alcohol has been banned in some police departments as well. 
Another way that secondary employment can negatively impact agencies is when officers 
use resources including vehicles. However, it has been suggested that agencies can offset 
these costs by requiring that officers pay them a portion of their off-duty salaries to offset 
these costs. The Bureau of Governmental Research (2011) remarked, “While there are 
departmental costs related to details, departments can price details to cover those costs” 
(Bureau of Governmental Research, 2011, p. 1).  Secondary employment can also 
undermine chain of command if a subordinate is in charge of secondary employment for 
a superior officer (Bureau of Governmental Research, 2011). Finally, and most germane 
to this study, are the effects of secondary employment on officer fatigue while on duty.  
In 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division released findings 
from an investigation into the New Orleans Police Department. Among several 
problematic areas with the NOPD, investigators specifically pointed to problems with 




There are few aspects of NOPD more broadly troubling than its Paid Detail 
 system. NOPD’s Detail system, as currently structured: 1) drastically undermines 
 the quality of  NOPD policing; 2) facilitates abuse and corruption by NOPD 
 officers; 3) contributes to compromising officer fatigue; 4) contributes to 
 inequitable policing by NOPD; and 5) acts as a financial drain on NOPD rather 
 than fulfilling its potential as a source of revenue for the City and Department 
 (Office of Civil Rights, 2012, p. xv). 
In response to this report, the NOPD overhauled its paid detail system (City of 
New Orleans, 2013). All of these are important considerations regarding secondary 
employment of police officers. However, the most relevant of these concerns with respect 
to this study on vehicle collisions is item number three—the impact of second jobs on 
officer fatigue while serving in a law enforcement capacity. 
Vila and colleagues have demonstrated that secondary employment increases 
officer fatigue on the job, which in-turn leads to a host of negative outcomes including 
vehicle collisions (Vila, 2000, 2009; Vila & Kenney, 2002). In fact, the effects of officer 
fatigue are often compared with the effects of alcohol Vila, 2000, 2009; Vila & Kenney, 
2002). The implications of these findings are clear—reducing the number of hours 
worked in secondary employment.  
Problems with secondary employment have also been reported in the PGPD. In 
November, 2010, three PGPD officers were arrested and charged with corruption 
(Flaherty, Klein, & Zapotosky, 2010). The federal indictment alleges that two of the 
officers were working off-duty for a liquor store owner and helping distribute untaxed 




officer was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and use of firearms in drug 
trafficking (Flaherty et al., 2010). Less than one month later, the PGPD announced that it 
was forming a special panel comprised of five members of the PGPD and one community 
member to examine secondary employment in the agency (Noble, 2010). According to 
media accounts, the panel first focused on whether businesses should directly pay officers 
for services or if the PGPD should serve as an intermediary. The practice of agencies 
scheduling secondary work, receiving payment from private businesses, and paying their 
officers is used in several agencies including the nearby Baltimore Police Department 
(Noble, 2010). This policy was also implemented in the NOPD as a requirement of their 
consent decree with the USDOJ. However, the PGPD has not focused on the effects of 
secondary employment on collisions. 
The PGPD has implemented several changes regarding secondary employment in 
the past five years. The Office of Secondary Employment was created in late-2010 and 
led by Major Morris (Spencer, 2010). So far, the Office of Secondary Employment has 
focused on security plans with outside employers (Prince George’s County Police 
Department, 2011). Chief Magaw was quoted in the Washington Post as follows: “The 
office of secondary employment, the main focus of that is to vet out the different 
businesses that want officers to work there, to make sure that they’re legitimate 
businesses that hold the same values as this community and this police department” 
(Zapotosky, 2010a). Major Morris has also stated that he would like increased training 
regarding off-duty work and a better system of monitoring where and when officers were 
working outside the PGPD (Zapotosky, 2010b). In fact, the PGPD regulations regarding 




2010). The PGPD has also limited the number of secondary employment hours that 
officers may work to 20 per week (Spencer, 2010). It is unknown how this regulation 
compares to other agencies in the Washington, D.C. area. However, this study found that 
PGPD officers reported working up to 40 hours per week outside the agency—two times 
the maximum number of hours allowed (see Table 4.1). Several agency leaders have 
reported that they have not been able to closely monitor and enforce existing PGPD rules 
regarding outside employment including Major Morris, Fraternal Order of Police 
President Canales (Spencer, 2010), and Chief Magaw who said, “There’s a lack of 
supervision here that we’re looking into (Zapotosky, 2010a). The PGPD may begin with 
improved supervision and enforcement of the existing 20 hour limitation. Another option 
would be to further limit the number of secondary employment hours permitted per week. 
A few comments are necessary regarding secondary employment of police 
officers in Maryland. First, agencies cannot ban secondary employment among officers 
but they can limit it. The Maryland Public Safety Code (Annotated in 2014) states in 
Section 3-103 (b) the following: “A law enforcement agency: (1) may not prohibit 
secondary employment by law enforcement officers; but (2) may adopt reasonable 
regulations that relate to secondary employment by law enforcement officers” (State of 
Maryland, 2014). Second, agencies can be held liable for actions resulting from 
employees’ secondary employment in Maryland. In 2001, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
decided in Lovelace v. Andersen that both law enforcement agencies and private 
employers were liable for officers’ off-duty actions.  
One potential means of reducing on-duty vehicle collisions is changing agency 




primary law enforcement careers. Another avenue for agencies that already restrict 
secondary employment is to demand stricter adherence to existing policies. These may be 
controversial topics because secondary employment presents benefits to police officers 
and law enforcement agencies. Against these benefits must be weighed the costs 
associated with secondary employment. Overall, this study finds that the costs of 
secondary employment in terms of on-duty vehicle collisions are significant in the PGPD.   
On-Duty Collisions and Off-Duty Collisions 
A significant positive relationship was also found between the number of off-duty 
vehicle collisions and the number of on-duty vehicle collisions reported by PGPD patrol 
officers during the same four year period. This positive relationship was the second most 
consistent significant finding across the analyses presented in this study, which suggests 
an underlying propensity towards collision involvement among some PGPD officers. 
This relationship implies improvements in driving safety among the general public, for 
instance among teen drivers, may translate to the law enforcement environment for those 
who ultimately become police officers. On the other hand, it also suggests that officer 
driving training may have the corollary benefit of reducing collisions among off-duty 
officers. Similar to this study, a consistently strong, positive relationship between on- and 
off-duty collisions was also found among patrol officers in eight California agencies by 
Hansen et al. (2015).  
It appears that officers who get in off-duty collisions are also at increased risk of 
on-duty collisions and some PGPD patrol officers have issues with collision involvement 
regardless of context. One potential avenue for reducing on-duty collisions is improving 




screening by agencies should begin with a review of all applicants’ driving records. In 
most states, individuals are allowed to obtain their driver’s license at the age of 16 so 
applicants’ driving records should span at least a 5 year period. Screening can also take 
place during police academy driving training. Some academies allow officers to retake 
areas of driving training courses that they failed—failures that may or may not be 
reported to their employing agencies after academy graduation. Preventing the 
employment of individuals who will become problematic officers will be more effective 
and less costly than later intervention. Those who have been identified as having pre-
employment or academy driving issues and become police officers may need additional 
monitoring and training during their careers to ensure safe vehicle operations. The 
training and other costs to employing agencies must be weighed against potential human 
and financial costs that could result from unsafe driving and collisions.  
Monitoring of unsafe driving behaviors must also take place throughout officers’ 
careers. It is customary for law enforcement agencies to supervise and enforce policies 
regarding on-duty vehicle collisions; however, monitoring collisions that occur while 
officers are off-duty is a far less common practice. This is not to suggest that the idea of 
monitoring and addressing problematic off-duty behaviors is new. A comprehensive 
study of career-ending misconduct in the NYPD over a 2 decade period found that 20 
percent of behaviors that resulted in termination took place while officers were off-duty 
(Fyfe & Kane, 2006; Kane & White, 2013). For several decades, law enforcement 
agencies have monitored and disciplined officers’ off-duty firearm usage in particular. 
For instance, Fyfe (1980a) found 20 percent of police firearm discharges occurred off 




results were found in Philadelphia as well (Fyfe, 1980b). Police departments have been 
advised to define off-duty misconduct in order to reduce risk of litigation as a result of 
those behaviors (Martinelli, 2007).  
Monitoring of off-duty collisions could be accomplished by reviewing officers’ 
driving records on an annual or semi-annual basis or by instituting an agency policy of 
mandatory reporting. Self-reported collision information may be collected and used in a 
timelier manner than records kept by a state department of motor vehicles that may suffer 
from a backlog in data entry. Of course, asking any employee to self-report information 
to their employer that may be used to discipline them later introduces motivation for self-
preservation via noncompliance. On the other hand, official collision data will exclude 
minor and other unreported collisions. Collecting this information is only the 
beginning—it must also be used effectively in order to reduce on-duty collisions.  
Monitoring problematic off-duty officer driving with official police records is 
difficult because officers may be less likely to issue a driving citation to a fellow officer 
than another member of the public in similar circumstances. In turn, driving records for 
off-duty police officers may provide an incomplete picture of negative event 
involvement. The practice of “professional courtesy” makes it difficult to identify 
problematic police drivers using official records. This practice may also give officers the 
impression that they operate under a different set of rules than the driving public. Several 
mechanisms have been used to reduce the issues that may arise when one officer 
investigates another officer. Some law enforcement organizations request the assistance 
of a neighboring or state agency when investigating crashes involving their officers. 




exceeded or red-lights are disregarded may also remove some of the subjectivity in terms 
of officers ticketing other officers. Although agencies including the PGPD have a 
practice of waiving red light tickets that officers received during the course of duty, 
problematic off-duty driving should be recorded in a means identical to that for the 
general public. Citizen complaints are investigated outside of the chain of command in 
the PGPD so complaints may provide notice to agency leaders when officers are reported 
for operating their patrol vehicles off duty. On the other hand, it is doubtful citizens will 
be able to identify PGPD officers operating their personal vehicles. 
Regardless of how they are collected, off-duty collision records should be 
included in agency early intervention systems, which can be used to flag officers with a 
concerning number of off-duty collisions over a period of time. This study suggests that 
even one off-duty collision greatly increases the probability of an on-duty collision 
during the same four year timeframe. For example, the probability of 1 on-duty collision 
was 43.2 percent for officers in 0 off-duty collisions but 67.3 percent for officers in 1 off-
duty collision when all other covariates are held at their mean values. Officers targeted 
for intervention should be provided additional driver training.  
Study Conclusion 
There appears to be a relationship between on-duty collisions and receiving 
citizen complaints. However, this positive relationship was limited to complaints for 
reasons other than excessive force and was not entirely consistent throughout the study. 
Based on the results of this study, agency risk managers and other parties interested in 




Police Department would be well-advised to pay close attention to officers’ secondary 
employment and off-duty crashes.  
The positive relationship between secondary employment and on-duty vehicle 
collisions suggests that further reasonable limitations on the number of hours that officers 
are permitted to work outside the agency may be one means of reducing officer-involved 
collisions in the PGPD. Of course, concerns for officer financial wellbeing must be 
considered in addition to their safety behind the wheel. Closer monitoring of secondary 
employment hours may also be necessary. Increased monitoring of off-duty collisions is 
also suggested to reduce on-duty collisions involving PGPD patrol officers. Officers 
identified as having problematic off-duty driving records should be provided driving 
training. CalPOST found that driver training with driving simulators and emergency 
vehicle operation courses reduced collision involvement (Gustafson, 2009).  
Mechanisms for reducing on-duty vehicle collisions in the PGPD involve changes 
to policies and procedures. These suggested solutions include further limiting the number 
of hours that officers are allowed to work outside the PGPD, closer supervision of 
secondary employment, and increased agency oversight of officers’ off-duty driving—
especially collision involvement. Agencies have often revised their policies to manage 
risks and liabilities (Alpert & Smith, 1994) and to improve officer safety (Alpert & 
Smith, 2008; Schultz, Hudak, & Alpert, 2009). Overall, agency moves towards more 
restrictive policies have been found to reduce officer involvement in negative outcomes 
including deadly force (Fyfe, 1979; Geller & Scott, 1992; Meyer, 1980; Sherman, 1983; 
Sprager & Giacopassi, 1992; Tannenbaum, 1994; Uelmen, 1973) and vehicle pursuits 




In sum, evidence presented herein suggests that more restrictive policies regarding 
secondary employment and off-duty driving may reduce collisions in the PGPD—the 
goal of this study.  
This study began with the question of whether police officers exhibit 
specialization or generalization when committing criminal or deviant acts. Hirschi and 
Gottfredson’s (1994) book The Generality of Deviance includes a chapter by Sorensen 
(1994) devoted to exploring how motor vehicle collisions are related to other negative 
outcomes including crime and deviance. Sorensen (1994) found considerable evidence 
for a relationship between involvement in crashes and other forms of deviance and crime 
but did not explore specialization with respect to officer-involved vehicle collisions 
specifically. The current study explored this topic by examining whether officer 
involvement in deadly force, citizen complaints for excessive force or other reasons, and 
vehicle pursuits increased the probability of on-duty vehicle collisions. The results of this 
research lend partial support to both positions. On one hand, receiving citizen complaints 
for reasons other than excessive force increases the probability of being in vehicle 
collisions. However, this relationship was not always statistically significant and the 
other three independent variables did not demonstrate any predictive value with respect to 
on-duty and at-fault vehicle collisions. More empirical evidence is needed to help 
develop a theory of negative police officer behaviors. Still, based on the work of 
Sorensen (1994) and findings from this study, it appears that collisions among police 
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APPENDIX E: COMPLETE CASE ANALYSES 
 
Table E.1. Logistic regression of undesired events on on-duty collision involvement. 
 
 Any On-Duty Collisions (1 = yes) 
 b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:   
Vehicle Pursuit Frequency       0.078 (0.069) 1.081 
Deadly Force Event Frequency     - 0.312 (0.546) 0.732 
Excessive Force Complaint Frequency       0.075 (0.251) 1.078 
Other Complaint Frequency       0.403 (0.147)** 1.496 
Control Variables:   
Male     - 0.044 (0.423) 0.957 
Age     - 0.035 (0.033) 0.966 
Race-Ethnicity   
     African American     - 0.872 (0.438)* 0.418 
     Hispanic     - 1.010 (0.667) 0.364 
     Other      - 0.694 (0.579) 0.500 
Educational Attainment   
     High School       0.755 (0.593) 2.128 
     2 years or Less of College       0.270 (0.406) 1.310 
     Associate’s Degree     - 0.282 (0.631) 0.755 
In Committed Relationship     - 0.312 (0.414) 0.732 
Have Children       0.465 (0.426) 1.592 
Officer Rank       0.391 (0.498) 1.478 
District   
     2     - 0.265 (0.649) 0.767 
     3       1.107 (0.619) 3.024 
     4     - 0.535 (0.568) 0.586 
     5     - 1.373 (0.806) 0.253 
     6       0.367 (0.831) 1.444 
Prior Law Enforcement Experience     - 0.066 (0.567) 0.936 
Prior Military Experience       0.389 (0.410) 1.476 
Law Enforcement Hours (Weekly)     - 0.046 (0.020)* 0.955 
Other Employment Hours (Weekly)       0.068 (0.026)** 1.070 
Commute Daily (in Minutes)       0.005 (0.005) 1.006 
Off-Duty Collision Frequency       1.287 (0.359)*** 3.623 
Productivity Link Scale     - 0.009 (0.090) 0.991 
Peer Productivity Scale       0.004 (0.084) 1.004 
Officer Productivity Scale     - 0.007 (0.069) 0.993 
Preferred Assignment Scale     - 0.142 (0.151) 0.868 
Routine Events Supervision Scale       0.061 (0.111) 1.063 
Rare Events Supervision Scale       0.080 (0.076) 1.083 
Driving Limitations Scale     - 0.018 (0.092) 0.982 
Other Limitations Scale       0.087 (0.123) 1.090 
Constant       0.014 (2.797) 1.014 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 




Table E.2. Multinomial regression of undesired events on on-duty collision frequency. 
 
 Zero vs. One 
 b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:   
Vehicle Pursuits    - 0.019 (0.102) 0.980 
Deadly Force Events      0.337 (0.555) 1.400 
Excessive Force Complaints    - 0.088 (0.287) 0.916 
Other Complaints - 0.500 (0.162)** 0.607 
Control Variables:   
Male    - 0.223 (0.727) 0.780 
Age    - 0.007 (0.038) 0.993 
Race-Ethnicity   
     African American      1.121 (0.547)* 3.067 
     Hispanic      0.886 (0.838) 2.426 
     Other       0.325 (0.694) 1.384 
Educational Attainment   
     High School    - 0.215 (0.786) 0.808 
     2 years or Less of College    - 0.194 (0.489) 0.823 
     Associate’s Degree      0.679 (0.806) 1.972 
In Committed Relationship    - 0.041 (0.547) 0.960 
Have Children    - 0.321 (0.525) 0.726 
Officer Rank      0.160 (0.551) 1.174 
District   
     2      0.160 (0.784) 1.174 
     3    - 0.601 (0.769) 0.548 
     4      0.729 (0.680) 2.073 
     5      1.279 (0.965) 3.591 
     6    - 0.306 (1.005) 0.737 
Prior Policing Experience      0.795 (0.809) 2.215 
Prior Military Experience    - 0.179 (0.496) 0.836 
Law Enforcement Hours       0.065 (0.028)* 1.067 
Other Employment Hours     - 0.048 (0.030) 0.953 
Daily Commute     - 0.008 (0.006) 0.992 
Off-Duty Collisions     - 1.202 (0.409)** 0.301 
Productivity Links      0.073 (0.106) 1.076 
Peer Productivity     - 0.056 (0.100) 0.945 
Officer Productivity     - 0.023 (0.080) 0.978 
Preferred Assignment       0.060 (0.183) 1.061 
Routine Event Supervision     - 0.012 (0.102) 0.988 
Rare Events Supervision     - 0.005 (0.085) 0.995 
Driving Limitations       0.122 (0.117) 1.130 
Other Limitations     - 0.218 (0.155) 0.804 
Constant    - 0.064 (3.547) 0.938 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 




Table E.3. Multinomial regression of undesired events on on-duty collision frequency. 
 
 Zero vs. Two or More One vs. Two or More 
 b (SE) OR b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:     
Vehicle Pursuits   - 0.158 (0.085) 0.854    - 0.139 (0.109)  0.871 
Deadly Force Events     0.641 (0.619) 1.898      0.304 (0.495)  1.356 
Excessive Force Complaints   - 0.113 (0.313) 0.893    - 0.025 (0.317)  0.975 
Other Complaints   - 0.227 (0.168) 0.797      0.273 (0.141)*  1.314 
Control Variables:     
Male     0.381 (0.771) 1.464 0.604 (0.861)  1.830 
Age     0.104 (0.054)* 1.110 0.112 (0.059)  1.118 
Race-Ethnicity     
     African American     0.561 (0.611) 1.752    - 0.560 (0.702)  0.571 
     Hispanic     1.066 (0.870) 2.903 0.180 (1.037)  1.197 
     Other      1.102 (0.789) 3.011      0.777 (0.868)  2.175 
Educational Attainment     
     High School   - 1.139 (0.817) 0.320    - 0.925 (0.967)  0.397 
     2 years or Less of College   - 0.345 (0.531) 0.708    - 0.151 (0.598)  0.860 
     Associate’s Degree   - 0.584 (0.575) 1.063    - 0.618 (0.997)  0.539 
In Committed Relationship     0.061 (0.827) 1.682      0.561 (0.648)  1.753 
Have Children   - 0.418 (0.570) 0.659    - 0.097 (0.648)  0.908 
Officer Rank   - 1.319 (0.555) 0.268    - 1.479 (0.771)  0.228 
District     
     2     0.751 (0.869) 2.120      0.591 (0.973)  1.806 
     3   - 1.971 (0.790)** 0.139    - 1.370 (0.866)  0.254 
     4     0.526 (0.768) 1.693    - 0.203 (0.853)  0.817 
     5     1.575 (1.089) 4.829      0.296 (1.250)  1.345 
     6   - 0.351 (1.097) 0.704    - 0.046 (1.215)  0.955 
Prior Policing Experience   - 0.512 (0.708) 0.599    - 1.307 (0.887)  0.271 
Prior Military Experience   - 0.809 (0.546) 0.445    - 0.630 (0.613)  0.533 
Law Enforcement Hours      0.029 (0.025) 1.030    - 0.036 (0.030)  0.965 
Other Employment Hours    - 0.102 (0.033)** 0.903    - 0.053 (0.035)  0.948 
Daily Commute    - 0.004 (0.007) 0.996      0.004 (0.007)  1.004 
Off-Duty Collisions   - 1.296 (0.431)** 0.274    - 0.095 (0.399)  0.910 
Productivity Links   - 0.060 (0.117) 0.942    - 0.133 (0.128)  0.876 
Peer Productivity      0.109 (0.110) 1.115      0.166 (0.119)  1.180 
Officer Productivity      0.006 (0.097) 1.006      0.028 (0.106)  1.029 
Preferred Assignment      0.267 (0.206) 1.306      0.207 (0.233)  1.230 
Routine Event Supervision    - 0.157 (0.161) 0.855    - 0.146 (0.178)  0.865 
Rare Events Supervision    - 0.317 (0.144) 0.728    - 0.313 (0.148)  0.732 
Driving Limitations    - 0.160 (0.121) 0.853    - 0.282 (0.143)*  0.754 
Other Limitations      0.028 (0.155) 1.028 0.246 (0.179)  1.278 
Constant     4.601 (3.854) 99.594 4.665 (4.354) 106.203 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 
and odds ratios (OR). ***p ≤ .001 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test).  
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Table E.4. Logistic regression of undesired events on at-fault collision involvement. 
 
 Any At-Fault Collisions (1 = yes) 
 b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:   
Vehicle Pursuit Frequency    0.037 (0.037) 1.038 
Deadly Force Event Frequency    0.599 (0.526) 1.820 
Excessive Force Complaint Frequency  - 0.349 (0.272) 0.705 
Other Complaint Frequency    0.198 (0.115) 1.219 
Control Variables:   
Male  - 0.523 (0.584) 0.593 
Age  - 0.010 (0.036) 0.990 
Race-Ethnicity   
     African American  - 0.512 (0.471) 0.599 
     Hispanic  - 1.884 (0.982) 0.152 
     Other   - 0.094 (0.586) 0.910 
Educational Attainment   
     High School    0.737 (0.645) 2.090 
     2 years or Less of College  - 0.329 (0.443) 0.720 
     Associate’s Degree    0.056 (0.648) 1.058 
In Committed Relationship  - 0.461 (0.440) 0.631 
Have Children    0.298 (0.468) 1.347 
Officer Rank    0.649 (0.563) 1.913 
District   
     2  - 0.269 (0.722) 0.764 
     3    1.448 (0.632)* 4.255 
     4  - 0.131 (0.627) 0.877 
     5  - 0.619 (0.830) 0.538 
     6    0.365 (0.838) 1.441 
Prior Law Enforcement Experience  - 0.716 (0.608) 0.489 
Prior Military Experience    0.252 (0.453) 1.286 
Law Enforcement Hours (Weekly)  - 0.006 (0.018) 0.994 
Other Employment Hours (Weekly)    0.054 (0.025)* 1.056 
Commute Daily (in Minutes)    0.002 (0.005) 1.002 
Off-Duty Collision Frequency    0.583 (0.302)* 1.792 
Productivity Link Scale  - 0.078 (0.099) 0.925 
Peer Productivity Scale    0.001 (0.089) 1.001 
Officer Productivity Scale  - 0.039 (0.073) 0.962 
Preferred Assignment Scale    0.013 (0.169) 1.013 
Routine Events Supervision Scale    0.193 (0.130) 1.213 
Rare Events Supervision Scale    0.102 (0.091) 1.107 
Driving Limitations Scale  - 0.039 (0.105) 0.962 
Other Limitations Scale    0.145 (0.132) 1.157 
Constant  - 3.554 (2.987) 0.029 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 




Table E.5. Multinomial regression of undesired events on at-fault collision frequency.  
 
 Zero vs. One 
 b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:   
Vehicle Pursuits      - 0.045 (0.036) 0.956 
Deadly Force Events      - 0.569 (0.461) 0.566 
Excessive Force Complaints        0.210 (0.259) 1.234 
Other Complaints      - 0.208 (0.110) 0.812 
Control Variables:   
Male        0.688 (0.591) 1.989 
Age      - 0.019 (0.036) 0.981 
Educational Attainment   
     High School      - 0.488 (0.586) 0.614 
     2 years or Less of College        0.391 (0.450) 1.479 
     Associate’s Degree      - 0.084 (0.614) 0.920 
In Committed Relationship        0.001 (0.469) 1.001 
Have Children      - 0.108 (0.453) 0.897 
Officer Rank      - 1.006 (0.582) 0.366 
Prior Military Experience      - 0.269 (0.436) 0.764 
Law Enforcement Hours         0.016 (0.019) 1.016 
Other Employment Hours       - 0.043 (0.025) 0.958 
Daily Commute       - 0.003 (0.005) 0.997 
Off-Duty Collisions       - 0.441 (0.308) 0.644 
Productivity Links        0.051 (0.103) 1.052 
Peer Productivity       - 0.127 (0.062)* 1.068 
Officer Productivity         0.076 (0.074) 1.079 
Preferred Assignment       - 0.094 (0.173) 0.911 
Routine Event Supervision       - 0.306 (0.130)* 0.737 
Rare Events Supervision         0.004 (0.089) 1.004 
Driving Limitations         0.066 (0.098) 1.068 
Other Limitations       - 0.158 (0.133) 0.854 
Constant        5.874 (2.782)    355.757 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 















Table E.6. Multinomial regression of undesired events on at-fault collision frequency. 
 
 Zero vs. Two or More One vs. Two or More 
 b (SE) OR b (SE) OR 
Independent Variables:     
Vehicle Pursuits       0.101 (0.232) 1.106      0.146 (0.234)   1.157 
Deadly Force Events     - 0.597 (0.712) 0.550    - 0.028 (0.615)   0.973 
Excessive Force Complaints       0.518 (0.549) 1.679      0.308 (0.764)   1.361 
Other Complaints       0.146 (0.367) 1.157      0.354 (0.375)   1.425 
Control Variables:     
Male     - 0.250 (1.423) 0.779    - 0.938 (1.476)   0.391 
Age       0.243 (0.126)* 1.275      0.262 (0.129)*   1.300 
Educational Attainment     
     High School       0.355 (1.392) 1.426      0.842 (1.445)    2.322 
     2 years or Less of College       0.714 (1.037) 2.042      0.323 (1.101)   1.381 
     Associate’s Degree     - 1.183 (1.432) 0.833    - 0.099 (1.499)   0.906 
In Committed Relationship       1.860 (0.898)* 6.425      1.859 (0.964)   6.419 
Have Children     - 0.728 (1.086) 0.483    - 0.619 (1.141)   0.538 
Officer Rank       2.057 (1.383) 7.822      3.063 (1.451) 21.381 
Prior Military Experience     - 0.437 (1.086) 0.646    - 0.167 (1.142)   0.846 
Law Enforcement Hours      - 0.009 (0.044) 0.991    - 0.025 (0.046)   0.975 
Other Employment Hours      - 0.069 (0.058) 0.933    - 0.026 (0.061)   0.974 
Daily Commute      - 0.009 (0.011) 0.992    - 0.011 (0.010)   0.994 
Off-Duty Collisions     - 0.684 (0.546) 0.505    - 0.244 (0.561)   0.784 
Productivity Links     - 0.030 (0.173) 0.970    - 0.081 (0.189)   0.922 
Peer Productivity        0.156 (0.147) 1.169      0.283 (0.156)   1.327 
Officer Productivity        0.019 (0.181) 1.019    - 0.057 (0.190)   0.945 
Preferred Assignment        0.104 (0.410) 1.110      0.198 (0.434)   1.219 
Routine Event Supervision        0.235 (0.226) 1.265      0.541 (0.250)   1.717 
Rare Events Supervision      - 0.384 (0.312) 0.681    - 0.388 (0.320)   0.679 
Driving Limitations      - 0.355 (0.261) 0.701    - 0.421 (0.273)   0.656 
Other Limitations        0.089 (0.270) 1.093      0.247 (0.284)   1.280 
Constant     - 0.923 (7.919) 0.398    - 6.797 (8.198)   0.001 
Note. Entries are unstandardized partial regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), 
and odds ratios (OR). ***p ≤ .001 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .05 (two-tailed test).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
